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On The Verge of Photography: Imaging Beyond Representation
is a provocative and bold rethinking of photography in light of  
the digital transformation and its impact on fine art, culture  
and society. Addressing the centrality of the digital image to our  
contemporary life, the fourteen new essays in this collection  
challenge the traditional categories of photographic theory – that  
of representation, evidence, documentation and the archive –  
and offer a fresh approach to its impact on aesthetics, contemporary 
philosophy and the political.  Drawing on the networked human 
condition of embodiment, social-media, and bio-politics, On the 
Verge of Photography offers an invaluable resource for students  
of visual culture, researchers in the field of digital imaging and artists 
working with new media.
Reading this extraordinary book it becomes clear that so much  
of what we knew or thought we knew about photography is  
at one and the same time accurate and obsolete. With digital  
photography the image can no longer be discussed or defined for 
what it is conventionally assumed to be – a distinct visual unit.
This is not a crisis, claim the editors of this timely volume, but  
an opportunity to step away from the representational terminology 
that has over-determined the discourse of photography in order  
to address the image’s actual modes of being and becoming:  
being digitally-born, constantly transmitted, mutated and shared.
When images are“digitally networked” they cannot be isolated  
and viewed as distinct or unique. This book is a must read  
for anyone who shares with the authors collected in it an urge to  
acknowledge the contemporary image as a kind of living organism 
that intervenes in the world we share not only by and through  
the ways we share them.
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7It is a question of extending representation as far as the too  
large and the too small of difference; of adding a hitherto  
unsuspected perspective to representation – in other words,  
inventing theological, scientific and aesthetic techniques  
which allow it to integrate the depth of difference in itself; of 
allowing representation to conquer the obscure; of allowing it  
to include the vanishing of difference which is too small and  
the dismemberment of difference which is too large; of allowing  
it to capture the power of giddiness, intoxication and cruelty, 
and even of death. In short, it is a question of causing a little  
of Dionysus’s blood to flow in the organic veins of Apollo.
 
– Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition.1
Everyone is at once a mouth that sucks on the images and an 
anus that gives the undigested, sucked thing back to the images.
 
– Vilém Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images.2 
This is a world of networked digital images in which massive  
air-conditioned server-farms create real landscapes and where reality 
is found in augmented form on digital screens. Logged into social  
networks, life-caching his/her every move, micro-blogging to the 
Introduction: On the Verge of Photography
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8world, equipped with smartphones, tablets and helmet-mounted 
cameras, the contemporary subject can surf the everyday like a layered 
mash-up made of qr codes and hash-tags as well as sandwiches and 
pavements. It is increasingly hard to say where digital life ends and 
physical life begins as every footstep taken can now be live-streamed 
(on the way to 10,000 steps a day) and each calorie consumed can  
be archived in the cloud where it forms part of an indelible and  
ever-evolving data-shadow perused by security services, marketers  
and lovers. If this multi-layered reality comprising of bits of matter 
and bits of information appears homey and familiar it is in part  
due to the ease with which digital images are so readily translatable 
between different layers of data, code and matter.
The question that animates On the Verge of Photography 
concerns the role played by the photographic image in creating and 
maintaining this contemporary environment, characterised by  
infinite bifurcation between the virtual and the real. What happened 
to the category of the image in the spread and consolidation of  
computerised processes? 
In response to this question it is salutary to remember that until 
not long ago the photographic image seemed on the brink of being 
surpassed by such exciting developments as 3d Cinema, Virtual  
Reality Displays and holographic gaming. However, it now seems 
that it is the humble photographic image, in all its hybridized digital 
forms, that encapsulates the interlacing of physical and algorithmic 
attributes, aesthetic and political forms, which characterise the age 
of information capitalism. It seems that the digital-born image has 
become a hinge between these physical and digital modes of existence, 
combining as it does elements of familiar ocularcentric culture – with 
its trust and reliance on the true-to-life photograph – and algorithmic 
processes that problematise the presumption of an ontological  
connection between images and objects.
Until recently the default position of photography theory was 
that photography is consumed by the eye. But the digital-born image 
presents a strong challenge to this foundation and has provoked 
renewed interest in the nature of photographic representation. Vision 
and representation have occupied theorists of photography since its 
inception, whether these categories have been taken at face value in 
order to celebrate them or their purchase on photographic culture 
has been challenged. Either way, the relationship between vision and 
representation has until recently set the frame for our understanding 
of the photographic. To question photography’s status as a visual  
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9form might thus appear counterintuitive. After all, there are few 
things more apparently obvious than the visual appearances and the  
representational functions we attribute to photographs. 
This is, in part, due to fact that the photographic image in its 
current cultural form cannot be fully accounted for from any position 
that begins by taking for granted what an image is. Accordingly, there 
is no single theory of the image that emerges from On the Verge of 
Photography; neither does it promote any particular methodological 
approach. Rather, it sets out to provoke questions about the  
contem-porary image and to explore different ways of responding 
to these questions. On the Verge of Photography entertains the 
idea that the networked digital image has moved us in important 
respects beyond visual representation. But what might this mean? 
In their contributions to this anthology, some authors respond to 
these questions and problems by embracing the idea that there is or 
should be a “beyond” to representation. Others argue that, despite its 
transformed terrain, representation remains basic to the production, 
dissemination and consumption of images and, indeed, to human life. 
Some pursue critical examinations of novel photographic forms and 
practices. Others take the contemporary condition of networks as the 
object of their theoretical attention. These individual analyses and 
the dialogue that emerges between them will, we hope, serve both to 
widen and to focus theoretical and critical attention on the recent fate 
of photography and its relationship to the networked digital image.
This plurality of methodological approaches marks the moment 
when photography is able to extract itself from dealing only with  
questions of truth, the archive and the index in order to become  
interested in its transformed conditions of production, its own states 
of becoming. One of the consequences of the much lamented loss  
of ontological connection with the real is that the digital-born image 
can now be seen for what it is and not only for what it represents.  
Consider, for instance, that the digital image embodies within it  
notions of instantaneity and simultaneity which are no less integral to 
it than the chronology of before and after is to the representational  
image. In today’s visual regime an image can be uploaded to  
someone’s Facebook stream in the morning, “liked” and tagged at 
various points of the network and by the evening re-emerge as part of 
diverse and varied series, search results and image-sets that have no 
linear connection with the event of the original upload: it is trending 
on twitter, it is siphoned into image mashups, remixed into palimpsets 
and aggregated with other bits of information to form new images, 
I n t r o d u c t i o n
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texts and sounds, all of the time drawing from an infinite stream  
of computer data. Just as the analogue image’s relationship to time 
could be said to embody the linear chronology of a living organism, 
instantaneity and simultaneity are not only the technical qualities  
of the digital image, they are also expressions of the mental and  
spiritual reality of anyone who is hooked to the network through it.
Once uploaded online, an image can appear anywhere there is a 
networked device and it can do so simultaneously across the entire 
globe. The digital networked image, it could be said, moves along 
two – rather than one – temporal axes. It moves along the axis of 
chronological time in which the image maintains connection with an 
event in the past, and it also moves along another axis on which the 
instantaneity of its dissemination takes precedence. Here an image is 
not an archive of past events but a force that shapes the present. For 
instance, in news reporting, photography can no longer be reduced 
to the documentation of political events as it has become a principal 
actor in the unfolding of political situations. In this globalised context, 
there are more images produced and disseminated than ever before, 
but today we are less sure than ever of what we mean when we talk 
about an image and what an image is capable of doing.
There is much more going on with this digital-born image than 
meets the eye. If we only talk about the event-image in terms of  
visual appearances, we risk missing the infinitesimal complexity of  
the underpinning algorithms which account for the fractal-like  
ability of the digital image to be repeated, mutated through repetition  
and spread through various points of the network, all the time  
articulating its internal consistency on the one hand and the  
mutability and differentiation of each instance on the other. Within 
the digital-born image the logic of representation is augmented by the 
logic of self-duplication and mutation. It is as if the photograph is not 
the mirror of the world any more, but is itself placed between two 
mirrors triggering an endless circulation of reflections. And while the 
logic of representation is based on the guiding principle of truth as 
correspondence, the logic of mise-en-abyme suggests an economy of 
repetition that does not depend on correspondence for its agency. This 
double articulation of the digital image as a representational image 
and as a network event, suggests that the digital-born image is a good 
entry point into understanding the mysteries of the online organism.
Perhaps, then, photography is an orifice of the network. But as 
long as it is considered from an ocularcentric perspective we stand to 
miss crucial factors that shape its meanings and use. If we cannot  
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understand these forces in conventionally framed visual terms, then 
what does this mean for any representational uses to which the image 
might be put? The image is no longer, or no longer only, the passive 
register of past events. It is active, it has an agency that relates to 
and has an effect on embodied existence. It comes before and has 
effects on the real, which resonates with Foucault’s understanding of 
language as having had, in different times, different relationships to 
representation: ‘[Language] prophesied the future, not merely  
announcing what was going to occur, but contributing to its actual 
event, carrying men along with it and thus weaving itself into the 
fabric of fate.’ 3 Without wanting to reduce the image to language 
or discourse, or to take yet another linguistic turn, the condition of 
the contemporary image does seem to be in the process of taking on 
something like the force and agency that Foucault projects. Language 
was a force in the world which became subsumed into representation. 
Photography was born from the womb of representation and has 
somehow managed to leave this behind.
What can the digital-born image tell us about the categories 
and concepts previously used to define photography, like the archive, 
truth, memory and the temporalities of the image as an index of the 
past? What can the contemporary image tell us about these cherished 
categories of photography theory, which no longer seem to describe it 
adequately? If there is one thing to grasp in the face of the digital-born 
image, it is that we don’t know what an image is any more. Rather 
than dwelling on this as a crisis, one might ask what can we do with 
this insight?
A possible answer that emerges from the pages of this volume  
is that multiplicity is one of the conditions of possibility and a  
determining factor of the digital image and our embodied relation to 
it. Far from meaning that photography is dead (as many have claimed)  
important aspects of photography are only now coming into their own. 
Photography, understood as multiplicity, might just be on the verge 
of releasing itself from the burden of representation. By foreground-
ing multiplicity as the determining condition of the digital image, we 
would also like to suggest the possibility of multiple interpretations 
of this image that cannot rest on the values of representation. This 
digital-born, networked and algorithmically constituted photographic 
image suggests the need for a complete revaluation of its values in 
order to give it a metaphysics becoming of it.
In contrast to earlier forms of photography, the digital-born  
image seems defined by how it exceeds familiar terms of visual  
I n t r o d u c t i o n
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experience. What one sees as an image on-screen, for instance, is only 
conventionally presented to appear the same as the analogue  
photograph: it is actually a skeuomorph. In reality this image is a 
variegated field of data that is not bound to obey the material and 
visual logic often taken to be defining of photography. Conventional 
understandings of the photograph have tended to concentrate  
on the material characteristics of film and print, forms for which  
what happens at their edge has great importance. For example,  
photography’s distinctive manner of excising a moment of time and  
of framing particular spaces can be said to depend upon the fact  
that what it shows is structured by what it excludes. Here, what  
is left out of the frame – and the implied sense of a past and a future 
pertaining to the moment depicted – give significance to what is  
visible in the image. These factors have, for instance, been understood  
in the art historical terms of perspective, composition and artistic  
intention, and also psychoanalytically, in terms of the uncanny  
affects that the camera’s simultaneous operations of stilling time and  
cropping space might produce.
On the face of things, on-screen images might seem to obey the 
same rules as the analogue photograph and to depend upon similar 
formal constraints for their effects and meanings. But despite this 
visual similarity the modes of space and time that we habitually  
identify in the digital image are very different. On-screen, the  
evocative edges of the photograph – what it shows, cuts off, distorts 
and thus presents to vision – become arbitrary. Previously it was  
assumed that the edges, the framing and the cropping of the photo-
graphic image were necessary. However, at the level of code, these 
visible edges are actually continuous with everything else on-and-
off-screen. What we are calling the verge of the image is not, in its 
networked digital form, physically or compositionally marginal.  
Rather, the verge of the digital image entails the dissolution of defining 
distinctions between form and content, centre and periphery, image 
and matter that constituted many of photography’s representational 
strategies. The processing and algorithmic chains of coding that bring 
images to our screens are always potentially verging on becoming 
something else and always establishing temporary and labile relation-
ships with what they verge upon. These facts register in one’s experi-
ence of particular images but they also highlight questions about what 
the contemporary image as such is in the process of becoming. 
This is an avenue of thought that foregrounds untamed and 
unruly elements in the image. It challenges notions of cause and effect 
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and ultimately remains closed to forms of analysis that seek to resolve 
the image in clear and precise terms. There is a whole critical tradition 
that inflected photographic representation with embodiment. Gender 
critiques and queer critiques, accounts of photography and desire have 
sought to render representation in the messy terms of bodily processes. 
But one must also come to terms with the fact that the digital image 
does not travel along the clean passages that convention might have us 
believe. Rather than perpetuating the positivist metaphorics of  
interference-free fiber-optic cables, the passage of information at the 
speed of light and screens as illuminative epistemological portals we 
would like to borrow from George Bataille in order to think of the 
screen-interface as a solar anus, as a ‘filthy parody of the torrid and 
blinding sun’ and to collapse “writing with light” into the expanded 
notion of the digital image as a black hole figured by this anus.4  
One might then ask, with Nietzsche: ‘[…] how well disposed would 
you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more 
fervently than this ultimate, eternal confirmation and seal?’ 5 
 By naming instantaneity, simultaneity and multiplicity as the 
forces that shape the field of the digital-born image, we are driven  
to make two observations on the subject of the detachment of  
photography from notions of visual representation as a guarantor  
of truth and as an archive of time. The first is that the time of the 
digital image is not necessarily chronological, rather it is more  
resonant with what Nietzsche named “the eternal return” and  
Heidegger refashioned as “the ecstatic temporality of the ‘is’”.6 The 
second observation concerns the understanding of the technologically 
produced image as precisely the site at which contemporary  
subjectivity is being formed and deformed. 
Therefore it is tempting, somewhat counter-intuitively, to 
speculate that photography has not yet really arrived but is only now 
on the verge of fulfilling its promise. But one might also risk saying 
that the meaning of being on the verge of photography, in the wake  
of the digital-born image, is that we are on the verge of becoming  
like images. What would this mean? Would it be such a bad thing?  
Far from being the untrustworthy vehicle of manipulation and 
untruth, the digital image is actually a very accurate image, not, in  
the first instance, of an external reality but of the ways in which we as  
humans embody the network and how the network is intertwined 
with our embodiment. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n
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Figure 1. The missing data appear as black stripes in this natural-colour image of Baltimore, 
Maryland, from May 20, 2009. (nasa Earth Observatory image by Robert Simmon, 
based on Landsat 7 data.)
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Since 1972 a continuous flow of multispectral information has 
streamed from 705 km above the earth’s surface to ground stations 
throughout the world, transmitting image-data of landmasses from 
an orbital pass made every 16 days. The synoptic coverage of the 
Landsat earth-observation satellite program has produced the most 
comprehensive archive of the topological dynamics of our planet for 
more than 33 years. However on May 31 2003 the raw data captured 
and relayed disclosed a remarkable feature when decoded. In place 
of the usual full-colour visuals that would typically emerge upon 
processing, images forcefully striated with diagonal slashes appeared 
(fig. 1).
A sensor on the Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus, 
the world’s the most accurately calibrated earth-observing satellite, 
had failed resulting in a 22% loss in overall data. Since that time all 
Landsat 7 images are traversed by a diagonal pattern of dropout.1 
Atmospheric Correction 
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The malfunction of the Scan Line Corrector, which ‘removes the 
zigzag motion of the imaging field,’ had introduced a new visual 
characteristic.2 While the Landsat 7 continues to acquire raw data 
from terrestrial scenes, up to a quarter of this image information 
has to be retroactively filled-in with data originating from other 
similar scans. Producing, in effect, a hybrid in which data gleaned 
from different temporalities is interlaced to create the semblance of a 
continuous image. ‘To fulfil the expectations of the user community 
for full coverage single scenes, data from multiple acquisitions  
are being merged to resolve the slc-off data gaps.’ 3 This reparative 
procedure, or what I prefer to call “atmospheric-correction” in 
a conceptual nod to another common method of satellite image 
enhancement is, by its very nature, an act of technical subterfuge,  
but one not directed towards sabotaging history. On the contrary,  
its motivation is recuperation and repair. Filling in the gaps in  
one Landsat etm+ image with data assembled from another 
scan taken sometimes weeks later creates an abstract electronic 
representation that radically re-calibrates the temporal and visual 
contiguity of the image-event, and calls its indexicality – its ability 
to account directly for the topological history out of which it arose 
– into question. As such it also raises certain related philosophic 
provocations. The diagonal gaps in the uncorrected Landsat 7 imagery 
are literally “placeholders” for receiving incoming data from the 
future. The failure of the slc, in producing a pattern of voided space, 
registers, by default, the virtuality of atmospheric events yet-to-
come. Gaps in a satellite image taken on 9 February 2011 are thus 
an inducement to a future that will ultimately feed 25 February 2011 
back into the system as its digital doppelganger (fig. 2a/2b).
Brian Massumi has suggested that preemption acts not to inhibit 
a future event from taking place, as per its conventional military 
formulation, but rather to bring the future into the present as an 
effect. ‘Preemption does not prevent, it effects. It induces the event, in 
effect. Rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the 
future, preemption brings the future into the present.’ 4 Unlike Jean 
Baudrillard’s thesis of simulation in which media systems over-encode 
the real to the extent that they end up supplanting it, preemption 
doesn’t necessarily annul the present, instead it strives to “overlay” 
the future onto the present as a perceptual event. The example that 
Massumi turns to is the current system of spectral warning codes 
used in the United States to alert its citizens to imminent danger and
potential threats. The receptor body of the American public is so 
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attuned to living in a permanent state of code-red anxiety that they 
experience the fear of imminent danger as if it has already happened. 
The dread streaming from the future is internalised within the space 
of the here and now and thus experienced as an actuality in the 
present (before anything has happened or will happen). The logic 
of this transaction between the future and the present does seem to 
hinge upon confidence in what the future might hold as a likely event. 
When error-correction is built into a digital processing system it is 
with the understanding that the system is governed by a probability 
function that certain events will repeatedly come into being. While 
it would be misleading to suggest that the black zigzags bring 
about the “felt-effects” of the future-anterior, it is useful to refract 
Massumi’s conceptualisation of preemption (as that which induces 
the future in the present) through the post-processing regime of 
Landsat 7 etm+ imagery. The very presence of dropout in the images 
operates as a kind of latency that gestures towards the retroactive 
re-potentialisation of the present by way of the future. The capacity 
for images to be read against the grain of representation is a condition 
that is available to all photographic materials, but it is made explicit 
when images are composited out of multiple, different on-the-ground 
realities. Although the image or satellite-scanning event must be 
retroactively recomposed to create a specular whole, the preemptive 
Figure 2a – 9 Feb 2011 image/Figure 2b – 25 Feb 2011, filled with image-analysis. 
Scaramuzza, et al (2004) at Yale University developed a technique to fill gaps in one 
scene with data from another Landsat scene.
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dimensions of this corrective are not bound to the same program (the 
desire for cohesion) but cut across the smooth plane of visuality to 
expose, or at the very least trouble, the inherent fiction of the image. 
Satellite data (like all digital information) exists firstly as 
binary code and requires several stages of processing before it can 
recompose itself into a comprehensible image. Because the processing 
of raw data gleaned from remote vision technologies is so complex 
and lacking in agreed-upon best practices a whole new industry 
assigned with error-correcting its image-data has emerged; notably 
organised around a distinction between what is seen by machines 
and how something is processed so that it can be seen by humans. 
What is clear with regards to the Landsat 7 imagery is the extent of 
uncertainty that might be present when algorithmic tools are tasked 
with turning information drawn from different sources into a coherent 
representational schema or image. While atmospheric-correction 
is generally designed to remove effects that obscure the surface 
properties of satellite images such as reflectance, in the case of the 
flawed Landsat 7 sensor, it would seem that its entire archive of raw 
scans are equally available for use as algorithmic correctives should 
pixel attributes align themselves in a relationship of relative symmetry 
between two discrete image-events.5 At the time of this writing, 
I’m not entirely sure how the decision to match and interlace two 
different images is technically arrived at (whether this is determined 
by on-the-ground weather conditions or via random sampling of 
pixels), but we can already see how this act of data-merging across 
time and space might prove problematic should the image be called to 
testify within a legal context given the law’s need for unadulterated 
evidence. Even those agencies offering post-processing solutions 
recognise the compromised nature of such a corrected satellite image 
and make the source of it’s retroactive fix available by providing 
metadata in the form of a bit mask that details the change in the 
original value of a pixel. ‘In all cases, a binary bit mask is provided 
so that the user can determine where the data for any given pixel 
originated.’ 6 However this disclosure doesn’t mean that their pixelated 
merger is such that relations can be recoded with impunity. But in 
making legible the disjunction between temporalities and events we 
can start to read a micro-politics back into the processing of pixels. 
By politics here, I mean quite simply a projection into the future 
that imagines a different version of events – new aesthetic ideas – to 
that of the present. The binary bit mask, in returning singularity to 
each pixel, effectively unmasks the fallacy of certainty that scientific 
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images often carry, reminding us that the present (9 February 2011) 
can’t seamlessly slip into the future (25 February 2011) as a merely a 
difference in degree organised by the time of month, but should be 
understood as inaugurating a difference in kind between two different 
atmospheric image-events and thus two competing versions of history. 
‘This is why’, writes Elizabeth Grosz, ‘the question of history remains 
a volatile one, not simply tied to getting the facts of the past sorted 
out and agreed on. It is about the production of conceivable futures, 
the future understood not as that which is simply constituted in the 
present, but rather, as what diverges from the present.’ 7
Politics enters into the visual field not simply at the level of 
representation – the content displayed in the image – but at the 
structural level of its information acquisition, processing, and 
transmission; at the moment when pure data is captured by sensors, 
transformed into binary code, assigned pixel values, algorithmically 
adjusted, composited to produce a digital image, saved in a 
standardised file format, and transmitted to recombine with others 
circuits of technical and social assembly. This is what I am calling the 
micro-politics of [image] processing. All the points of contact between 
the various networks of information transfer, translation, and 
transmission that are also points of potential transformation (whether 
we view this as antagonistic or productive to the overall functioning 
of the system) that allow difference and thus politics to enter.8 Politics 
always operates in the gaps – between coding and recoding – whereas 
revolution disrupts the fantasy of specular wholeness brought about 
by algorithmic correctives. 
Gilles Deleuze has argued that it is only the ‘metamorphosis 
or redistribution of singularities that forms a history’ and that 
‘each combination and each distribution is an event.’ 9 Transposing 
this provocation to the digital event suggests that each juncture of 
information processing, from data capture through to conversion 
and signal relay, is itself characterised by a set of singularities 
that express conditions attached to that event, which in turn bear 
upon problematics specific to their manner of dispensation. This 
is the political dimension of the processing event. The question of 
politics, following Deleuze, arises out of the problem of information 
processing, and these problems are themselves “enveloped” in the 
question of the political as their enabling condition. ‘Just as solutions 
do not suppress problems, but on the contrary discover in them 
the subsisting conditions without which they would have no sense, 
answers do not at all suppress, nor do they saturate, the question, 
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which persists in all answers.’ 10 While the problem of the damaged 
sensor found its practical solution in atmospheric correction (filling 
in the gaps), the solution opens up a conceptual breach that allows 
me to reflect upon the micro-politics of algorithmic processing vis 
à vis machine-made images – specifically remote sensing satellite 
images. To extend Deleuze’s provocation to digital processing more 
generally, one could say that although the operative modality of such 
processing is considered to be a problem of calculation (between ones 
and zeros), “processing” is not in and of itself a problem requiring 
our remedial intercession. Rather, our task is that of “problematizing 
human events” which in the case of the faulty Landsat 7 sensor came 
into being through the transmissional regimes of data processing and 
the networks in which such data is made to circulate as an expression 
of specific terrestrial events.11
Satellite image-analysis has, as we know, produced discourses 
that have been powerfully influential in shaping the contours of the 
post-9/11 landscape (perhaps most notably with un Security Council 
Resolution 1441 that led to the invasion of Iraq) and yet they have 
no actual stand-alone legal traction, in large part because they are 
not subject to any standardised methods of data processing. The 
uneven treatment of raw satellite data, the algorithmic complexities 
associated with transforming this coded material into images, and 
the widespread conviction that such non-human modes of sensing can 
provide unambiguous representations of conditions on the ground 
(in spite of their quasi and contested legal status) positions satellite 
imagery as paradigmatic to a discussion that aims to locate the 
political within processing. Many theorists have argued that the new 
perceptual modalities facilitated by computational modes of seeing, 
from satellite and drone vision to the geophysics of ground-sounding, 
have so thoroughly abstracted vision that images can no longer 
guarantee the ‘position of an observer in a real, optically perceived 
world’ with the consequence that the conduits of information transfer 
no longer require the human as their privileged point of reference.12 
This argument can, in part, be traced to much earlier developments 
in the industrialisation of vision such as the discovery of X-rays, in 
which emissions could pass through the atmosphere and pierce the 
body to generate shadowy photographic tracings from at a distance.13 
Referred to as “ghost pictures” because of the mysterious agency that 
transforms solid forms into ethereal image-matter, the X-ray was the 
harbinger of a new imaging regime – what film theorist Akira Mizuta 
Lippit has called a radical form of a-visuality – in which technologies 
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of remote sensing transgress the physical thresholds of an optically 
available world.14 Digital images are also increasingly manufactured 
by machines to be read and interpreted exclusively by other machines. 
The proliferation of cctv data is a case in point as the sheer 
magnitude of image-capture has necessitated the outsourcing of its 
low-level image-analytics to other automated scanning processes.  
This substitution of the human traditions of seeing by technical 
machines is rendered even more complicated when images are the 
consequence of elaborate non-visual techniques of observation 
requiring multiple algorithmic interventions before their data can be 
convincingly reconstituted into a unified pictorial field. Something 
that becomes all the more important when these visuals are mobilised 
as indexical “truth claims” that are called into evidence or rallied in 
support of statements that provoke action in and on the world. 
Is seeing, when derived from numeric code freed from any 
indexical obligations, able to account convincingly for the histories 
out of which it developed?15 Even though photographs resulting 
from satellite technology have already entered into public forums as 
corroborating evidence (most notably in the case of Colin Powell’s 
image-analytics for the un Security Council in February 2003 and 
in the 1995 documentation of mass graves at Srebrenica), their legal 
admissibility as stand-alone evidence has yet to be achieved. Until 
such time that the error-margin of satellite technology is proved to 
be virtually infallible, satellite images can, for the present, only play 
a supporting role in courts of law. However this has not diminished 
their use as a regulatory mechanism or compliance tool.16 It is the lack 
of agreed-upon protocols governing the various stages of processing 
from the recording of raw satellite data, its transmission to a ground 
station, and its reassembly back into an image-event that have 
hindered its legal acceptance. In a recent conversation I had with Dr. 
Ray Purdy, a legal scholar who researches satellites and the law at 
University College London, he made the point that although codes 
of practice have been developed by the Home Office for digital speed 
cameras, at present there are no national or international agreed-upon 
best practices for the processing and handling of satellite images that 
would enable such computer-generated images to act as stand-alone 
evidence: 
A court will be particularly concerned that any image has 
not been processed or altered in a misleading manner. They 
will require further evidence that the satellite photograph 
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Figure 3. The missing data appear as black stripes in this natural-colour image of Southwest 
Ontario, Canada from May 25, 2009. (usgs image based on L7 etm + slc-off.)
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Figure 4. Detail. 
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came from the original data and had not been mistakenly 
or maliciously changed in a way that could affect its probity. 
However the processing of a satellite image in practice is 
dependant very much on what the image is intended to show. 
Different interpretations by different operators can result 
in different conclusions in practice (objects can be removed, 
positions altered and different colours used).17
 
In order for a digital image to have any legal traction as evidence, 
approved procedures that guarantee the security of image-data (chain 
of custody) and standardise its processing from code to pixels (audit 
trails) are required to secure its legal determination as evidence. Given 
this predicament, should the stability and integrity of information 
transfer therefore be held accountable to an originary event, or does 
the very condition of a highly deregulated commercial satellite market 
combined with post-processing vagaries render the truth claims of 
satellite imagery suspect at best? Certainly the long-standing view of 
the photographic image as objectively congruent with a given external 
reality still holds within many contemporary discourses, including the 
juridical, even if it fails to convince within critical photo studies. The 
point is not to rehearse the contestation of such truth claims, a debate 
that is already fully worked out, but to reflect upon the provocations 
that new modes of technical witnessing raise as specifically ethical 
imperatives for contemporary image-taking/making practices.18
In the case of earth-observation systems directed towards 
uncovering human rights abuses or monitoring conflict (see the recent 
Amnesty International report on destruction in Aleppo, Syria, July-
August 2012 or the Eyes on Darfur project in western Sudan), one 
might ask whether the algorithmic coding of the terrestrial event can 
carry any traces of the intensity or violence out of which it emerged? 
Or is computation evacuated of all political significance until it is 
recoded and reassembled into an image and narrated, typically by an 
expert? In my ongoing research on the material witness I have looked 
at media artefacts, which still manage to archive trace-evidence of the 
violent events that produced them. These have, to-date, been analogue 
entities whose material composition lends itself to chemical or 
physical alteration and with it the capacity to read history back out of 
matter.19 The digital, by contrast, seems immune to such ontological 
contamination, as any incoming information is subject to immediate 
recalculation producing a new value – a difference of degree – but 
not a difference in kind.20 The challenge is thus to relocate aspects of 
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this broader project (material as witness) within the domain of the 
digital and its coding processes, which must in turn presuppose a new 
conception of materiality derived out of calculation and measurement: 
a provocation for thinking materiality differently, for thinking the 
digital analogically, that the discussion at hand only initiates.21
The question remains: to what extent are digital processes 
immanent to history and thus able to narrate the particularities of 
events that enter the circuitry of technical systems as data and exit as 
images? How might we begin to understand the ways in which coding 
practices, by virtue of their deep embeddedness in a numerical milieu 
(which consigns their operations to a sphere of relative invisibility 
to humans), are also deeply implicated in shaping the kinds of 
representations that ultimately emerge and with them decisions to 
act in and on the world? To begin to answer this question we need to 
work back – forensically – through all the nodes and points of data 
capture, conversion and recompression, including their transmissional 
relays with other machinic assemblies. This is what I have begun to 
do with my analysis of satellite image processing. In resisting the 
natural tendency to focus exclusively on higher-level image outputs 
and shifting my attention to the handling of metadata (fixing the 
phenomena of zigzag) I can begin to track the ways in which different 
modes of processing intensify connections between data and events. 
In the mid-twentieth century the conviction that information 
could circulate independently of its material substrates and be 
transmitted without variation between different mediums became 
pivotal to a new understanding of data as merely a signal passed 
between nodal points in a channel.22 This definition of information 
as entirely abstracted, without signifying connotation, was 
developed by Claude Shannon in his 1948 thesis The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication when he was a young researcher at 
Bell Laboratories.23 Shannon defined information as a “probability 
function” with no dimensions, no materiality and no necessary 
connection with meaning. If according to Shannon no message is 
ever sent, and what is transmitted is only a signal or placeholder for a 
message, then meaning is deferred to a secondary act of signification 
that requires the signal’s interface with an external interpretative 
apparatus that can decode its transmissional regimes and restore its 
signifying content. I have tried to argue for a distributed account of 
the political that relocates a form of contingent intelligibility within 
signal processing itself. Ultimately the event of vision “transpires” out 
an entangled performance between many different kinds of machinic 
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processes, whether these are analogue or digital in nature, social, 
technical, or political systems, human or non-human entities,  
organic or non-organic matter. So while I do not necessarily  
disagree with Shannon, in the sense that moments when information 
crosses-over from one system to another do not result in explicit 
rhetorical signification, nor are these nodes of information transfer 
entirely devoid of any potential connotation. Just as new photographic 
theories have parted with Roland Barthes’s forceful account of 
indexicality in suggesting that, at best, the image can attest to an 
event of some kind having taken place – a camera was present on the 
scene – without assigning a single immutable reading to the image-
event pictured, one can actually harvest a great deal of information 
from the various stages of digital processing especially at the level of 
metadata. This information can, in turn, be productively recoupled 
to an external matrix of events and may even help to redefine our 
understanding of them. For it is only at the thresholds of information 
transfer and transmission that certain relations begin to become 
suggestive and conditional histories start to gain a certain legibility.24
There are of course many other forms of satellite image-fixes 
that I could have drawn upon to make similar points such as ortho-
rectification, which adjusts distortion or false-colouration and is used 
to highlight and contrast vegetative features. However the faulty 
sensor and algorithmic post-processing of Landsat 7 etm+ images 
offers a singularly useful example to explore how the various stages 
of processing are themselves active agents in shaping the variable 
contours of the image-event. If satellite systems and remote imaging 
machines are conceptualised merely as delivery systems for data 
we loose an opportunity to think about the ways in which such 
technologies are conditioned by and conditional to the specificities of 
history: as both capable of making history and becoming a condition 
for producing new histories. ‘The future – that field to which all ethics 
and politics is directed insofar as they are attempts at amelioration 
of the past and present – is the condition and very mode of present 
political, ethical and legal action and effectivity.’ 25 Examining the 
data flows and intensities between machinic processes enables us to 
redistribute the narrative terrain in which a given image might have 
settled, an activity that gives rise to new questions and also new 
problems – and perhaps even a new conception of politics that emerges 
out of gaps.
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‘It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards’
– Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What 
Alice Found There
Introduction: Through the Rabbit Hole
Digital-born photography can be seen as both an indicator and 
a catalyst of a virtual and incorporeal visuality that constitutes an 
alternative to the perspectival, oculocentric and linear visual schemas 
inherited from the renaissance.1 This new visual regime disposes 
with the mono-centred grid of Brunelleschi’s perspective in favour 
of a grid of fibre-optic cables, wi-fi transmitters, retina displays and 
electric power wires.2 Visual culture has now entered a phase in which 
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computers and not humans are the ones who process, sort, store, 
archive and distribute images.3 When computers look at photographs 
they do not see aunt Helena, a sunset or a birthday cake with 
candles. Here a photograph is calculable information, not different 
from other bits of calculable information that we quaintly refer to 
as songs, films and books. In other words, digital-born photography 
is now part of the infectious, ubiquitous, seductive and addictive 
networked environment that underpins not only our interactions with 
computers but also the way individuals reach out to each-other via 
social networks, navigate through the city in a way that resembles 
surfing the web with a smartphone (from one wi-fi point to the next), 
decide where to go, what to consume and what to do by imperceptibly 
drawing from a layer of computational, algorithmic, remotely stored 
and processed information. The availability of this layer of screen-
based information determines to large extent each individual’s reach 
into the world and her/his ability to realise plans and projects.4
Out of Time
An image on a computer might look like a photograph and this 
resemblance can prompt discussions about the meaning of the 
image in the spirit of the Saussureian science of signs. However such 
semiological considerations are unhelpful as they usually lead to 
thinking about the image as signifier, coded message or representation 
and leave some questions unanswered – for instance: what can the 
digital image tell us about the network, and what is its relationship 
to time. It is perhaps more constructive to consider the digital image 
as a layer of ubiquitous information that continually combines and 
recombines figures, texts, glitches and numbers by passing electronic 
signals between the nodal points of the internetwork; constructing 
cells, building new connections and creating proliferating, mimetic 
surfaces. The time of the digital image is not the linear, chronological 
time of the photographic archive, but something much more fractal, 
simultaneous and recursive.5 Multiplicity and instantaneity are 
now part of the digital image no less than the ability to order and 
demarcate historical time was part of the analogue photograph.6
Consider for instance that once uploaded to a computer and  
attached to the network, an image is not constrained to a single  
physical location but is able to move almost instantaneously from 
one place to another or appear simultaneously in several places at 
once. Within each contemporaneous context this blob of data forms a 
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temporary unity with other images, with varied and discontinuous ex-
periential outcomes. Some instances of the image form “information 
spaces” that contribute to setting up narrative continuity.7 In some of 
these narrations the image might enter a sequence with other images 
and form a series, yet in other instances the image might fail to  
link-up or proceed to connect with an entirely different series. It is  
not only the case that photography is more-than-visual since  
becoming digital and networked, but also that the visuality of digital  
photography is augmented by the resonance of this instantaneous 
transformation – by the ability to affect and be affected, by the 
unpredictable diversity and simultaneity of the network. A digital 
image might be directly linked to a time and place in the past, or it 
can be synthetic, constructed within the bowels of the network purely 
through computation; but in any case it is also the product of the 
duplications, variations, transformations, and calculations which are 
part of the algorithmic and coded structure of the network.8 As digital 
images form series, continuities and assemblages they enter into  
relationships with other images, processes, machines and symbols, 
and in each instance material connections are formed that create  
concrete social realities. That the digital image is not meaningless is 
evident, but it is also evident that it cannot be “read” or “unpacked” 
with the tools of visual analysis because semiology and representa-
tion are unable to follow the narrative diversity in which meaningful 
sequences are not pre-given but develop out of logical statements, 
relational conditions, coded transformations and permutations that 
characterise encoded landscapes.9
Thinking Inside the Box
The world-view that asserted the superiority of the representational 
model persisted more or less unperturbed until the beginning of the 
20th century, when this image of the universe was challenged, or rather 
demolished by the development of quantum theory. Suddenly the 
deterministic paradigm was flipped on its head; gone was the rational 
clock model, and the universe turned out to be unpredictable and 
chaotic, and every clock was to some extent a nebulous, indeterminate 
and amorphous cloud. This discovery was made by physicists studying 
electrons, photons and other quantum entities, but their findings had 
consequences that reached far beyond the sub-atomic level. As Heinz 
Pagels said in his book The Cosmic Code:
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There is no meaning to the objective existence of an electron 
at some point in space, for example at one of the two holes, 
independent of actual observation. The electron seems to spring 
into existence as a real object only when we observe it[…] 
reality is in part created by the observer.10
For Vilém Flusser, the discovery of quantum physics meant that the 
old categories of matter and form were found wanting. Instead of 
the centralised logic of representation that emanates from the optical 
nerve towards the outer limits of space, he proposed to think of matter 
as made of layers, and not governed by a single set of laws: 
“matter” now looks very much like a series of Russian dolls, 
one containing the others. The biggest doll is astronomical 
(Einsteinian), it contains the molecular doll (Newtonian), which 
contains the atomic doll (where mass and energy merge), which 
again contains the nuclear doll (where causality abdicates in 
favour of statistics), which again contains the particle doll 
(which poses curious problems of symmetry) and the smallest 
doll is the quark doll (where it is difficult, even meaningless, to 
distinguish between phenomenon and mathematical symbol).11
For the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, the repercussions of quantum 
physics were so shocking that he devised the thought experiment that 
became known as “Schrödinger’s cat”. Nowhere is the strangeness 
and outwordliness of quantum physics better demonstrated than in 
the famous exercise that involves a certain cat, a deadly device that 
can be triggered by a single particle, and a particle generator. What is 
even more remarkable is that this experiment captures something of 
the innate ambiguity of the photographic image as it travels between 
the layers of matter. This is because Schrödinger’s cat suggests a  
new regime of the image, one in which the image is not a placeholder 
for a linear narrative but the visual manifestation of the difference 
between narratives.
The experiment places a cat inside a sealed room, isolated from 
all possibility of outside interference. Inside the room there is a light 
source that emits a single photon which passes through a half-silvered 
mirror. When the photon hits the mirror its reflection is split into two. 
The photon has a 50% chance of going through the mirror and hitting 
the wall and a 50% chance of being reflected down onto the light 
sensitive cell. Under normal circumstances, if the photo-cell registers a 
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beam of light it records it as an image, however in this experiment the 
wave-function of the photon triggers the photo-cell to smash a phial 
of cyanide which kills the cat.12 If on the other hand the photon passes 
through the mirror without being reflected, then the photo-cell does 
not register an exposure and the cat is saved.
Now, for someone who is witnessing the event from inside the 
sealed room, (presumably wearing full protective gear against the 
deadly cyanide fumes), once the photon is fired the cat will be either 
dead or alive as we would expect. However – and this is the crux of 
the experiment – for an observer who is outside the room, the position 
of the photon is undetermined and consequentially the cat is both 
dead and alive at the same time. According to classical quantum 
physics (the so-called Copenhagen interpretation), when the particle 
is not being observed it does not behave like a particle at all but 
like a mixture of waves which represent the various probabilities of 
finding the particle somewhere within the box.13 However, when an 
observer is making a measurement, the act of measuring itself forces 
the quantum entity to choose one or another of these states. The 
curious and disturbing conclusion is that for each of the observers the 
factual reality of the experiment is different: for the observer inside 
the box the cat is either dead or alive, which is consistent with our 
existential experience of the world, but for the observer outside the 
box the indeterminacy of the unobserved particle forces the cat to 
be both dead and alive at the same time. The consequences of this 
insight could not be greater, for they not only mean that the laws of 
Newtonian physics do not apply to quantum particles, but they also 
suggest that the rational logic of traditional physics and mathematics 
cannot account for the events taking place within the dark chamber  
of the cat experiment.
Recall that the whole Newtonian-Cartesian framework was 
premised on the idea that reality can be accurately represented either 
mathematically with the aid of formulas or visually with the aid of 
perspective. In either case, to be known scientifically or experienced 
aesthetically a thing must be other than the knower because a thing  
is only known as a representation.14 However, Schrödinger’s cat points 
to the collapse of representation as the idea that knowledge is external 
to the subject and can be objectively represented.
This is because the bifurcation of the real into two separate 
realities cannot be represented, or in the words of Deleuze ‘[t]he 
diversity of narrations cannot be explained by the avatars of the 
signifier, by the states of linguistic structure which is assumed to 
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underline images in general’.15 Because for each of the observers 
reality is different, no unified representation of it is possible. Instead, 
difference and not representation is the underpinning principle that 
holds the two observers together while simultaneously making them 
irreconcilable with each other.
Schrödinger devised the cat experiment to demonstrate the 
absurdity of applying quantum logic to something as big and complex 
as a cat, but the result was just the opposite. According to Newtonian 
laws of motion, not to mention standard logical reasoning, an object 
cannot be in two places at once. And yet, Schrödinger’s cat stubbornly 
insists on being both alive and dead at the same time, inhabiting what 
became known as a state of indeterminacy.16
Before letting go of the cat, let me spell out the significance of the 
feline to photography. The photographic aspect of this experiment is 
not only in exposure of the light-sensitive cell to a particle of light but 
also – and critically – in the requirement for isolation between the 
room with the cat and the observer outside the room. This rupture 
exposes the divide between the moment of inscription by light that is 
taking place within the camera and the moment of “developing” that 
is taking place when a measurement is being made. In this rupture 
the ontological condition of the photographic image is revealed as 
the difference between two incommensurable states. The principle 
of photography is not in the indexical connection between past and 
present, nor is it the representation of abstract forms, but in the 
visual presentation of time as internally divided. The requirement 
for rupture institutes the possibility of an image that captures 
indeterminacy and a-symmetry as the very condition of visuality. The 
exposure produced by firing a single particle captures the difference 
between the two observers. It is neither the dead cat not the alive 
one that constitutes the image, rather, the photographic element of 
the experiment is the very possibility of the co-existence of the two 
and the figuration of the difference between them. In other words, 
difference is expressed through the heterogeneity of narrations 
underpinned by the bifurcation of time. This bifurcation constitutes 
the materiality of the photographic image while at the same time 
asserting its indeterminacy.17 As the digital image on the computer 
screen is a configuration of particles that were clumped together by 
a computational process, it is significant that a quantum inspired 
understanding of photography suggests that apart from the forms 
of content such as perception, identity and representation, images 
are also forms of expression that contain open ended reflections 
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on the nature of computation, indeterminacy and the limits of 
representation.18
Getting slightly ahead of myself I want to signal that these 
understandings prefigure some of the conditions that describe the 
fate of the photographic image in digital culture. The condition of 
reproducibility does not warrant a connection with fixed reality. 
Instead, each repetition of the image opens up the possibility of 
indeterminacy, variation and multiplication that can pull the image 
away from an indexical connection with the past. Within the network 
the image operates on several levels – computational, electro-magnetic, 
economic, conceptual, particle – and each level produces separate  
but interconnected affects. The inherent instability of this assemblage 
makes it impossible to fix the meaning of the image and limit it to 
the content available to the gaze. Instead, significance and agency 
are formed by the relations, interactions and dialogues between the 
different parts of the system. In other words, meaning is established 
not through the procedure of representation but according to the 
manifold of relations to the other parts of the network.19
Plastic Control
Radical and liberating as quantum indeterminism was, with all the 
ensuing multiplicities of time and the polyphony of voices on offer, 
and notwithstanding the energising effect indeterminism had on art 
and literature, there was still a problem with this world view, which, 
to put it quite simply, threatened to undermine the whole project of 
converting all the clocks into clouds. This problem can be summed 
up as follows: the indeterminism model was at its core a theory that 
asserted that everything is governed by chance and nothing else.  
It suggested that the strict rules of the Newtonian clock universe be 
replaced by randomness, chaos and irresponsibility. In an article  
titled ‘On Clouds and Clocks’ Karl Popper sums this up nicely:
If determinism is true, then the whole world is a perfectly 
running flawless clock, including all clouds, all organisms,  
all animals, and all men. If, on the other hand, Peirce’s  
or Heisenberg’s or some other form of indeterminism is true,  
then sheer chance plays a major role in our physical world.  
But is chance really more satisfactory than determinism?20
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If everything in life is decided with the throw of a metaphysical dice, 
what hope is there to build a free and just society? Quite clearly, none 
whatsoever. If the determinism of the swinging pendulum seemed 
oppressive and inescapable, then how much more inescapable and 
how infinitely more oppressive is the thought that we are thrown into 
an abyss with no logic, no rules and no hope of getting out. This is 
the kind of desperate abyss that lead the exasperated Dostoyevsky to 
proclaim in Brothers Karamazov: ‘If there is no god then everything 
is permitted!’ It appeared that the discoveries of quantum physics, 
combined with Einstein’s theory of relativity threatened to do more 
than to simply overturn the old rational paradigm: in addition  
to heralding the age of nuclear power and supper-computing it 
also seemed likely to unleash a form of radical nihilism that would 
jeopardise the very idea of freedom, choice and responsibility  
and replace them with an entropic mayhem were everything is down 
to accident.21 
For Popper the dangers of this kind of nihilism were too grave to 
ignore. For one thing, this free-for-all indeterminism was only a step 
away from a fascist state, where no ethical or moral rules apply and 
everything is determined by pure force. If nihilism is the only certainty, 
how do you maintain some form of control over the rampant and 
unrestrained urges that are sure to raise their ugly heads? And to 
complicate matters further, how do you keep behaviour in check 
without appealing to the higher power of god, the absolute, or the 
torture chambers of the secret police?
Popper’s solution to this double headed problem of chaos versus 
determinism was simple and brilliant, and he named it “plastic 
control”. It was simple because he placed a middle point, a kind of 
halfway-house between the predictability of the determinist clock 
and indeterminism of the cloud. In positing plastic control as an 
intermediate membrane or a semi-conductor between determinism 
and chaos, between the world of representations and the world of 
probabilities, Popper sidestepped the dualism that maintained that 
things can only be one way or the other: either a cloud or a clock, 
either mind of body, image or object. Even more astonishingly, Popper 
suggested that this layer of plastic tissue is not another system, not a 
cloudy clock or a clockwork cloud, rather it is the site of consciousness, 
feelings, desires and sensations. In Popper’s own words:
we want to understand how such non-physical things as 
purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions, theories, intentions, 
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and values, can play a part in bringing about physical changes 
in the physical world.22 
Plastic control is therefore a cluster of appetites, affects and passions 
that brings together the physical and the analytical, combining 
them into something both carnal and controlling, both sensual and 
cerebral. In other words, Popper uncovered a synthetic diagram of 
social, political, erotic and physical drives that forms images out 
of chaos. Plastic control does not discipline chaos, but allows it to 
create connections between bits of matter and bits of ideas that do 
not fit with each-other like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle and yet they form 
something like a constellation or an archipelago, or a network.23 
According to the logic of plastic control, meaning is not to be 
located in the deterministic world of the clocks but equally neither is 
it in the indeterminate world of the clouds. As the grey area where 
feelings, desires, and games of chance rule over logic and reason, 
plastic control offers a glimpse into non-binary thinking that rejects 
the dualisms of form and content.24 In the world of the computer 
networks, plastic controls are the algorithms that translate the 
social world of human activity into something that computers can 
understand as data. And conversely, plastic controls take computer 
data and make it into something that looks like a photograph when it 
appears on a screen.
Plastic control allows one to step away from the dialectical 
reasoning that conceives photography in terms of presence and 
absence, practice and theory, subject and object. It also exposes the 
fallacy of thinking about digital photography as being somehow 
immaterial or virtual. Digital images can be made without a camera, 
without chemistry, without lenses, even without light, which means 
that all the old rhetoric about photography being the trace of the 
real, or having an indexical connection to events in the past does not 
have to apply to the digital-born image. The idea that photographs 
have a representational, indexical or signifying connection with 
events, people and objects in the real world does not need to hold for 
digital images that rely on electronic signal and computation. The 
destabilisation of photographic meaning is the direct result of the 
image being detached from universal notions of representation and 
re-staged in terms of the plastic materiality that figures the image 
through difference, bifurcation and self-replication.
This understanding of the digital image as unchained from the 
dualisms of Western metaphysical thought can help to advance a 
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way of thinking that is taking on board the material conditions of 
the network. However, this insight requires the overcoming of the 
tendency of idealist aesthetics to think of photography as a process 
that mediates the world with the agency of light to produce legible 
signs. As the Schrödinger’s Cat experiment suggests, the processes that 
govern particle distribution call for a different distinction between 
materiality and form. As there is no unified visual field the narrative 
is in every case irreducibly different. A further consequence to the 
overcoming of aesthetic representational thought is that the digital 
image does not have to be understood in visual terms as something 
to be looked at. Rather the digital image both undermines and 
transcends representation by actualising an interval between itself and 
its object. Through its diversity of narrations the digital image acts as 
a reminder that only the identical, the normative and the similar can 
be captured by representation while the expressive, the singular and 
the non-identical remains outside its reach. 
It is however salutary to remember that representation operates 
in two distinct but interconnected ways: as a kind of epistemological 
code that organises information by creating order out of chaos, and as 
a political system that organises communities by instituting a shared 
ethical code. The principle common to all regimes of representation 
is the exclusion of everything that is singular and non-identical: the 
barbarian, the freak, the abnormal and the different need not apply. 
One does not have to be a unicorn or a little green man to be subjected 
to the exclusion principle: it is sometimes enough to speak with a 
slight accent, to stutter, to have a lame foot or anarchist tendencies. 
For this reason, the question for post-liberal political thought is 
how to inaugurate a community that does not depend on the codes 
of representation; how to remain sceptical and suspicious about the 
tendency of images and languages to privilege identity and cohesion 
over the clamour of disparate voices. Deleuze and Guattari name 
this non-representational community the nomadic war machine. Its 
primary objective is not war against the state but resistance to the 
forms of iconology of the state: 
The war machine is that nomad invention that in fact has war 
not as its primary object but as its second-order, supplementary 
or synthetic objective, in the sense that it is determined in such 
a way as to destroy the State-form and city-form with which  
it collides.25
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This dimension of the war machine cements its relevance to the 
concept of the digital image: the modern capitalist state is marked 
by the systematic codification of life along the axes of technicity and 
representation26 so as to eliminate libidinal creativity that constitutes 
the only possibility of resistance to empirical reality.27
The digital image allows for the non-visual within the visual 
to become manifest as a diagram of the diversity of fragments. The 
digital image belongs simultaneously to two regimes of the visual: it 
is the annunciation of difference as the condition of visuality and it is 
a computational fractal that has no depth, no inside and no outside. 
Thanks to this “double articulation” the digital image is both a figure 
of identity and a figure of transformation of identity into new and 
unpredictable states. Variation and unpredictability are of another 
order than representation. They cannot themselves become a subject 
of representation or be reduced to it. What the digital image is capable 
of is to express the irreducible schism between the computational 
and the representational, not dialectically as “lack” or “absence” 
or “the excluded middle”, but as something inhabited and yet non-
representational, like the grin of Schrödinger’s cat.
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Notes
1. Central to the representational model is the glass-cut distinction 
between that which the eye can see and that which the mind can  
comprehend. Descartes famously demonstrated how unreliable vision is 
by comparing seeing to the actions of a blind man who tries to identify 
objects by tapping on them with a stick. René Descartes, Philosophical 
Writings, trans. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter T. Geach (Great Britain: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1970), 248-9. He argued that the 
mind, on the other hand, is capable of seeing the truth thanks to the 
power of reason, which converts the distorted picture painted by the 
senses into true knowledge. In this way the mind became the true organ 
of seeing, and the eye (and with it the rest of the body) assumed the role 
of unreliable witness. This imagistic and pictorial model of the world 
achieved its most complete development in Kant’s Critique of Pure  
Reason: ‘Our representation of things as they are given to us does not 
conform to them as things in themselves, but, on the contrary, that these 
objects as appearances conform to our mode of representation.’  
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. F Max Müller and  
Marcus Weigelt (London & New York: Penguin, 2007), 20 Bxx, xxi. 
Simply stated, this means that I experience the world as a unified  
time-space continuum not because that is what the world really is but 
because I experience myself as a unified entity. See also: David Summers,  
‘Representation’, in Critical Terms for Art History, ed. Robert Nelson 
and Richard Shiff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3-17.
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2. Joseph Nechvatal, Towards An Immersive Intelligence: Essays on 
the Work of Art in the Age of Computer Technology and Virtual Reality 
1993-2006 (New York: Edgewise Press, 2009), 9.
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6. On demarcation of time see: Peter Wollen, cited in David Green and 
Joanna Lowry, Stillness and Time; Photography and the Moving Image 
(Brighton: Photoworks / Photoforum, 2006), 17.
7. “Information space”, as a space structured through the flow of 
information, is drawing on the concept of “timed space”, as developed 
by Parkes and Thrift. See: Don Parkes and Nigel Thrift, ‘Putting Time in 
Its Place’, in Making Sense of Time, ed. Tommy Carlstein (New York: J. 
Wiley, 1978), 119-129.
8. On the agency of code and its inherent undecidability (and how 
this undecidability is politically manipulated) see: Lucas Introna, ‘The 
Enframing of Code’, Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2011), 
113-141. On algorithmic photography see: Daniel Rubinstein and 
Katrina Sluis, ‘The Digital Image in Photographic Culture; Algorithmic 
Photography and the Crisis of Representation’, in Martin Lister (ed), The 
Photographic Image in Digital Culture, 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 
2013).
9. Introna, ‘The Enframing of Code’. Also see: Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 
2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: 
Athlone Press, 1989), 22-40. 
10. Heinz Pagels, quoted in John R .Gribbin, In Search of the 
Multiverse: Parallel Worlds, Hidden Dimensions, and the Ultimate 
Quest for the Frontiers of Reality (Hoboken, nj: John Wiley & Sons, 
2010), 20.
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14. Claire Colebrook, Ethics and Representation: From Kant to  
Post-structuralism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 2.
15. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 137.
16. Adrian Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh University Press, 
2005), 60.
17. Dorothea Olkowski, ‘Time Lost, Instaneity and the Image’, 
Parallax 9, no. 1 (2003), 28-38.
18. Flusser, ‘Immaterialism’, 218-9. This is not to suggest that 
photography became undecidable only since becoming digital. On 
the contrary, one of the most overlooked and under-theorised aspects 
of analogue photography is the so called “latent image”: the invisible 
formation of silver halides produced by the exposure of light-sensitive 
emulsion to light. The latent image is not only indeterminate but also 
enigmatic, for until it is chemically developed there is no way of finding 
out what the image contains, yet development also destroys the latent 
image, effectively severing the connection between the image and the 
object.
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Deviations From Deleuze and Guattari (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 
1992), 19.
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 226.
21. ‘The underlying idea is that our body is a kind of machine which 
can be regulated by a lever or switch from one or more central control 
points. Descartes even went so far as to locate the control point precisely: 
it is in the pineal gland, he said, that mind acts upon the body. Some 
quantum theorists suggested (and Compton very tentatively accepted 
the suggestion) that our minds work upon our bodies by influencing or 
selecting some quantum jumps.’ Ibid., 232-233.
22. Ibid., 229.
23. ‘Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the 
reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events […] The plane is like a 
desert that concepts populate without dividing up. The only regions of 
the plane are concepts themselves, but the plane is all that holds them 
together.’ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? Trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London, New York: Verso, 
1994), 35-36.
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supplement, and augment collective life; the unfolding or evolutive power 
of technologies to make things happen in conjunction with people’. Rob 
Kitchin and Martin Dodge, Code/space: Software and Everyday Life 
(The mit Press, 2011), 42.
27. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and 
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As inhabitants of the photographic universe we have become 
accustomed to photographs: They have grown familiar to us.  
We no longer take any notice of most photographs, concealed as 
they are by habit; in the same way, we ignore everything familiar 
in our environment and only notice what has changed. Change  
is informative, the familiar redundant. What we are surrounded 
by above all are redundant photographs.
– Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography.1
The history of photography is also a history of automation. And 
at various key moments – such as when George Eastman pre-loaded 
the first Kodak box camera with film in 1888 – the activity of 
photography has been fundamentally altered by changes to the camera 
Redundant Photographs: Cameras, Software  
and Human Obsolescence 
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apparatus. Needless to say, the primary aim of automation is to reduce 
“human labour time (related to a secondary aim of removing human 
error). Indeed, certain kinds of cameras today – such as those designed 
to identify car number plates – need no regular human operator at 
all. Of course automation takes many forms, and is presented to 
different markets in diverse ways. This chapter concerns the realm 
of consumer and “creative” photography, where the automation of 
factors like focus and exposure have typically been sold on the basis 
that they enable photographers to concentrate on responding instantly 
to the world around them, rather than investing unnecessary energy 
engaged in mastering unwieldy technology. The logical aim, as a 
typical Minolta advertisement from the 1970s put it, is to allow you to 
‘quickly and easily translate the vision in your mind to your film’.2 As a 
tagline for this advertisement makes clear – ‘When you are the camera 
and the camera is you’ – the camera operates as prosthetic device.3 
Automation here is naturally linked to the seductions of ergonomics 
(‘The controls are so logically positioned that your finger falls into 
place naturally’) and the guarantees of standardisation (‘Everything 
works with such smooth precision that the camera feels like a part 
of you’).4 Paradoxically, however, I will argue that, since automation 
removes decision making from the photographer it has also resulted 
in situations that render the agency of the photographer more or less 
obsolete. This has become particularly apparent in recent years, when 
digital software has augmented the process of making photographs 
in new ways. Therefore, what I seek to explore are some of the 
paradoxes of photographic production and the status of the individual 
photographer in our age of photographic excess.
Experiential Photography
Don Slater has shown that the history of popular photography elicits 
a conventionalization of ‘how things can be photographed’, in which, 
after Kodak, ‘Taking photographs is itself structured […] as the 
paradigm of structuring a complex skill into a few simple actions’.5 
Recently, however, camera makers have sought to give new kinds 
of control to their consumers, in an effort apparently designed to 
revitalise and individualise their picture making. These are not the 
parameters we are necessarily familiar with from the history of 
photography – of focus, shutter speed, aperture, lens and film. Nor 
do I refer to auto-face recognition and auto-smile detection. If we are 
to judge from recent releases, the cutting edge of camera design lies 
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in software that enables more experimental forms of image capture. 
Thus, the Lytro “light field” camera, introduced in 2011, which in 
design more closely resembles a torch than a conventional camera, 
enables a user to focus the image after the exposure. This is achieved 
via a combination of micro lenses in front of the normal lenses  
which break the image down in such a way that the sensor itself 
captures various aspects of a light ray such as color, intensity,  
and direction. Software then reconstructs an image so that focus 
can be placed anywhere in the scene and depth of field can be 
simulated. Meanwhile, the new Olympus om-d camera, despite 
its more traditional appearance, ‘aims to change the way in which 
you experience photography’.6 Olympus claim in their promotional 
rhetoric that:
Its Electronic View Finder (evf) enables photographers to check 
the Art Filter effect, colour temperatures and exposure levels 
in real-time. When shooting, you can instantly “create” a truly 
unique world and preserve it in exceptional quality. The “world” 
will be transformed from something you see to something 
you “take part” in. The om-d is a groundbreaking new digital 
interchangeable lens camera perfect for people who want to 
“take part”, “create” and “share”.7
Of course not all of this rhetoric is new or unique. But the activity of 
photography, it would appear, needs updating – at least in the eyes of 
camera company marketing departments. As the use of scare quotes 
in the Olympus advertisement around the words “world”, “take 
part”, “create” and “share” underline, this way of framing the act of 
photography appears to reflect a certain anxiety on the part of the 
camera maker about the status of conventional picture making. To be 
sure, from the perspective of traditional camera manufacturers this 
anxiety is probably quite genuine, given the declining sales of stand-
alone cameras in the wake of increasing quality camera phones that 
threaten to make point-and-shoot cameras completely obsolete within 
years. Indeed, the enthusiastic reference to those who wish to take 
part in and create a world – rather than merely take photographs – 
represents a new stage in the marketing of cameras. While the appeal 
to the imagination is a recurrent theme in camera advertising, the 
recommendations here seem to implicitly critique more traditionally 
“possessive” behaviours of the photographer. It is almost as though the 
Olympus marketing department have taken seriously Susan Sontag’s 
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well-known complaint that the camera promotes a “detached” and 
“passive” way of seeing the world.8
These newly “experiential” ways of framing the act of 
photography are perfectly understandable from a marketing point 
of view. Camera makers are today engaged in an ongoing effort to 
commodify photographic activity as a leisure pursuit worthy of a 
dedicated consumer device. They are now also in competition with 
the makers of dedicated photo-apps for smart phones. The popularity 
of iPhone apps such as Hipstamatic and now especially Instagram 
– simulating nostalgic analogue styles and imperfections within a 
digitally networked context – continues a long tradition of marketing 
the experience of photography as fun and above all social. The 
history of publicity for Kodak, and particularly Polaroid, immediately 
underlines this point, driven by the imperative of promoting film sales 
– where most of the profits had conventionally been made. But at the 
same time, the current rush to experiential photography might also 
be interpreted as minor crisis in the conception of photography that is 
sustained by the “possession-based” ideology of what we might call 
“photographic individualism”. No doubt the “I was there” imperative 
continues to underpin most single photographic acts, but it would 
appear to be undergoing a subtle but significant reframing. To be sure, 
Olympus’ exhortation to “create your own world” continues to appeal 
to the photographer’s individual ego and the value of their ostensibly 
unique fantasy worlds. But an individual vision is no longer translated 
to film, as in the 1970s Minolta advertisement. It is no longer enough 
to simply “be there”, compose an image and expose it correctly. 
Instead, a photographer can now create a world in the moment of 
their encounter with it, through the use of features like the real-time 
“Art Filter effect”. In the process, the vision of the photographer is 
augmented by software. Human vision, you might say, has become not 
just machinic but algorithmic.
These new cameras – fundamentally driven by software 
developments – are a response to the condition of photography 
in an age of online photo sharing. By extension, they are also a 
response to the new digital environment in which images produced 
by geographically dispersed individuals, largely redundant on their 
own, can increasingly be aggregated and organized by metadata 
into something useful en masse. Flickr, and Microsoft’s stitching 
software, Photosynth, are the two most oft-cited examples of this 
new photographic universe. Flickr obviously enables a wide variety 
of conventional photographic practices to continue; however, it also 
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establishes the possibility of new forms of image organisation via 
human tagging and non-human calculation – as Flickr’s attempt to 
patent the algorithm for their “interestingness” ranking makes clear. 
Photosynth is proprietary software that analyses digital images in 
order to generate a three-dimensional model and a point cloud of 
the represented space, and then reassembles the images into a near-
seamless composite. In what has been dubbed an “algorithmic turn”, 
viewers are then free to explore the assembled photographic space 
from any direction, including depth.9 According to a Photosynth  
press release:
You can share or relive a vacation destination or explore a 
distant museum or landmark. With nothing more than digital 
camera and some inspiration, you can use Photosynth to 
transform regular digital photos into a three-dimensional, 
360-degree experience. Anybody who sees your synth is put 
right in your shoes, sharing in your experience, with detail, 
clarity and scope impossible to achieve in conventional photos 
or videos.10
Inspired by research in photographic tourism, “creating a synth”, 
as Microsoft’s promotional rhetoric states, ‘allows you to share the 
places and things you love by using the cinematic quality of a movie, 
the control of a video game, and the mind-blowing detail of the real 
world’.11 Thus articulated as a libidinal fantasy of ever-increasing 
verisimilitude, the user of such software is able to shape and control 
an image space that is both open-ended and potentially tailor-made to 
the individual. In the process, not only is the status of the individual 
photograph reconfigured, the activity of viewing photographs is 
reinvented as an experiential and pseudo-democratised event even as 
the images are assumed to remain a transparent broker of the  
real world.
Roll Film Cameras, Photographic Excess and Modernist Photography
The current experiential and participatory turn in photography is 
fundamentally antithetical to the modern period of photography. It 
is well known, for instance, that the Pictorialist photographers were 
given a shot in the arm by the rise of Kodak and the introduction 
of cameras that came pre-loaded with roll film. Pictoralism, as a 
nascent international art photography movement at the end of the 
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nineteenth century, was largely reactionary – in the literal sense of 
wishing to react with individual sensibility to picturesque scenes, 
and also in its response to industrial progress. With the rise of 
Kodak and instant amateur photography, where suddenly almost 
everyone had access to the means of taking photographs, its appalled 
protagonists sought to distinguish their activities from the masses of 
“snapshooters” by introducing complex and labour-intensive processes 
such as gum bichromate printing to ensure their work was seen as 
art. Such photographs emphasized the role of the photographer as a 
craftsman and sought to counter the argument that photography was 
an entirely mechanical medium. Pictorialism was an early form of 
modern photography in its embrace of the medium’s qualities and the 
subjective response of the photographer, but it rejected any taint  
of automation.
Or consider the case of one of the best-loved and more influential 
photographers of the twentieth century, Ansel Adams. The legacy 
of this American photographer goes well beyond his redemptive 
landscape images, which are admittedly still revered, and lies 
particularly in his insistence on the photographer’s absolute control 
of the photographic process. For at least three decades various 
editions of his instructional books – notably The Negative: Exposure 
and Development (1949) and The Print: Contact Printing and 
Enlarging (1950) – were standard texts among serious amateurs and 
professionals alike. Key elements of his philosophy, such as the Zone 
System – which codified the principles of sensitometry to determining 
optimal film exposure and development – became a standard in 
photographic courses around the world.12 Adams’ argument was that 
the “creative photographer” must master the craft of photographic 
technology and the darkroom in particular in order to be free to 
express themselves through the finished print. His attempt to establish 
artisan credentials for photography relied on a commitment to what 
the guru of subjective photography, Minor White, later called “pre-
visualization”. While the logic of subjective vision does not determine 
the pictorial outcomes, and a variety of results were possible, the 
modern photographer essentially treated the camera as a transparent 
medium to master, in order to express one’s encounter with the 
world. Although polarising filters and other chromatic corrections 
were encouraged as part of the process, Adams would no doubt 
have been offended by the idea of “real time” “Art Filters”. Given 
the broader modernist privileging of honesty and integrity to one’s 
individual vision, his general advice was to keep things simple and 
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never compromise one’s vision with technology that cannot be fully 
understood and mastered.
The modern, or modernist approach is closely associated with 
the privileging of form – associated with figures like Edward Weston – 
and “fine print” photographic practices. It represents a complementary 
approach to that of modern photojournalists indebted to Henri 
Cartier-Bresson’s idea of the “decisive moment” in its emphasis on 
the integrity of the individual photographer to their subject. However, 
instead of being an eyewitness to an event, the archetypal modernist 
“fine art” photographer is witness only to their own feelings in front  
of form. In both cases, the presence of the photographer behind 
the lens is essential. In 1978, the curator John Szarkowski famously 
divided American photography in terms of mirrors or window – 
where photographers aligned with mirrors focus on self-expression, 
and windows on observation – but in reality both were dependent 
on the reflective gaze of a controlling author. Thus the photographer 
Robert Adams (no relation to Ansel) expressed his conviction in his 
1981 book Beauty In Photography in the following way:
Without the photographer in the photograph the view is no 
more compelling than the product of some anonymous record 
camera, a machine perhaps capable of happy accident but not 
of response to form.13
Needless to say, in contemporary art discourse, this idea of 
photography as a “response to form” is out of favour, and the heroic 
photojournalist is under suspicion. Both, like the “fine art print”, 
have been the subject of broad attack by “postmodern” critics as 
irredeemably conservative and even inherently patriarchal in their 
efforts to master the world.14
At the same time, in a curious reversal, the idea of the 
“anonymous record camera” and the “happy accident” have both 
been embraced in the world of post-conceptual contemporary art. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the idea of photography as a personal 
“response to form” had already been undermined from within the field 
of “art photography” itself. Street photographer Garry Winogrand, 
for instance, embraced chance and the happy accident. Winogrand 
famously amassed an unworkably large number of negatives in his 
effort “to see what the world looks like photographed”. When he died 
in 1984 he left 2500 rolls of film undeveloped, as well as 6500 rolls 
of developed film he had not seen or edited. Documentaries of the 
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photographer show him wandering the streets taking pictures in a 
seemingly automatic fashion using a motor drive on his Leica camera, 
and stuffing plastic bags full of film canisters into a filing cabinet. 
Such scenes might evoke the complaint, repeated regularly since the 
1960s and typified in the writings of Jean Baudrillard, that the world 
is over-saturated with images.15 As an art critic recently speculated, 
the abundance of photographic images has produced a situation 
in which no single photograph can ‘stake a claim to originality 
or affect’.16 However, such claims of image saturation – at once 
iconophobic and iconophilic – invariably miss the point. Single images 
operate in various contexts under different spectatorial conditions. 
Thus single pictures by Jeff Wall can still command attention in the 
art museum, often in light-boxes for maximum impact. Nevertheless, 
Winogrand’s performance of photographic excess seems prescient 
because he treated the photograph, as information, as more or less 
interesting. He was completely unsentimental about “previsualization” 
or the “decisive moment”, and more interested in the camera’s  
ability to capture slight shifts in movement and angle of view. His 
approach, not coincidentally, paralleled the rise of conceptual  
artists adopting the camera as an art-making tool for precisely the 
reason that Robert Adams disparages: that is, as an anonymous  
record camera.17
The Pop artist Ed Ruscha famously stated in a 1965 interview 
about his work that ‘photography is dead as a fine art; its only place is 
in the commercial world, for technical or information purposes’.18 The 
photographs in his books, such as Twentysix Gasoline Stations (1962), 
present exactly what the titles indicate, and appear to be no different 
than commercial images. Ruscha’s ‘collection of “facts”’ was followed 
by other “serial” approaches in which artists took to the camera only 
in order to refuse conventional signs of photographic authorship.  
In the case of Douglas Huebler, this conceptual approach amounted 
to a something like a philosophy of photography. The operations that 
Huebler set up for his “variable pieces” from the late 1960s involved 
him taking on the role of photographer-functionary – most notably in 
Variable Piece #70, (In Process) Global, (1971) – his life-long project 
to ‘photographically document […] the existence of everyone alive’. As 
he wrote of his working method in a 1969 statement: ‘I use the camera 
as a “dumb” copying device that only serves to document whatever 
phenomena appears before it through the conditions set by a system’.19 
Beneath the deadpan pseudo-scientific approach, one might detect  
a certain utopianism in Huebler’s systematic attempt to decipher the 
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world through the camera. More importantly, for my argument here, 
Huebler’s role as an artist – performative and mimetic – appears to 
dutifully reenact the logic of the modern roll-film camera itself.
Vilém Flusser, Redundancy and Digital Photography
Douglas Huebler outlines a position that is given more full expression 
in Vilém Flusser’s 1983 book Towards a Philosophy of Photography, 
as John Miller has perceptively intuited.20 Flusser posits the 
photograph as a “technical image” and the camera as a programmable 
apparatus, one that, paradoxically, programs the photographers 
(functionaries) who use it. The terms redundant and redundancy are 
important ones in Flusser’s writing, influenced as he was by Shannon’s 
communication theory, and the history of communication technology 
as a process of increasing abstraction and automation. For Flusser, 
“redundant” photographs are those that carry no new information 
and are therefore superfluous. Flusser speaks of ‘the challenge for the 
photographer: to oppose the flood of redundancy with informative 
images’, that is, those that provide the photographic universe with 
new information.21 Flusser allocates “snapshots” to the realm of 
redundant images, and his critique of so-called “creative photography” 
is based on the idea that most of what people are doing when they 
photograph is to reproduce clichés set in place by the apparatus.22 
However, Flusser’s critique is more complex than often recognized, 
counterbalanced as it is by his praise for what he calls “experimental 
photography”: ‘to create a space for human intention in a world 
dominated by apparatuses’.23 Elsewhere Flusser speaks of “envisioners” 
who actively work against the automation of the apparatus – and 
at times he would appear to be a straightforward defender of what 
we already identified as subjective vision. Thus, on the one hand, he 
pessimistically states that ‘the photographer can only desire what 
the apparatus can do [… and] the intention of the photographer is a 
function of the apparatus’,24 while, on the other hand, he celebrates 
“envisioners” as those with ‘the capacity to step from the particle 
universe [of abstraction] back into the concrete’.25 
In Flusser’s essay ‘The gesture of photographing’, published the 
year of his death in 1991, but only recently translated into English, 
he presents what is undoubtedly his most sanguine account of the 
photographer’s potential role. Here, between periods of reflection 
and moments of action, photography is positioned as part of a 
phenomenological ‘project of situating oneself in the world’.26 Flusser 
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goes so far as to call this ‘a movement of freedom’, ‘a series of 
decisions that occur not in spite of, but because of the determining 
forces that are in play’.27 Flusser also celebrates the “reflection”  
on the part of the photographer engaged in the photographic act: 
The camera has a mirror, and when the photographer looks 
into it, he sees how his picture might be. He sees possible 
pictures and as he looks in this futurological way he chooses 
his own picture from those available to him. He rejects all the 
possible pictures except this one and thereby condemns all the 
other possible pictures, except this one, to the realm of lost 
virtualities.28
For a writer better known in the English-speaking world for 
identifying the photographer as a “functionary” of the apparatus, 
this is an unusually poetic defense of the photographic act. However, 
in focusing only on the moment of capture, Flusser ignores the 
fundamental role of editing pictures after they have been taken. Given 
that cameras are now capable of capturing at least five frames per 
second, and increasingly, high definition still images can be drawn 
from moving image footage, the image is only “chosen” on the 
screen afterwards. In other words, today’s photographer may in fact 
hold on to such “lost virtualities” (even of focus, for instance, in the 
case of Lytro). Thus, one might legitimately ask how the editing of 
photographs in software such as Photoshop or Lightroom complicates 
Flusser’s equation, given that endless different virtual versions of 
an image are enabled by the lossless editing of digital files. Rather 
than situating oneself in the world in the act of photographing, a 
photographer may now approach the world as fluid raw material to be 
selected from and manipulated later. In some sense, the photographic 
moment has been extended indefinitely. The “mirror” of the camera 
(which in fact many do not possess) is no longer merely reflective but 
malleable and programmable. And the print is no longer the resolution 
of the previsualised image – comparable to the “performance” of the 
negative “score”, as Ansel Adams once suggested – but one possible 
outcome of various software actions.
Flusser’s arguments, pitting the photographer against the 
apparatus, reverberate in Julian Stallabrass’ 1996 essay ‘60 billion 
sunsets’. Stallabrass is concerned with what he calls ‘the demise of 
the amateur attitude to reality’ – by which he means the meaningful 
use of cameras that were understood by their users.29 Stallabrass 
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romanticizes the 35mm amateur photographer’s activity as a zone of 
freedom, or non-alienated activity, salvaging the hobbyist against the 
snobbery normally directed at them by professional artists. He argues 
that the increasing automation of cameras paradoxically disables 
the amateur photographer by removing their erstwhile control under 
a haze of electronic sophistry. As he says, ‘the camera becomes a 
mystical object which uses its possessor’.30 Indeed, although we have 
identified a shifting pattern of labour away from the moment of 
capture towards post-production, we know that most photographs 
are not manipulated later – or only in the most cursory of ways (a 
visual “boost” upon import to a computer, or the removal of red-eye). 
Undoubtedly this under-utilised creative potential is another of the 
motivations for Olympus to shift the moment of transformation to 
the moment of capture in their om-d. However, features such as “Art 
Effects” – as we have seen above, in a similar way to playful camera 
phone apps – serve largely to mystify the process of capture. 
In the digital world, Stallabrass predicted, narcissistic simulations 
are likely to prevail: ‘the represented object loses it rights: there is 
no bar to unleashed subjectivity’.31 One is reminded again of the 
marketing for the Olympus om-d, which implores users to “create 
your own world”. It could be argued that the resulting multiplicity of 
atomized “private” worlds prevents the possibility of referring to a 
shared “public” world. If there is no common world, where does this 
leave documentary photographers engaged in social change? However, 
the possibility for “unleashed subjectivity” is also accompanied 
by an opposing trend: the increasing automation of the process of 
capture along standardised lines, which seek to remove chance and 
homogenise image-making. Point-and-shoot cameras increasingly 
shift creative decision making to the camera instead of the person 
taking the picture, offering automated modes labelled “intelligent 
auto” – which detects your environment and adjusts the camera’s 
settings accordingly, choosing the most appropriate scene mode. Face 
detection and smile capture even decide when the picture is taken. 
Thus a witty advertisement for Fujufilm’s Finepix f70 camera features 
an image of a funeral with a group of solemn, black-clad mourners 
– with the digital camera’s green focal square brackets locked onto a 
gentle smile on the face of a young woman. Such software additions 
are designed to make the camera smarter, and in the process allow the 
photographer to be less responsive, if not dumber.
Jean Baudrillard, in another echo of Flusser’s pessimistic position 
around the photographer as functionary, once suggested that ‘man 
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himself performs only what the machine is programmed to do and 
the ‘camera is a machine that secretly distorts any specific will, that 
erases all intentionality, supporting only the pure reaction of taking 
pictures’.32 Thus, he wrote, the resulting images ‘may be the object’s 
insight into the subject and not, as we commonly believe, the subject’s 
insight into the world.’ 33 According to Baudrillard, ‘the magic of 
photography […] is this involution of the subject into the black box, 
this devolution of his vision to the impersonal eye of the camera.’ 34 
Baudrillard’s embrace of radical objectivism here must be read with 
caution, laced as it is with his infamous irony. As a photographer 
himself, he would have known that photographic images are produced 
through a human-machine interaction with the world. However, 
Baudrillard also notes that whereas traditional machines (including 
analogue cameras) were strangers to humans, and something one felt 
alienated from, “interactive machines” and “computer screens” do 
not alienate; rather ‘I am connected with them, I am integrated with 
them. They are a part of me, a part of myself, like contact lenses, like 
transparent prostheses integrated into the body’.35 Modern cameras 
and computers have combined, of course (quite comically in the era 
of tablet devices such as the iPad, where people hold up a screen to 
the world in a gesture that is anything but seamless). As a result, one 
needs to go further than Baudrillard. Since the camera is no longer 
just a “black box”, but a networked digital device, human vision  
is devolved not merely to the impersonal eye of the camera but to the 
network and all its protocols.36
The Networked Camera
As we have seen, the digital environment for photography – in which 
images have become just another form of data – helps to enable 
various forms of post-human vision, such as car number plate cameras 
that store and match records in computer databases. Paul Virilio 
has long referred to the production of “sightless vision” and “the 
industrialization of vision” as part of a logic of modernity.37 However, 
my interest here lies in how networked automation impacts on 
ordinary photographic practice and the idea of the photographer as 
an individual creative agent. There are of course no clear conclusions 
to be drawn from the current situation. For example, it could be 
argued that the combination of camera phones and social networking 
is making photographic production more individualistic and intimate 
(the mobile phone is owned by an individual rather than a family, and 
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images are often deployed in the service of performative presentations 
of the self on sites like Facebook). On the other hand, as Kate 
Steinmann has suggested, photography seems to function within 
social media ‘as a collective, transindividual affective practice’.38 To  
be sure, social networking software facilitates the collaborative input  
of large numbers of people in the all-important process of tagging.  
As Daniel Rubinstein and Katrina Sluis explain:
Tagging, commenting, titling and annotating of images are 
essential elements of participation in the social aspects of photo 
sharing which play a role in creating communities of users 
interested in specific images39
Given the importance of databases in digital networks, one conclusion 
we might draw is that aggregations of images are increasingly more 
important than individual images. Indeed, value is acquired through 
circulation, and the individual author of specific photographs is often 
unimportant.40
The online networking of photography and the participatory 
world of Web 2.0 is altering the dynamic between photographer and 
machine in ways that writers like Flusser and Stallabrass could not 
have anticipated. The digital camera is now thoroughly entwined with 
the network, and the redundancy of individual views of the world 
has in some ways been institutionalised. Thus the Dutch site Woophy 
(WOrld Of PHotographY) encourages amateurs anywhere – in Borges-
like fashion – to fulfil its ambition “to ultimately cover every inch of 
our world map with images that represent the world’s beauty”. For 
the exhibition We Are All Photographers Now! (2007) at the Musée 
de l’Elysée in Lausanne, Switzerland, anyone who was interested 
could submit a photo online. In an attempt to respond to the rapidly 
changing world of digital photography, submissions were received 
from more than 7500 photographers from 128 countries. However, 
rather than one or more humans selecting the work to be shown – in 
the manner of classic group exhibitions like The Family of Man (1955) 
– each week a hundred images were chosen at random by a computer 
and printed in archival quality. The selections were shown in  
the museum for a week before being replaced by the next selection,  
and so on.
A number of critical artistic strategies have also emerged from this 
new context. German artist and photography critic Andreas Müller-
Pohle anticipated key aspects of the current situation in his 1985 
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manifesto-like essay ‘Information strategies’, written at the cusp of the 
emergence of digital photography. Müller-Pohle predicted that soon  
‘it will be possible to generate and regenerate literally every conceivable 
– or inconceivable – picture through a computer terminal’.41 This 
declaration coincided with Müller-Pohle’s critique of conventional 
photography, which he found “exhausted” as a strategy. Deeply 
influenced by Flusser’s basic position that most photographs are 
redundant, he wrote of the ‘impressionistic gestures’ of conventional 
creative photographers that ‘can only be consistent in so far as they 
are concentrated into “a personal way of seeing”’ (stylization), and 
dubbed this process “photographism”. Müller-Pohle’s own response as 
an artist was to turn his attention to the apparatus itself, and to digital 
code in particular. Müller-Pohle’s prediction about generating pictures 
through the computer terminal has found some unlikely realisations 
in the form of software tools such as Google Image Search. Indeed, a 
number of contemporary artists have chosen to use the automated 
cameras of Google Street View for their creative projects. Artists Jon 
Rafman, Michael Wolf, Mishka Henner, and others have utilised the 
space of Google Street View as a virtual form of photojournalism, 
personalising the impersonal lens of Google’s roving cars. Rafman 
has compared his work with Google Street View to that of classic 
street photographers like Cartier-Bresson, who sought out “decisive” 
moments of serendipity.42 Now, however, instead of a photographer 
capturing something unfolding in front of the camera, images 
are found and selected retrospectively, long after the moment has 
occurred, by scanning and hunting in Google’s vast image archives. 
The photographer is no longer present to the event, only to the 
monitor screen.
Some of the more adventurous and engaged curators have started 
to recognise the challenge to conventional ways of thinking about 
photography posed by networked photography. For the exhibition 
From Here On at the 2011 Arles photographic festival, five artists and 
artistic directors (Clément Chéroux, Joan Fontcuberta, Erik Kessels, 
Martin Parr, and Joachim Schmid) signed a manifesto declaring a 
profound change in photography brought about by the dominance of 
the Internet and digital creative methods in accessing and distributing 
images. The display included thirty-six artists who recycle, clip 
and cut pictures from sites like Google Earth, Google Street View, 
Facebook and Flickr. The exhibition continued to privilege a creative 
role for individual artists – reasserting their ability to make sense of 
the new digital universe – but their traditional role was questioned. 
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For instance, one of the “photographers” was a cat from Devon called 
Nancy Bean. In recent years, thanks to inexpensive, lightweight 
“petcams” that can be fastened to a collar and programmed to take 
photographs at regular intervals, a number of “photographer cats” 
have emerged and even attained minor celebrity status. Nancy Bean’s 
owner, Christian Allen, fitted his three-legged cat with a camera as 
part of his architecture course at the University of Plymouth. The 
resulting photographs are much as you might imagine – low-angled 
and often blurry images of gardens and the sky, the underside of 
cars, the cat bowl, the occasional human or animal encounter, and 
so on. Admittedly, cat photographers – the most famous is Cooper 
(www.photographercat.com), an American Shorthair in Seattle who 
has sold thousands of dollars of his work in galleries – are only as 
good as the images their owners select. However, they underline not 
only the redundancy of most photographs, while also hinting at the 
imminent explosion of images by non-humans. Apparently humans 
are increasingly incidental to photographic production.
Conclusion
My aim here has not been to evoke nostalgia for master photographers 
and their frequently grandiose claims, nor to elicit any specific 
political or aesthetic concerns about image saturation. My point is 
not to evince nostalgia for the analogue era, but to recognise the 
current conditions for photographic production. I am particularly 
interested in whether photography historians, theorists and curators 
need to start thinking about photographic authorship in more 
critically expansive ways. As we have seen, the creative act no longer 
belongs to the photographer alone, if it ever did, but is deferred 
to software, and to increasingly collaborative possibilities (both 
human non-human). At all levels – capturing, editing, distributing 
and receiving – the traditional role of individual human agency in 
photography is changing. Thus, even as viewers of online images via 
sites like Photosynth are increasingly ‘free to explore an extensive and 
dynamic image space unconstrained by […] an authorised or “correct” 
viewing position’, computer software is increasingly capable of 
reading the images that reside in online databases, both via metadata 
and image pattern recognition.43 In short, the decision making that 
Flusser reserved for human operators is opened up to various modes 
of software-enabled interactive viewing. This has major implications 
for how we might think about the idea of photography and its 
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fundamentally human-centred terms such as “witnessing”. I began 
this chapter with reference to the release of recent digital cameras 
that seek to extend the creative act via delayed decision making – 
respectively, post-capture focus, and “real time” engagement with the 
world via the electronic view-finder. We might now understand these 
developments as introducing photographic experiences of a particular 
kind, ones that are romantically attached to the individual who is 
immersed in the network and yet still struggling to visualize a sense 
of their own position within it. That is, experiential photography is a 
paradoxical appeal to resist the logic of the networked apparatus, and 
its transfer of agency, already underway, from the camera operator to 
the new functionaries, both human and non-human, of the database.
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Introduction: Technical-Aesthetic Observation
Walter Benjamin, in his second version of The Work of Art in the 
Age of its Mechanical Reproducibility, expressed a historical opening 
for media technologies beyond their participation in what he had 
before called the phantasmagoria of capital and commodity.1 In it he 
wrote that the loss of aura in a work was not a loss or destruction 
of an aesthetic sense, but rather a possibility for a new acquisition of 
human apperception – precisely a practice and mode of observation – 
opened up by technology. Film, which was a technological extension 
of the “photographic device” in its image/shot editing technique, was 
a form of “play”.2 
 
Object Communication of the 
Photographic Assemblage
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Far from arguing that photography and film represent a deterministic 
technological deployment for mastery over nature, Benjamin describes 
the establishment or opening of a field of play where it is not merely 
images, sequences, celluloid and lenses at play. Along with these 
media, human knowledge, discourse, bodies and practices enter 
the field, and are repeated for refinement and learning. Benjamin 
recognizes here what Bourdieu would call habitus and Foucault 
would label techniques of the self – in Benjamin’s case, all through 
media technologies. Segments of life here are a process of procedures, 
rehearsal, and then mimesis – Benjamin will identify mimesis as the 
‘primal phenomenon of all artistic activity’ and the human body as the 
simplest medium for mimetic practice.3 ‘The mime presents himself 
as a semblance […] he plays his subject’.4 In playing and rehearsing 
through these media, it is not the photograph or the film as work 
that represent reality (since they have lost their aura), but, rather, the 
human body, its movements and its identity that become semblances 
of other things in the world. Benjamin provides a moment of 
contribution to a post-humanism, importantly, not through semiology, 
or the discursive or psychoanalytic lenses that would emerge later, 
but specifically through the analysis of media and human beings. 
Benjamin’s claim is that a new social formation, a new collective, was 
linked to humanity’s future capacity to live and communicate through 
the technologically mediated rehearsals, as a human being’s ‘whole 
constitution has adapted itself to the new productive forces which the 
second technology has set free.’ 5 
Crucial to Benjamin’s analysis is his conception of photographic 
and cinematic technologies – not in the sense of being visual mediums 
employed by the producer, but in terms of how those technologies 
function beyond both their visual and aesthetic contexts, as well as 
the producer’s intention. This approach raises the question: what, in 
specific relation to the photographic and cinematic, is the purpose 
of technology? In his critical account of technological processes 
Benjamin combines his historiographic and philosophical approach 
with descriptions of bodies and objects as well as the spaces of 
technological procedure. Communication, both human to human 
and technology to human, matters. His answer to the above question 
is that the purpose of technologies is that of experiment, where 
through technologies the process of play strips the human being of 
its metaphysical character. This is precisely the process he describes 
in a cinematic “test performance,” one in front of a group of experts 
(directors, producers, etc.) that interact with each performance, one 
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that is repeated and performed non-narratively, non-linearly. The 
result of such an experiment, is, again, the transformation of what 
human is, when:
the human being is placed in a position where he must  
operate with his whole living person, while forgoing its aura. 
For the aura is bound to his presence in the here and now.6
Radical Historiography and Media Objects
This observation derives from a larger media history project 
that analyses computing research documents from the cold war, 
specifically the period from late 1950s to early 1960s, or the shift 
from 2nd generation (transistor powered) computers to 3rd generation 
digital computers (which utilized microelectronics in the form of 
the integrated circuit). Within this context I take Manuel Delanda’s 
extension of Gilles Deleuze’s assemblage theory as a useful way to 
analyse computers and photography in non-representational,  
non-hermeneutic terms. I also see assemblage theory as an example 
of a larger area of media analysis that utilizes the nonhuman as a 
principle catalyst of change and that integrates critical humanist  
and scientific modes of thought. 
Photographic technology has a twofold historical relation to this 
development of computers. First, photography fits (too neatly) into 
computers’ past as one technology in official stories of a lineage of 
visual technologies – from painting, to imagistic, to screen to interface 
– whereby each new medium takes what is aesthetically useful from its 
predecessor while simultaneously putting the prior form into a state 
of precarity. We then see a sequence of “deaths” (of the photographic 
in the face of immaterial image, of the cinematic in the face of 
proliferating interactive and small screens, of the televisual in the face 
of a litany of online content, etc.).
Second, engineers, scientists, the military and burgeoning  
computing corporations all utilized photography to document  
computers within their spaces of experiment. As early as 1954 the u.s. 
military computing research showed signs of being embroiled in a new 
paradigm of visuality as new fields of knowledge (such as cybernetics) 
and information formed from shifts in research goals, language, and 
technological design. Photography played a part in this clamouring 
and was deployed not only for cataloguing, but also in order to model 
the changing laboratory and indicate how the technology would  
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similarly transform institutional, economic, and epistemological 
forms. I take seriously the theoretical claim that computers specifically, 
and technologies generally, should be conceived of as historical and 
cultural agents – what the historian of science Jorgs Rheinberger calls 
“epistemic things” – those objects of experiment that become “real” in 
the material operationalizations (laboratories/equipment) and episte-
mological forms (scientific theories) that they produce.7 An epistemic 
thing, like a gene in biology, or particle in physics, is an object that 
obtains reality despite, or actually precisely because its conception is 
“fuzzy”.8 My claim is that, outside of the very specific experimental  
scientific fields, “medium” is just such an epistemic thing – and so 
both photography and computing technology become similarly “fuzzy” 
and withdrawn in their representations to human observers. My 
purpose is not to show that the digital has resulted in a fundamental 
shift in visual media culture, in a post-photographic or post-cinematic 
epoch. I argue instead that there is little or no difference between the 
photographic and computational that would set computers apart as 
a medium, communicative form and agent. Rather, what shifts (or 
should shift) from one to the other is the level or order of observation. 
What is new but not exclusive to the computing medium is the general 
question of communication qua communication in which the figures 
of human machine symbiosis and the interface stand in for canon or 
form and content of a work – not as representational concepts but as 
features of reality. The computer is merely another moment where a 
medium moves beyond its aesthetic and provides a possibility for the 
mingling of critical humanistic analysis with realist and technoscien-
tific thought. Don Ihde describes technoscience as ‘the hybrid output 
of science and technology, now bound inextricably into a compound.’ 9 
This hybrid is a synthesis of histories, ‘that of technologies that go 
back as far as all human origins, and that of science,’ seen as a modern 
history.10 The value in a technoscientific historical perspective lies in 
its unhinging of our belief that an unmediated human sensation exists. 
Ultimately, this level of observation does away with the fallacy of 
an original unmediated experience by which technologies are meas-
ured, and when brought to bear on photography yields innovative an-
alytic insight within photographic theory. It also does work to bridge 
the gulf between humanistic and scientific treatments of the visual. As 
with Benjamin, who expressed affinity both with a technoscientific 
description of cinematic technologies with non-human purpose of play, 
there have since been important expressions of non-human purpose 
correlating with the proliferation of computing technologies. 
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Gilles Deleuze, whose most famous foray into the philosophy of 
technology/media was the cautionary tale ‘Postscript on Control 
Societies’, expressed another historical way of opening critical 
thought up to the highly technical and scientific at a moment when 
the electronic revolution was giving way to the information society.11 
Deleuze borrowed heavily from the observations and figures of 
experimental sciences, seeing complexity/chaos theories, black holes 
and singularities as resonating with his immanentist philosophy. In 
his work with Félix Guattari, Deleuze reconfigured art, science and 
philosophy as the three fundamental threads of human creative 
endeavor, all of which engaged with the figure of chaos by casting 
a plane over it.12 Further, Deleuze was specifically interested in the 
meeting of the three planes in chaos, ‘the relations between the 
arts, science, and philosophy’, the resonance of thought and mutual 
creativity revealing that there was ‘no order of priority among  
these disciplines’.13 In his refusal to order these fields into a hierarchy 
vis-à-vis their relationship to meaning or creativity, Deleuze insists 
that none of these disciplines see chaos as a problem that needs 
to be scientifically or philosophically solved. Rather, it is a space 
rich in its productive potential as an ongoing problem-space, or 
the “virtual”. DeLanda will identify Deleuze’s as a process-oriented 
philosophy that breaks from the ontological tradition going from 
Aristotle to Kant, using chaos in order to free problems of knowledge 
from the subordination to solutions.14 Ultimately, what constitutes 
the subsequent assemblage theory is an openness to objects whose 
purpose is unknown to humans. This intervention is significant in 
that it is a shift towards recognising an object-oriented approach to 
purpose, agency and organization. This works only because of the 
continual integration of scientific and philosophical thought.
For Deleuze, each epistemological thread also comes into 
‘relations of mutual resonance and exchange at moments of emergence 
of a type of material organization with purpose; what he and Felix 
Guattari theorize as a machinic assemblage.15 It is from this basis that 
DeLanda extrapolates his notion of machinic phylum, ‘the overall set 
of self organizing processes in the universe’, a concept that may be 
reproduced as a historical figure for the emergence of highly specific 
organizations in a given particular moment.16 This self-organization 
is the translation of autopoiesis from the realm of biological life to 
the world of inorganic objects, what De Landa considers even more 
radically as inorganic life.17
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Theorizing visual images along with their medium in an assemblage 
places them within what media theorist Ian Bogost calls an Object 
Oriented Ontology (ooo), which, importantly, conceives of humans 
as elements but never the sole elements of philosophical thought. ooo 
draws equal ‘attention to things at all scales’.18 ooo would conceive 
of medium generated images as expressing a sort of reality to the 
universe and to any observer therein. Things are real insofar as they 
exist and have purpose beyond the scope of human observation and 
intention. Scale here is crucial not as a concept that destroys human 
perspective (subjectivity) per se, but rather, as DeLanda has argued, 
that allows movement of analysis between the micro (sub-personal) 
and macro (extra-personal) scales.19
For DeLanda an assemblage is the emergence of a non-
totalizing whole from heterogeneous parts, through a process ‘in 
which language plays an important but not constitutive part’.20 
Additionally, DeLanda believes there to be a fundamental distinction 
between representational constructions and the virtual modeling of 
physical processes by computing technologies. The motor driving 
representational descriptions is a “relation of interiority” within 
language and semantic meaning, where none of the representational 
parts have an autonomous existence outside their relationships to 
other terms. 
Assemblage theory relies instead on a relation of exteriority, 
that is, an exteriority of existence beyond human beings. The 
components of any assemblage, even nouns and verbs within 
a grammar, exist independently of their relationality to one 
another, and each also exercises a capacity to affect and be affected 
independently of anything like a homogeneous rule of language. In 
this sense, photographs can be seen as part of a concatenation of 
many things: the scaling down of objects within its mise-en-scène 
to the representational; the chemical and material processes that 
constituted it; and, beyond the photographic image itself, the cameras, 
computers, bodies and institutions to which it is connected. Key to 
this reorganization is the notion of a “within” to photographs, the 
idea that images contain visual objects whose identities depend on 
their relationships to one another as well as to the “actual” objects 
they correspond to. At the heart of De Landa’s argument is the idea 
that symbols carry non-linguistic information, and that there is a 
possibility for observing this non-linguistic, non-representational 
information from material, as well as discursive, objects in the world.21 
I wish to extend this possibility to the medium of photography, in a 
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very specific attempt to analyze the elements of archival photography 
alongside other physical materials as relations of exteriority whereby 
forms of signification, photorealistic image, technical sketch, icon, 
text, number, etc. cease to have well-maintained or decipherable 
interior “content.” Instead, each will be conceived of as a “social 
entity” not because of particular properties it contains or represents, 
but rather because of the capacities it has to interact with other social 
entities.22 In this sense there is no unified hermeneutic approach or 
aesthetic sensibility dictating what a photograph “depicts.” 
Bogost, in assessing numerous strands of object oriented thought, 
gives an account of how analysis could approach its object non-
hermeneutically and effectively translates the metaphysics of ooo into 
a practical method. Ontography, Bogost explains, is a figure deployed 
by many object oriented thinkers as a general ‘inscriptive strategy’ 
for maintaining a nonanthropocentric vantage point of objects while 
describing their interrelatedness, in order to show their ‘repleteness 
and interobjectivity’.23 Ontography accomplishes this precisely because 
it is not an attempt at ontology, an understanding of the essence of 
things, but a description of basic relationality (and disruption or non-
relationality) in a given space of things. 
For Bogost, the list is the simplest discursive example of things 
that do ontographic work. Lists offer a mere naming, a revelation 
of object relationality without ‘necessarily offering clarification or 
description of any kind’.24 Crucially, both narrative and perspective 
fall by the wayside when listing. A list needs no order or hierarchical 
organization – it is not a sequence but a series. In addition, the 
capacity of a list to relate things to one another and to itself does not 
rely on an author or the origin of its writing. We may build here  
on a type of writing, based on random or ephemeral observations  
of things, that need not derive from an essential textuality in 
analysis. Whereas for Bogost lists do ontographic work on the 
register of written language, visual images, specifically photographic, 
do ontographic work when they present an ‘exploded view’ of 
the universe.25 An exploded view diagram, again borrowed from 
engineering and scientific practices of construction, provides a 
diagram of the numerous components within a body or organization 
– the constituents that form a unit – pulled apart yet in proximity and 
relation to one another. Photography is not merely representational 
(the implication being that text/logos is), but provides a chemical 
visual catalogue of actual phenomena – it is a “way of looking” that 
can provide an exploded view of what is generally taken to be a  
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mise-en-scène.26 It is here that we may push, with the help of 
assemblage theory, beyond Bogost’s distinction between lists and 
photographs, between words and images as things. What results is a 
type of critical observation or analysis that is even further removed 
from a strictly hermeneutic approach that by its nature values 
things as it renders them meaningful. Text and photography, when 
recognized as media or things that have purpose beyond their human 
designs, are two unique assemblages from a multiplicity of others. 
From a radically historical media perspective the photographic 
correlates no more to the real than does writing; just as writing is not 
a refinement of orality, nor is the present digital image transformative 
of the photographic. 
In what follows I present a list of particular image units including 
an icon/graphic art (fig. 1), a technical sketch (fig. 2), flow charts (figs. 
3, 6) and photographs (figs. 4, 5). The image units are not placed in 
any particular order based on their analytic relationship, and each 
has a multiplicity of relationships with one another based on the 
interiority of visual objects as well as the exteriority from which they 
were constructed. With attention paid to the assemblage of these units 
one sees the immensity of exterior relationality based in part on the 
archive from which they derive, the historical moment of the spaces 
and bodies that did exist in the past, as well as the bodies and things 
in the present moment. What begins to form analytically is a litany, 
an endless speaking of things and butting up against one another. 
Given Bogost’s understanding of photographic images as being 
diagrammatic and providing exploded views, as well as DeLanda’s 
claim that all elements of the visual or symbolic have non-linguistic 
information, we can observe the below figures as reorganizing 
themselves. These images cease to have any figurative relationship 
whatsoever. A picture is not worth 1000 words and the Figure 2 is not 
a lower resolution, less-realized visual than a photograph of a data 
bank would be.
On the interactions among art, science, and philosophy Deleuze 
concluded that, like any other unique individual or singularity – the 
members of an assemblage are not individuals as autonomous and 
closed; a singularity is a tendency to become an event (melting point 
elements, the tendency of a film cell to emulsify, or the tendency of 
a scientist to model a particular feature of the universe) – within an 
assemblage, that the three are fundamentally different.27 As with any 
encounter with the other, science could never see art or philosophy 
outside of its need for descriptions and its production of functions, 
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Figure 1. Cover page of brochure for Joint Navy/Air Force/Army computer research centre.
Figure 2. Technical drawing of an imagined “Data Bank”.
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Figure 3. Flow Chart depicting the associative memory 
capability of a digital computer circa 1965.
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Figure 4. Photograph of woman seated at magic: a machine  
for automatic graphic interface to a computer.
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Figure 5. A remote visual display test circa 1970.
Figure 6. Flow Chart used to depict command control function  
of National Bureau of Standards Computer Research Facility.
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art can only ever see the production of affects, and philosophy 
cannot but conceive of the fundamental or metaphysical concepts 
produced in the other two forms of thought. With all three being 
creative internally, and a final non-translation of the scientific into the 
philosophical and vice versa, mediators are fundamental. An observer 
of any cloth (artist/scientist/philosopher) must recognize that he or 
she is always working within a group, a series, an assemblage of other 
individuals: 
If you’re not in some series, even a completely imaginary one, 
you’re lost. I need my mediators to express myself, and they’d
never express themselves without me.28
Deleuze’s theory of media here does not mention technologies outright 
because of its demand that mediators be anything in relation to any 
other thing, whether sentient, inanimate, or imagined. We find here 
a peculiar conflation, or rather reconfiguration in Deleuze that can 
be used to define medium. There is no binary of medium versus non-
medium or mediated versus immediate because, as Deleuze claims, the 
great affinity between contemporary sciences and a philosophy that 
feels the need to interact with and know it, is the shared imperative 
that a search for origins has been undone. The concern now is for 
the “in between”. A photograph does not mediate a human vision 
or aesthetic affect, and a computer does not mediate virtual human 
to human communication or information – because neither exists in 
a context that derives from human purposes. The movements of the 
photographic and the computational through history must be delinked 
from human design and the line of teleology. Interestingly, then, as in 
Benjamin’s test-performance human, we can begin to discuss human 
purpose as well, without epistemological constraints such as origin 
versus end, real versus imaginary, and human versus nature – all the 
inheritances of a dualistic epistemology in Western Philosophy. 
The reconceptualization of media technologies as agents provides 
a radical historiographic methodology, radical in that the de-emphasis 
of historical conventions of inventor, time-line, and new versus old. 
Also, as media histories are becoming an increasingly important 
form of scholarship in New Media Studies, this conceptualization 
provides specifically for a radically historical approach to media 
studies. A radically historical media studies does not merely produce 
histories of technological objects, but participates in a recursion, a 
reflexive turning in on itself in order to articulate a history of media 
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technologies with a history of the development of Media Studies itself. 
Like Deleuze, who clamoured to know the experimental sciences that 
were both separate from and interdependent with his immanentist 
philosophy, media historians would recognize the extent to which 
their objects of study actively engage them as subjects and move them 
to the kinds of knowledge they produce. The analysis of images – still, 
moving, physical and virtual – would become a “nomad science”, a 
mode of knowledge production which, like technological objects, 
is something that functions beyond the designs of the “sedentary” 
universalizing fields of science from which it escapes. Nomad sciences 
treat all of the types of matter that human beings encounter as 
animated from within by their own tendencies and capacities to both 
move and be moved by us.29 
In Thinking Otherwise: Philosophy, Communication, 
Technology communication theorist David J. Gunkel provides 
a critique of digital reason, a frame of thought extended from 
modernity’s theory of knowledge into the context of digital culture 
and Internet communication technologies.30 The figure of reason here 
continues to generate numerous dualisms based on a fundamentally 
binary logic: Universal/Particular, Theory/Application, Inside/Outside, 
Subject/Object, etc.. What results is a fundamental epistemological 
framework from which scientific and critical observers begin to 
describe information and communication technologies. What we 
continue to assume, is that at the “other end of the digital line” as well 
as what ultimately organizes a computer’s role in that line, is a  
human. Gunkel concludes that though he is seemingly arguing about 
how to describe and use computing technologies, that the stakes for 
escaping binary logic is fundamentally about our ethical encounter 
with the other. 
Thinking otherwise about media technologies with nonhuman 
purposes is one among numerous forms of knowing that addresses 
the fundamentally ethical nature of otherness. Thinking through 
technology as a purposive non-human is not to claim that it has a 
special status or primacy over other non-human members – species or 
animal beings, organic non-sentient life, general inorganic objects, for 
instance – it resonates with them all and contributes to a critical mass 
of pushing humanity/humanism into the plenitude of their universe. 
What becomes visible between the seeming extremes of nonhuman 
agency writ large and the dualistic thinking of human tradition, is the 
in between of ethical other-centric stances of all kinds. 
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This author recognizes the immense problem of engaging in analysis 
that “moves beyond” the history of dualistic epistemology in the West. 
The proposition I’ve put forth, of our reorientation with things, can in 
its own right be seen as a sort of progress narrative, falling back into 
a binary of bad versus good ideas, and nonhuman liberation. But as 
Deleuze and Guatarri wrote: 
We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another […] 
each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo 
the dualisms we had no wish to construct but through which 
we pass.31
It is perhaps that, while admitting the limitations of conducting non-
dualistic and non-anthropocentric thought, the incessant motivation, 
driven by an ethics of nonhuman others, can produce a technique 
of dualistic corrective that may persist in future analyses of media 
technologies. 
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In 1889 George Eastman, the founder of Eastman Kodak Company, 
introduced the No. 1 Kodak camera with the catchy slogan ‘you 
press the button, we do the rest’. While photography still involves 
pressing the button the “we” and the “rest” have transformed 
significantly during the last few decades. In the age of information, 
‘photography has come to exist within a new technological 
environment’, as Martin Lister aptly puts it.1 This shift has wide-
reaching cultural consequences that also involve our bodily existence, 
even if no significant changes can easily be recognized at the level of 
the trigger finger.
It is a widely recognized fact that images are involved in 
thinking processes. Their status, however, has been heavily disputed. 
The figurative elements of thinking have been seen now as a sign 
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of weakness of thinking, now as its innermost strength. Logical 
empiricism and early romanticism could be used to mark the two 
extremes in this regard.
Thinking, however, does not only rely on imaginative elements 
that refer to our bodily experience; it also takes place in the body.  
The body is the place where the intellect and the senses come  
together and constitute meaningful thinking. Referring to Immanuel 
Kant’s “transcendental aesthetics” we could say that the body 
schematizes.2 It makes an “image” of reality, and, at the same time, 
takes part in it as an image-like unit. Further, the question as to 
whether and how thinking finds its place in images is a theme taken  
up by numerous philosophers and media theorists. It is all but  
self-evident how to demarcate the place of thinking with regard 
to living and non-living bodies and the images they, in one way or 
another, embody.3
In the discussions concerning the relations between image, body 
and thinking, interestingly enough, attention has often been turned 
to photography. In Jacques Rancière’s discussion of the pensiveness 
of images, photography constitutes a paradigmatic example.4 In How 
Images Think, Ron Burnett takes up photography as a good example 
of intelligence programmed into images.5 Jean-Luc Nancy, in turn, 
has paid attention to an analogy between the Cartesian cogito and 
photography.6 He writes: ‘Every photograph is an irrefutable and 
luminous I am […] Like the other ego sum, this one is made explicit 
as an ego cogito. Photography thinks […]’.7 Nancy also insists on the 
inseparability of body and thinking in Descartes: ‘for Descartes, the 
res cogitans is a body’.8
Against this background it seems that image, body and thinking 
relate to each other in a circular way: both body and thinking make 
use of images, both images and bodies think, and both thinking 
and images involve a body. Should one break this circle or should 
one dive into it? I choose the latter: I dive in, since I think that this 
seemingly vicious circle can be turned into a productive one, even 
if it soon becomes obvious that one touches here upon the limits of 
conceptualization.
I want to ask how photography contributes to this frame of 
“bodily schematism”. I will focus on the question of haptic realism and 
the way it builds on the interplay of three aspects of embodiment that 
I would like to call (1) the physical body, (2) the phenomenological 
body and (3) the libidinal body. The notion of “haptic realism” refers 
here to the peculiar role that touching (both in tactile and in affective 
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terms) plays in representations that are considered realistic. Using 
these terms, I will develop a hypothesis that aims at indicating how a 
certain shift in the cultural status of touching might contribute  
to reshaping the “photographic” conditions of embodiment in the age 
of information. 
Photographic Distance and Proximity
It has become one of the commonplaces of recent media theoretical 
debates to state that digital media transform the frame of human 
experience. It is not difficult to find a consensus on this general level 
of the diagnosis of a shift. It is easy, for example, to agree on the fact 
that digital media are changing our sense of time and space – the 
conditions of our bodily existence – in many ways. Distance and 
proximity, in both physical and mental senses, take new forms. The 
task of theoretically articulating the details and the transformation 
mechanisms of experience that is at stake here is, however, a 
much more complicated matter and leads to numerous questions 
and debates.
In these debates photography is often claimed to be an outmoded 
medium as we live in digital or even post-digital culture. Photography 
is, however, booming like never before, both in terms of the quantity 
of images produced and the multiplicity of new photographic 
technologies and practices. In its current state of rapid transformation 
and diversification photography shows rich cultural potential, a 
situation comparable to the first decades after the invention of 
photography in 1839. As a consequence, photography research is 
facing new challenges and gaining a new importance.
Today, photographic technologies are linked to new production 
and publishing structures that alter the ways photographs circulate. 
This has multifaceted social, economical, political and theoretical 
consequences that are difficult to decipher. What to think, for 
example, of the fact that with the help of metadata that accompanies 
the digital image, moments of capturing, processing, presentation 
and distribution can be automatically interlinked in ways that go 
beyond visual mastery of spatiotemporal relations? To use Lev 
Manovich’s terms, it would seem that digitally mediated photographs 
are part of another kind of “cultural interface” or “cultural software” 
than film-based photography.9 The cultural status of photographic 
images is undergoing a transformation. My question will be: how to 
articulate this in terms of “bodily schematism?” How are the intimate 
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connections between body, thinking and photography currently 
changing? 
The sense of touch offers a productive starting point for an 
enquiry into these questions. The highly ambivalent role that touching 
has in western thinking is symptomatic of the tensional relation 
between physiological, mental and technical aspects of sentience. 
Touch twines together physical and psychical movements and 
intensifies them in pleasure and pain. To touch is always, in one way 
or another, to touch a limit, to push it and to test it, and, in the same 
instance, to attest to it. Touch is sentience at the limits, and thus an 
exemplary figure of reconfiguration. 
In contrast to other senses, at least seemingly, the sense of touch 
makes the sensing and the sensed coincide. When I see a stone, it 
is “out there” and does not see me, but when I touch that stone, it is 
“right here” and touches me. This sense of concreteness and immediacy 
lends the sense of touch a certain credibility. A seen stone can be 
made of plastic even if it looks just like a stone, but when I touch it 
I can feel the material. It is due to this fullness of touching that the 
tactile metaphor of “grasping” can stand for “fully understanding 
something”. From this point of view the sense of touch appears to 
be uncomplicated and immediate. On closer inspection, however, 
its status as a sense is rather difficult to grasp. In fact, it is more 
appropriate to speak of senses of touch, since touching exceeds the 
tactile world and encompasses also immaterial aspects of experience. 
Due to its multifaceted characteristics touch also challenges 
representational thinking in many ways.10
Photographs make this evident in a poignant way when they 
touch us at the same time as they withdraw themselves from the realm 
tangibility and meanings. As Margaret Olin points out, there is a 
tension between the ways in which photographs involve looking and 
touching: ‘the two activities seem to alternate like a blinking eye,  
as though we cannot do both at the same time’.11 This implies that our 
grasp of photographs does not take place in the light of knowledge 
only. One might recall here also the thought-provoking claim that 
Roland Barthes makes in Camera Lucida, according to which  
‘a photograph is always invisible’.12 Visibility falls short of explaining 
the ways in which we relate ourselves to photographic images.  
A photograph is touching when it provokes speech by being mute, 
and when it opens up a space for thinking by a gesture of closing 
itself off, by being individually separate and distinct. In other words, 
a photograph’s entry into the realm of representations is mediated, 
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besides vision, also by a distant touch – not unlike an eye contact that 
seizes the gaze only as absent.13
Touching is a moot point in western conceptions of embodied 
experience due to its peculiar role as a mediator between the material 
and immaterial aspects of reality. Different conceptual articulations 
and arguments, however, almost invariably share the “haptocentric” 
idea that touching is a way of locating and guaranteeing the contact 
between different elements of experience.14 On this basis, reality 
is understood as being-in-touch-with-something-real. The matter 
is further complicated by the fact that the different parties to this 
contact have many names in our tradition: soul, mind, psyche, reason 
versus body, flesh, sensuality, etc.. Correspondingly, the contact 
itself has been studied from the point of view of religion, intuition, 
reflection and synapses.
Touch, as a mediator between processes of signification, 
affectivity and materiality, figures prominently also in discourses 
on photography. Various forms of contact play an important role, 
especially whenever photography is inscribed into the tradition of 
“true images” (vera icon) or “self-generated images” (acheiropoietoi). 
Variations of this scheme can be found in Henry Fox Talbot’s ideas of 
“natural magic”, c.s. Peirce’s “indexical” sign function, André Bazin’s 
“objectivity”, and Roland Barthes’s discourse on “punctum”.15 With 
regard to the digitalization of photography the role of touching in  
its relation to seeing is, however, highly ambivalent. This is not quite 
unexpected, since, in the experiential horizon of digital technology, 
the status of touch as a guarantor of tangible reality would appear 
unstable, as a great deal of what we consider real is anything but 
tangible – even when we find it touching. At the same time, touch as 
tactility plays an important role in various forms of interface design. 
There the implicit aim is to functionalize touch and to integrate it 
into a system of digital mediations in order to increase the sense of 
instantaneity and realism. In these settings, touch tends to become 
represented as a sense that works in synchrony with vision offering a 
support for optical intuitionism. The question arises of how to relate 
tangibility to the conceptual, affective and mental dimensions of  
touch or feel.
In the 1990s much of the discussion concerning digitalization of 
photography focused on questions of difference between the digital 
and the analogue. Digitalization was often seen as a fundamental shift 
comparable to the invention of phonetic writing16 or that of central 
perspective.17 These debates led to various reconsiderations of the 
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peculiar convergence between notions of photographic realism and 
discourses of indexicality.18 Today, as photography has come to exist 
within a new technological environment, questions of connectivity, 
mobility and metadata are also starting to play an important part in 
considerations of the photographic “reality effect”. In Frieder Nake’s 
terms, we could say that at the same time as there are ever more 
invisible indices on the “subface”, which are made operative in the 
construction of photographic “reality effects”, the digital ‘surface’ is 
modelled on photographic looks that are familiar from film-based 
photography.19 Photoshop filters such as “film grain” and “lens flare” 
are in this respect telling examples.
What strikes me in these debates is the way in which most 
conceptions of photographic evidence tend to rely on ideas of 
continuity and causality. Photographic “reality effect” – regardless 
of whether it is held to be a result of context-related signification or 
material mediation – seems to be modelled on the “haptocentric”  
idea according to which the “real” is something we can grasp mentally 
or touch physically, and ideally both in a synchronous way. In short,  
the rhetoric of photographic realism builds, in one way or another,  
on continuity of chains of reference.
At first glance there would seem to be a clear contrast between 
mental continuity and sensuous contiguity, between the sign and the 
trace. On closer inspection, however, we can discern that the trace-
like character of the photographic image relies, in the last instance, on 
some kind of authorization, an “authorizing legend” that establishes 
the continuity of chains of reference.20 It is telling that even if 
photographs (and the various layers of metadata attached to them)  
can be used as pieces of evidence in court, they cannot replace 
a testimony. The photographic trace needs to be authorized, i.e. 
“culturally generated”.21 The other side of the coin is that signification 
processes need to be embodied, i.e. bundled and incorporated, in  
order to be effective.
Haptic Realism
I would go as far as to claim – this is my hypothesis – that the very 
notion of photographic realism is “haptocentric” in the sense that  
it tends to function as a vehicle for reproducing the idea of touch as  
an objective sense, i.e. as haptic sense operating in the realm of 
physical bodies. In short, visual capture combined with perceptual 
and cognitive recognition tends to objectify bodies.
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This operation tends to conceal something that we, following 
Bernhard Waldenfels, could call the “pathic moment” of touching.22 
The term “pathic”, derived from the Greek word pathos, refers to 
sensibility, affectedness and suffering. Inherent to the term, although 
normally ignored, is the concrete sense of being exposed to something 
excessive and unexpected that can even leave painful marks, such  
as wounds. In a word, “pathic moment” refers to an exposedeness 
that is implicated in all forms of touching.
Following Waldenfels it can be argued that as regards the 
phenomenological body, touching constitutes a prototype of “pathic 
experience”.23 It is the felt sense of being in the world, of being 
exposed: to touch is always also to be touched. Although touching is 
contact with the touched, there remains something inaccessible and 
withdrawing, something even untouchable inherent to the touched. 
This withdrawal lends to the contact an affective tension: the touched 
becomes touching. In other words, touching is over-determined 
by otherness as strangeness, and it turns out to manifest traits of a 
“foreign-sense”, with respective ethical significance.24 This elemental 
asymmetry tends to be ruled out when touching is studied in terms of 
immediacy and symmetry of contact. 
As a prototype of “pathic experience” touch turns out to be a 
complex field of sensing and feeling. In short, it is the making sense 
of various encounterings. This elementary function implies that when 
we consider the sensory distance, we cannot take the separateness of 
sensor and sensed as our point of departure, because to be exact, they 
are only articulated as such in touching. Furthermore, the question 
as to what should be invested in the positions of sensor and sensed is 
historical. To be able to study the suspension of sensory distance we 
must take into account “phenomenotechnics”, i.e. the technical and 
technological conditions of each particular time, since the experiences 
of distance and proximity are also always articulated in relation to 
them.25 This shows how the pathic structure of touch brings out the 
elemental role of technics in the constitution of experience.
My hypothesis is that in “haptic realism” the photographic 
contact is conceived of in terms of immediacy and continuity, despite 
its obvious asymmetry. This takes place predominantly in the name 
of visibility. This implies that as “hapto-visual” appropriation, 
photography tends to reduce the different dimensions of touch into 
tactility, that is, into an order where all distinctions are made between 
the same and the other and where there is the structural possibility 
for a third party to assess these distinctions. In contrast to this realm 
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of objective contact between visible surfaces of physical bodies, touch 
as exposedness has to do with existential integrity, a depth from 
which any objectifying third party is excluded. This pathic moment 
of touching is about separation between own and alien, between self 
and stranger, and remains a matter of singular experience. Touch as a 
pathic sense is a sense that excludes a third party.
“Haptic realism” would thus be about conflating or confusing 
these two orders. It would be about equalizing the ways in which 
distinctions between the same and the other can be made and the 
ways in which a self separates itself from a stranger. In other words, 
in haptic realism phenomenological bodies would, tendentiously, be 
modelled on physical bodies. Here photography builds on a long 
tradition, since this kind of haptocentric conception of the sense of 
touch has been operative in western thinking from Plato to Husserlian 
phenomenology as, for example, Jacques Derrida has painstakingly 
shown.26
The tendency to confuse these registers derives from the visual 
accuracy of photography as light-writing. This has consequences as 
regards both material mediation and signification processes. With 
regard to material mediation, the optical laws of light-writing suggest 
a natural link between the iconic and the indexical aspects of the 
depiction. As regards signification processes, in turn, the visual 
accuracy of the photographic image makes it more tempting to look 
through the image and see it as a visual representation of an absent 
thing than to see the image as a strange presentation that brings forth 
something which finds its origin in the image itself. In both cases there 
is a tendency to conflate iconicity and indexicality, and to measure 
photographic evidence in terms of visual likeness.
Formatting Embodied Experience
Digital forms of photography both reaffirm and destabilize this link 
between iconicity and indexicality. On the one hand, the relation 
between the “subface” and the “surface” tends to be conceived of (and 
programmed) in terms of hapto-visual appropriation. On the other, 
the affective tension potentially involved here turns out to be non-
programmable. I try to explicate this ambivalence with regard to the 
third aspect of embodied experience that I introduced at the outset: 
the libidinal body. 
Here I would like to take up the interesting argument made 
by Cathryn Vasseleu that digital technologies contribute to the 
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“formalization of touch” by instituting touch as an objective sense – 
with the aim of making contact and staying in touch.27 According to 
her, digital technologies tend to prioritize haptic appropriation and 
grasping by detaching the objective side of touching from its affective 
qualities. The result is an enhanced polarity between two interacting 
modes of touching: hypersensitive “ticklishness” that is detached 
from all functional object relations and ‘haptic touch’ exemplified 
by the omnipotence of the finger as regards the horizon of real-time 
telecommunication.28 This has implications as regards the libidinal 
body. This is also the decisive point where I see that digitality changes 
something in the intricate interplay between image, body and thinking 
that I call “bodily schematism”. 
In so far as “ticklishness” is a domain of tactile experience that is 
out of self-coordinatable control, it cannot have any pre-programmed 
function in digital telecommunication networks, since these are built 
on the idea that being in contact equals the perception that one is in 
touch with someone or something. It nevertheless plays an important 
role in digital tactility.
The enhanced polarity between the two modes of touching that 
Vasseleu discerns can be seen as a symptom of a transformation 
of tactile experience that finds its articulation also in the new 
technological environment of photography. This enhanced polarity 
becomes tangible in situations where the feedback structure of an 
interface is engaging at the same time as it lets the lability of the 
mediated contact come to the fore. Various forms of visual live 
streaming and instant photo sharing could be used as examples of this.
The psychodynamics of these operations can be studied in terms 
of Freudian vocabulary. In his article on denial, Sigmund Freud 
foregrounds parallels between thinking and perceiving by suggesting 
that they are both based on a “palpating impetus” (tastender 
Vorstoß), that is, a feeling and testing of the limits between inside and 
outside.29 This tactile process of demarcation offers a basis for psychic 
structures and various defence mechanisms, such as denial. Freud 
states that repressed representations can enter into the consciousness 
under the precondition that they are denied. Denial is a process of 
rationalization that disconnects affectivity from representation. The 
integration of repressed representations into consciousness takes place 
only on an intellectual level, and the affective implications of the 
repressed are cut off.30
Denial depends on an intellectual judging function (intellektuelle 
Urteilsfunktion), which concerns questions of inclusion and 
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exclusion.31 The ego decides if something is to be taken in or excluded. 
The reverse side of this intellectual decision is something Freud calls 
“reality testing” (Realitätsprüfung).32 The ego tests if an intellectually 
accepted and thus internalized representation also reappears in 
perceived reality. What is at stake in both functions is a decision 
between the inside and outside. The subjective exists only inside, 
whereas everything that counts as objective must exist outside as well. 
This double operation of internalization and reality testing makes 
sure that the relation between the inner representations and their 
counterparts in outer reality can be mastered.
Against this background, “haptic realism” in digitally mediated 
photography can be understood as denial of the ambivalence of touch. 
It is an operation that secures the division between the inside and the 
outside by representing the affective and physical aspects of contact as 
relatively autonomous dimensions. Hereby, tactility is prioritized and 
made into the paradigm of touching. Further, as a media technological 
form of denial “formalization of touch” appears as a “reality test” 
that contributes to consolidating those patterns of communication and 
affective behaviour that fit to its formats. 
Following Bernard Stiegler one could also take up Freud’s 
nephew, Edward Bernays’, theory of industrial manipulation of 
libido, according to which ‘the fight against economic crises required 
harnessing consumers’ desire to lead them to consume things they did 
not need’.33 As the facilitation of the passage from need to desire this 
“harnessing” allowed for the manipulation of the desire itself, because 
the passage is constituted by phantasm, i.e. the realm of objects 
that has reality only in the framework of desire. In other words, the 
harnessing of consumers’ desire is like set design as regards the staging 
of the desire in a phantasm. For Stiegler, the central question is: who 
is in control of this set design? In his analysis, the globalized culture 
industry has led to intensified exploitation of libidinal energy that 
accelerates the decomposition of desire into drives. In his scenario, 
finance capitalism itself, epitomized by the short-term investments of 
the stock market, becomes drive based. ‘[T]he rule of the short term is 
the rule of the drive. The drive wants everything right away: it wants 
immediate satisfaction’.34
With regard to the new technological environment of photography, 
the phantasmatic structure of the libidinal economy becomes tangible, 
if we think of the ways in which various forms of interactivity that 
involve photographic images endow the user with a sense of power 
at the same time as the status of the objects gained access to remain 
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suspended. Typically, the developers of multimodal interfaces set as 
their goal not only the richness and realism of sense feedback but 
also the pleasure that the user can experience. The idea is to have 
everything related to the system smoothly to hand. When this  
happens, the pathic moment of touch and the ethical dimensions of 
feedback remain in a dead angle. The focus is on feedback that  
affirms recognition and forms in its functionality a circle that feeds 
the sense of self-power.
Conclusion
The difference between “haptic realism” in film-based and in digitally 
mediated photography, according to the initial analysis presented 
here, would thus lie in their different ways of enhancing hapto-visual 
appropriation. Whereas the haptic realism of film-based photography 
tends to reduce touch to tactility by modelling the phenomenological 
body on the physical body, digital environments add to this an 
affective shortcut by customizing information with regard to the 
physical body (and its metonymic figure, the omnipotent finger). In 
their new technological environment photographs engage the viewers, 
or perhaps more precisely the users, more and more often by being 
hotspots. With regard to the tensional relation between vision and 
touch this implies that it is the affective link between the user’s body 
and digital information that tends to motivate the visual appearance of 
media contents in digital culture, whereas in pre-digital visual culture 
the most powerful substrate of affectivity was made up by visual 
appearances. In both cases the pathic moment of touching tends to be 
concealed. In Stiegler’s vocabulary, this kind of tendency is regressive: 
it marks the destruction of desire and the passage to the level of 
unbounded drives. This process takes the form of a ‘disordering of 
the aesthetic’ that, despite of its regressive tendency, opens up also the 
possibility for a ‘re-constitution of a new libidinal economy’.35
The rather schematic and hypothetical argument I have presented 
here has the implication that when analysing photographic truth 
claims and reality effects we should take into account not only 
technological formats but also conceptual, affective and sensuous 
processes of formatting. As I have indicated, a careful consideration 
of the multiple senses of touch operative in haptic realism offers a 
productive starting point for this. Against this background, the new 
technological environment of photography appears as a site where 
the ambivalent tendencies of touch are negotiated. Photographic 
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interfaces, i.e. the ways in which photography faces the body, provide 
something like an “aesthetic horizon” for the experience in the age 
of information by engaging the contradictions of our time at the level 
of the senses.36 The way in which these processes are intertwined in 
and through photographic images makes up the highly ambivalent 
and historically variable setting of the photographic conditions of 
embodied experience.
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Introduction 
Photographic practice, the “doing” of photography, is no longer 
confined to using a camera. It can involve a whole host of different 
technologies: mobile and smartphones, laptops, tablets and large 
amounts of powerful software. In this chapter I will outline some of 
the different ways that photographers in a recent study interacted with 
and oriented themselves around both their cameras and computers, 
and how, frequently, these technologies became entangled. This 
discussion has two wider aims. The first is to move discourse on 
photography away from the dominant representational framework 
that often ignores the doings of the photographer. Traditionally 
photography has been viewed in purely visual terms and user 
interaction with the camera is overlooked in favour of the images 
Between Bodies and Machines: Photographers with 
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produced. In this vein, Jonas Larsen has noted that: 
Photographing is absent from most theory and research jumps 
straight from photography to photographs. They directly go 
to the representational worlds of photographs and skip over 
their production, movement and circulation. The diverse hybrid 
practices and flows of photography are rendered invisible.1
Larsen’s statement is significant, not just for identifying the diversity 
inherent in photographic practice, but also for recognising image and 
movement in an everyday context. The empirical research featured 
here is part of a recently completed project, in which I studied 
photographers based in the North-East of England who use the 
website Flickr, and their routines with technology both online and 
offline. One of the main findings of the research was that there is a 
distinct crossing over between the movements involved in using the 
camera and the computer. 
Whether one thinks of the habitual bodily actions involved 
in using the camera or Flickr, movement is at the heart of these 
photographers’ practice. Taking photographs is a physical business 
requiring constant adjustment of position and posture. The 
photographers I observed often walk for miles on end, carrying their 
cameras until their shoulders and necks ache, standing outside in the 
cold until their fingers grow numb and their legs are stiff and sore. 
Whilst on the computer, the body is also moving and interacting; 
‘the image on the computer screen still demands levels of sensory and 
embodied engagement: the slight flicker of the screen, the tap of  
the keyboard, the physical movement of operating the mouse’.2 
At their computers the photographers in my study make micro 
movements with their hands and eyes and can spend hours exploring 
Flickr, uploading their own content, writing comments and making 
contacts. Here too, their eyes become tired and their backs and 
shoulders stiff. 
The everyday habits associated with photography have 
undoubtedly been transformed by mobile phone technology. 
Nonetheless, arguably, the practice of taking photographs has not 
altered that much in its 150 year history. On the one hand, it should 
be emphasized that ‘new digital amateur photographic practices are 
better understood as emergent in relation to both older photographic 
media and technologies’.3 But on the other hand, the circulation and 
interaction with digital images via computers and phones has become 
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an important part of everyday practice and ‘represents a fundamental 
shift in photography’s ontological orientation’.4
Frustratingly, however, there has been little research on what 
photographers actually do when they go out with their cameras. 
Additionaly, despite the fact that websites like Flickr, Pinterest, 
Instagram, SmugMug, Photobucket, Facebook and MySpace 
prominently feature a range of popular photographic practices, 
discussions of photography, technology and the links between 
everyday online/offline routines remain relatively ill-informed.
Nancy Van House comments that ‘there remains a relative lack of 
ethnographically informed research on people’s actual, daily  
practices of photography’.5 It is hoped that the work discussed in  
this chapter will enable greater understanding of such practices, as 
well as indicating potential avenues for further investigation into  
this under-researched field. 
Conceptual Framework
There are many truisms about photography in circulation, especially 
in literature on the image itself. Perhaps the most enduring of these 
is that photography is all about capturing a singular moment in 
time and is exhausted by a concern for stillness. This, for instance, 
is artfully expressed by Cartier-Bresson in his writings about the 
‘decisive moment’ and it shapes Barthes’ influential conception of the 
punctum.6 As a result, the importance of movement to photography 
has been frequently ignored. From the point of view of the image, 
movement is often seen as the enemy of photography. It leads to the 
unsightly smudging or blurring of a photograph’s subject, for instance. 
However, as practiced, movement is integral to photography, whether 
one thinks of the micro-adjustments of hands and feet necessary 
to position the camera or of those whole-body movements, such as 
walking, which bring photographer and subject into proximity with 
one another. 
We need to move away from discussing photography in visual 
terms that rely on such representational frameworks. An alternative 
philosophical approach is required in order to understand issues 
of practice, which place the body and movement at the heart of 
photography. Phenomenology offers a way of exploring photography 
and its associated practices by considering the way they are enacted 
and experienced in a everyday contexts. In its broadest sense, the 
phenomenological approaches have been utilised to enrich our 
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understanding of diverse practices such as hill walking, driving and 
watching films. However, no similar study into everyday photography 
practice and related areas such as movement, technology and the 
body has been conducted.7 Three authors, informed in different ways 
by phenomenology, will be employed below to explore these issues in 
more depth: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the human geographer David 
Seamon and the anthropologist Tim Ingold. 
Both phenomenology and photography are bound up with 
complex issues of vision, seeing and movement. The work of 
Merleau-Ponty, with its focus on perception, embodiment and 
habit, is particularly useful when reconsidering photography and its 
relationships between body, camera and computer. For Merleau-Ponty, 
‘habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or 
changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments’.8  
From a phenomenological perspective, the photographer becomes  
part of the visible landscape, but also needs distance to capture 
it, so he or she is simultaneously of the world and outside it. The 
phenomenon of this dual relation to the world is recognised by 
Merleau-Ponty, who writes that as we ‘step back to watch the 
forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the 
intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings 
them to our notice.’ 9 Photographers similarly step back from everyday 
entanglements in order to capture and reflect what others may not 
see, but of course they are always still firmly of and in the world. In 
this context, as Taylor Carman notes ‘visibility is neither surface 
appearance nor sensory stimulation. It is the intuitively felt reality of 
things disclosed to us as part of a dense, opaque world […] in which 
things show up amid things’.10
Photographers are often interested in things “showing up” 
particularly when they find that they have captured something  
others pass by unnoticed . It is not that they literally see differently  
to others, rather that they may be more attuned to everyday  
visibility as the variety of textures within the world open up to them,  
because ‘seeing the visibility of the visible requires stepping back  
from our ordinary naive immersion in things’.11 Many photographers  
tend to take their cameras out with them whether they intend to 
take pictures or not. This habit means that the camera becomes an 
extension of the body, an instrument that both extends the reach 
of vision and is incorporated into the wider body schema. When 
discussing body and habit, Merleau-Ponty gives the example of the 
typist, explaining that: 
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When the typist performs the necessary movements on the 
typewriter, these movements are governed by an intention 
but the intention does not posit the keys as objective loca-
tions. It is literally true that the subject who learns to type 
incorporates the key bank space, into their bodily space.12
The same can also be said for the photographers in my study, who 
through habit have learned to integrate the camera into their everyday 
space and routines, both by using and carrying their camera with 
them as they walk around. Their habitual use of the computer, too, 
means that their fingers come to find their way around the keyboard 
and touch-pad with the same ease. 
The subject of people “finding their way” in everyday life is also 
of interest to the anthropologist Tim Ingold, who is concerned with 
questions relating to movement, routine and dwelling (and has also 
been influenced by the work of Merleau-Ponty). Ingold is critical of 
the symbolic or rationalist tendency within anthropology, and instead 
proposes that ‘meanings are not attached by the mind to objects in 
the world […] rather these objects take on their significance […] by 
virtue of their incorporation into a characteristic pattern of day-to-day 
activities.’ 13
To this end, for Ingold, finding one’s way about is crucial for 
dwelling or habitation and ‘it is […] through the practices of wayfaring 
that beings inhabit the world.’ 14 Phenomenological considerations 
surrounding the ways in which photographers routinely find their way 
around with their cameras can be extended further into examination 
of their online behaviours. Flickr actively encourages members to take 
time and explore the content and the billions of different images that 
are publicly available. 
‘Ingold’s vocabulary of wayfaring and path finding is also useful 
when considering the inherently non-linear structure of online 
environments such as Flickr. The site continuously mutates and grows 
as users interact and connect, generating millions of multiple paths 
through their daily movements. For this reason, even if the user is 
familiar with Flickr, there is always the possibility of finding new 
areas and connections to follow. In Ingold’s terms, it is a place where 
users ‘know as they go’.15 Although he has not written specifically 
about online orientation, in a recent work a brief footnote does touch 
upon it: ‘experienced users, tell me that […] they follow trails [on the 
Internet] like wayfarers […] for them the web may seem more like a 
mesh than a net. How we should understand “movement” through 
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the internet is an interesting question.’ 16 This idea will be explored in 
more depth later on. 
David Seamon also places movement at the centre of his writing. 
His Geography of the Lifeworld studies the everyday complexities 
‘and inescapable immersion in the geographical world’ via the ‘body 
ballet [now described by the author as body routine] – a set of 
integrated gestures, behaviours and actions that sustain a particular 
task or aim’.17 This distinctive approach emerged from a branch of 
human geography that came to prominence in the mid-to-late 1970s 
through authors such as Edward Relph and Yi-Fu Tuan, which 
‘shifted analytical focus from social space to lived-in place, seeking 
to supplant the “people-less” geographies of positivist spatial science 
with an approach that fed off alternative philosophies – notably 
existentialism and phenomenology’.18 Seamon also utilises the work 
of Merleau-Ponty to investigate everyday actions and he argues 
persuasively that our relationships with place and our habitual 
routines are complex. They are not merely symptoms of automatic 
reinforcement nor simply conditioned by set thought processes (as 
is argued by cognitive and behaviourist theorists). Instead, Seamon 
writes that everyday interaction and movement ‘arises from the body’, 
which is ‘at the root of habitual movement’.19
Seamon’s ideas have recently been revived in diverse areas such as 
urban planning and media studies, but so far have never been applied 
to photography and visual studies.20 Although the work of Merleau-
Ponty and Ingold has been utilised by Sarah Pink within the context 
of visual studies there has generally a been a deep reluctance by 
authors in this field to move discussions about photography on from 
the traditional image-centric approach in order to focus on everyday 
practices and movements with the camera and associated technology.21 
What follows here is an attempt to show the potential of this 
phenomenological framework, and ultimately to take photography out 
of the still and into the world of movement. 
Photographers with Cameras 
What makes the connection between the photographer and their 
camera so distinctive? The findings of my study suggest it is a 
combination of two things: the body and its habitual movements 
with the camera. The movement at the heart of this close relationship 
means that during the photographic process, body and machine 
become entwined, which can be understood in terms of Seamon’s 
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claim that ‘phenomenology is as much a process as a product’.22
The relationship between the body and the machine here 
is a complex process and the corporeal and sensual interaction 
between each part builds over time, forming a strong connection. 
Through repetitive use the camera becomes an extension of both the 
photographer’s hand and vision. Throughout my study it became clear 
that the photographers used their bodies in multiple, unexpected ways 
with the camera. But it is not only in the taking of photographs that 
movement plays an important role. Other areas require the body to 
be fully engaged, such as posing and posturing in front of the camera 
when one’s picture is being taken or getting light spots in front one’s 
eyes due to the brightness of the flash. Later still, whether uploading 
the images from the camera to the computer or even handling the 
paper copies and leafing through a photo album, the body is always 
fully engaged in and by doing photography and can be seen more 
widely as ‘the site of activity and engagement with the world’.23
When photographers go out into the world, whether they decide 
to take pictures or not, they often take their camera with them. They 
become attached to their cameras: it becomes habitual, natural and 
they feel a little lost when they don’t have the instrument by their side, 
in their pocket or around their neck. Different participants told  
similar stories: 
When I was younger, I was stuck in the house, so I would 
always walk about with [the camera] and now it is just habit […] 
I carry my camera with me all the time I just always have it with 
me. If I don’t have a bag with me I feel like something is missing.
I have this [compact] with me 70-80% of the time when I am 
out of the house. Even when I go to the pub, I always have it 
tucked away in my coat pocket; you never know what is going 
to happen!
When you put that camera around your neck and you feel its 
weight, you activate something, like I have my photographer’s 
hat on.
Going out with photographers as they used their cameras demon-
strated to me that movement was an integral part of photographic 
practice. Taking photographs can often feel like hard work and it is 
potentially a very physically demanding pursuit. When out walking 
together we were battered by the wind and rain and wandered for 
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miles. We carried heavy cameras and manoeuvred into isolated and 
empty places that were damp and dusty. One photographer I spoke to 
told me: 
As soon as you put the heavy lens on, you do hunch over […] 
the other [camera] is too bulky so I carry the compact. I have 
the wrong bag and when you are taking a picture on a hill  
or something you start sliding down it with the weight of all  
the lenses gets you off balance and things […] you feel very  
lop-sided and when you get home you are aching from carrying 
it around.
In a phenomenological context, the practice of photography switches 
from ‘a way of seeing, to a specific mode of being’ which allows the 
photographer to have a heightened ‘sensory engagement with the  
environment’.24 Carman explains that ‘our bodies are constantly, 
though unconsciously and involuntarily, adjusting themselves to  
secure and integrate our experience and maintain our grip on the  
environment’.25 Repetitive encounters with the camera are important 
in creating a rhythm that allows the photographer to immerse  
themselves in their environment, as they start to notice how and  
where they go. 
The camera is a machine that becomes easily incorporated 
into the wider body schema, and this allowed the photographers I 
observed new insights into their locale. The habit of taking the camera 
with them each time they ventured out guided their movement around 
the city. For Merleau-Ponty, ‘it is the body which understands in the 
acquisition of habit’. Noticing the details of the world around them 
becomes second nature to the photographers and a natural part of 
their practice.26 Seamon discusses the importance and role of ‘noticing 
and heightened contact’ in everyday life, which in this case could be 
specifically applied to the photographers’ interaction with both the 
city and their cameras.27
Seamon describes noticing as ‘a thing from which we were 
insulated a moment before, flashes to our attention’.28 I believe 
photography is connected to a form of heightened noticing and 
photographers are often actively engaged in both looking for and 
noticing different scenes, people and places with their camera.  
One participant told me:
I like getting out and about. See even the other day, I thought I 
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will walk into town from where I am down the road where the 
rvi [a local hospital] is on the left and the park is on the right 
I normally walk down there, straight into town but when you 
have the camera you think, I should walk a different way. You 
think I have walked down this road before I am not going to 
see anything particularly different but if you go down the other 
street you might see something good!
Another told me that ‘when I am going out in Sunderland, I go where 
I think I am going to get good photos […] you see the world totally 
differently […] you are keeping an eye out.’ Noticing soon becomes 
a habit that changes the way photographers engage with the world 
even if they don’t have a camera with them. The relationship between 
camera and photographer goes deeper than simply interacting with a 
machine, it fundamentally changes the photographer’s movement  
with their body and ultimately, the way they view life.
Photographers on Computers 
Whilst it is vital to examine the physical and habitual character of 
taking photographs, for all of the participants in my study being on a 
computer was also an integral part of their practice. Aside from their 
interaction on Flickr most used some kind of post-production process 
to enhance their pictures. One participant explained that: 
Photography is not just about pressing the shutter; the post-
process work-flow is as important to the final image as is 
the viewpoint selection, in-camera composition, physical 
camera settings, etc. A more “typical” day of photography 
would probably mean I have four or five hours (weather and 
inspiration permitting) and then several more – over a few days! 
– working on the images.
Many photographers spent as much time on their computers as they 
did with their cameras and when they were not processing their 
images they were uploading photographs or browsing the content of 
Flickr. Once Flickr had become part of a daily routine, they would 
come to know certain parts and features of the site intimately and 
would repetitively visit them, much the same way as they would  
offline places. Indeed often the two crossed over as one photographer 
told me ‘if I have seen something that someone else has taken a  
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picture of [on Flickr] that would make me want to [go out and] do 
something different!’
When clicking quickly on the photographs on his favourite group 
pages, one photographer continually kept going back and revisiting 
the group sites and looking at the images there. In a similar way, 
another went between his personal and group pages, as well as the 
central Explore page, always in continuous, repeated movements. The 
movement of the photographers also subtly changed as they interacted 
with the site and, to use the metaphor of walking, shifted from a 
purposeful walk as they did the more administrative duties (checking 
messages in group sites and leaving feedback and comments) that 
developed later into a more explorative stroll around the site. 
What I want to emphasise here is that the photographer in front 
of the computer is not passive, they are actively using their body 
combining their skills with movements and familiar gestures, and 
there are significant overlaps and similarities between movements 
online and offline with the camera. In one example, when they like 
what they see outside with the camera, they press the shutter release; 
on Flickr they click with the touchpad or mouse on the picture  
that their eye is drawn to. When holding the camera they would  
briefly glance at the back screen to see the image they have taken, 
quickly taking position with their body again, getting ready for the 
next shot. On Flickr they quickly scroll through the photostream  
of the photographer, and if they like the photograph click the 
favourite button and move on to the next. 
The crossover between movements in an online/offline context 
is to be expected, as the ‘body subject can transfer its movements 
over similar contexts’, and certainly there were similarities when 
photographers were using both the camera and computer.29 Although 
their sessions on Flickr are to an extent unplanned, ultimately they 
are exploring the same places (groups and certain features) repeatedly. 
In a similar vein, there are features on Flickr that they never use 
or visit, just like destinations in the city. One photographer enjoyed 
“scouting about” on Flickr, however I noticed he limited the areas he 
visited online to the same local places as his offline walking habits, 
visiting and revisiting areas that were deeply familiar even if they were 
captured by other Flickrites. 
I would like to expand a bit more on how photographers find 
their way around Flickr, which continued this pattern of repetition. 
Although he has never explicitly written about online movement,  
I would particularly like to highlight areas of Ingold’s writing on 
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perception and orientation which is helpful in opening up discussions 
of what people do as they move around online places. Ingold’s  
more recent work has considered the lines and the paths we make 
as we move around and he considers the world not as a network of 
points but as a meshwork of interactions where people ‘make  
their way through a world-in-formation rather than across its 
preformed surface’.30
Taking these ideas a step further, I believe that the photographers 
on Flickr make their way through the site via similar paths and 
movements which are guided by routine encounter. Although Flickr is 
a huge site, which is also in a continuous state of formation (consisting 
of billions of photographs, with many more comments and tags), the 
photographers I observed tend to visit the same places and familiar 
group pages on the site, and to interact with the same people. When 
one photographer was scrolling through one of the groups he was a 
member of, he commented to me that it tends to be ‘the same old faces 
that you bump into’ on the group pages: of the 4000 members of this 
particular group, only around 100 or so seem to regularly upload 
images for the daily competition. This is also the case for the group 
meet-ups offline, and of the several that I went to it tended to be the 
same photographers that both organised and attended. 
Flickr’s construction – its different environs and groups, its 
various and infinite paths – allows the user to find their own, unique 
way around the site. Other participants told me separately that: 
I am probably on [Flickr] most days not for a huge amount of 
time; I live on the internet, I work with websites, it is a constant 
distraction. Even if I am not posting photos, I might just check 
if someone has made a comment, have look at some of the 
groups I am in just generally keeping in touch.
I am [on Flickr] everyday, if the pc is on I have it running on the 
background, I usually have a look to see if anyone has uploaded 
anything new from my contacts and see what it is, maybe make 
a few comments: I will look at what they have done.
Writing about dwelling and perception, Ingold proposes that 
‘knowledge is cultivated along paths […] and that people’s knowledge 
of the environment undergoes continuous formation is the very course 
of them moving about in it.’ 31 Ingold’s vocabulary is useful here 
precisely because it fits the shifting and transient architecture of Flickr. 
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The site is continuously mutating and expanding as users interact and 
connect, generating millions of multiple paths via their movement 
around it. If these paths were drawn with a pen, they would resemble 
a jumbled, dense meshwork of lines.
Ingold believes that the dominance of the network model (where 
the emphasis is put on the connections between people and things) is 
flawed.32 Instead he insists our entanglement and habitation along the 
trails of everyday life is messier than a well-ordered network diagram 
might suggest. Members of Flickr are not all connected together point-
to-point through their membership (most are not linked at all). Even 
their images can carve separate paths from their owners, as other 
photographers click on the photographs to add notes or make them 
a favourite to revisit later. In this context it is useful to recall Nancy 
House’s statement that ‘digital photographs have slipped the bounds 
of materiality and may have a life of their own, outside the control of 
their makers.’ 33
There are many different routes around Flickr and there are 
endless possibilities for users to find their own unique path on the site. 
I believe it is the inherently explorative feel of Flickr that has led to 
its global success. The language used throughout the site encourages 
users to find their way around a place rather than simply logging on to 
another site, deliberately mimicking their wandering strategies offline. 
Flickrites are being encouraged to conceive the site as a somewhere 
rather than just an abstraction. Due to the way photographs are 
randomly labelled and sorted (via folksonomy) there is every chance of 
finding a photograph in one search, then never coming across it again. 
This uncovering of content is more akin to when photographers notice 
things or places with their camera, and depending on what they find it 
can spin off and lead in different directions.
A further example of this is the aptly named Explore page, which 
asks photographers to find pictures on the site and asks if they wish to 
‘Explore interesting photos by choosing a point in time’, whilst offering 
numerous ‘places to Explore’ including on-site features like the world 
map, the most recent uploads, the calendar, or the blog.34  
It is interesting to note the explicit reference here to places rather  
than pages. 
The construction of the whole Explore page actively encourages 
random clicking so users can look at geotagged photos, see 
photographs from a year ago today or look at a few favourite sets 
where ‘stories are told, themes are developed, junk is collected’.35  
The use of the words stories and collection here links back to the 
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analogue practices of narration, gathering and revisiting photographs 
in albums. There are of course many other ways to get around Flickr 
and through visiting places other than the Explore page there is every 
chance that one could stumble upon the same groups or pictures at 
random via their own exploration and wandering of the site.
Conclusion
In studying technology the role of the body, those who make 
something, who use it, are affected by it – is integral. By 
this reckoning the very distinction between body and tool is 
blurred and each must be seen in a relationship to the other, in 
combination.36
Whether photographers use a digital or film camera, they must still 
go out into the world to take photographs, and on Flickr, there is 
always an offline context to online movement. Various technological 
innovations have meant that photographers can take more pictures 
than before whilst still performing the old routines in various sites. 
Online places such as Flickr have become popular, not just through 
their innovation, but because they offer a place where photographers 
can exhibit and compare their work, and discuss their passion for 
photography – something offered by photography clubs for the last 
100 years. Where Flickr differs from other websites is that its complex 
construction assists its members to actively explore the images on the 
site, mirroring their curiosity and noticings with the camera offline. 
Flickr is relatively new, but it allows photographers to transfer some of 
their old routines with the camera to their online experiences, making 
it a particularly unique place on the web. 
Two primary aims were stated above. The first was to move 
ideas on photography away from the dominant discussions of 
representation which often overlook the other interesting doings of 
the photographer. Following on from this, the second aim was to 
explore and reflect upon the relationship the photographer has with 
the camera and computer, and how their photographic and on-line 
practice impacts upon their everyday life. The proposed conceptual 
framework suggested here allows a move away from a representational 
framework. Instead it borrows from a diverse range of fields including 
human and urban geography, phenomenological philosophy and 
anthropology, working alongside media and photography studies to 
build an alternative approach to thinking photographic practice.
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Photographic practices are both diverse and long reaching, 
and can be found in many different places online and offline. The 
relationship between the body and the machine is a complex process, 
and the corporeal and sensual interaction between each part builds 
over time as photographers successfully ‘throw their bodies into 
the performance of meaningful action’ forming a strong connection 
with the camera.37 Naturally, this habit then impacts on the everyday 
routines of the practising photographer elsewhere. Infused within 
these various routines is movement: by bodies in the urban and online 
landscape and the images themselves as they carve their own paths  
on Flickr.
On Flickr emphasis is placed on connecting, sharing and 
exploration: its construction has been cleverly engineered to engage 
photographers further by mimicking the processes of offline everyday 
photography. If the habit of noticing flourishes offline, this also 
impacts on the photographer’s movement and routines on Flickr. 
Certainly, among the photographers I observed, there was clearly 
a process of being drawn to a random image on Flickr, which had 
similar properties to offline noticing with the camera. Visitors and 
members alike are encouraged to explore all of Flickr’s content, in 
the same way that they would explore outside with their camera. 
This exploration does come with an important qualification 
though. There are numerous ways to search for photographs on the 
site: via different tags, favourites, groups, geotags and maps, or via  
the content pre-selected by Flickr on pages such as Explore, the clock 
or the calendar. Each user has their own preference and routine as  
to where they go on Flickr and once it has become established they 
tend to stick to the same paths. Just like when they walk around the 
city, their wandering around Flickr is selective and they mostly go to 
the places they are familiar with. 
The relationship between bodies and machines is complex, and 
the corporeal and sensual interaction between each part builds over 
time, forming a strong connection. Naturally, this connection also 
impacts on the everyday routines of the practising photographer. 
Fundamental to these various routines is movement: of the body in 
the urban and online landscape and even of the images themselves. 
The different possibilities that these new wanderings offer make Flickr 
ripe for further exploration and a fascinating place to understand 
more about being a photographer in the world. 
To state that photography is more about movement than stillness 
sets this research philosophically apart from others in the field 
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of photography studies, and takes a leap into relatively unknown 
terrain. As Elizabeth Edwards suggests, it is time that writing was 
broadened and room made for new insights on the varied practices 
involved within modern photography – particularly in the era of 
sophisticated mobile smartphones with video capabilities.38 Images are 
produced from a culmination of different experiences, environments 
and movements, which are all essential parts that make up the 
multiple layers of practice. Furthermore it is clear that researchers 
within photography need to start looking at the diverse practices that 
continue to make photography an important part of everyday life  
and a thoroughly corporeal practice, whether with a camera or on  
a computer. 
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In What is Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue 
that art’s role is to confront chaos, throw a net over it and create 
a plane of composition.1 This is a powerful image, and one that 
figures the unwieldy struggle of picturing through which images 
emerge in the world. However, for Deleuze and Guattari, the 
aesthetic plane of composition should not be confused with technical 
composition, the relation between content and form. Rather it is 
figured as the productive synthesis of forces constructed as a block of 
sensation. According to this materialist ontology it is not the artist 
who creates sensations but rather underlying forces in material that 
create something “intensely present” that will allow new worlds to 
germinate. When this happens, we may “live” the image.
 
The Athleticism of Imaging: Figuring a Materialist 
Performativity
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The idea that an image is alive, an intensive presence that insinuates 
itself into our world so that we “live” it, offers a fundamental  
challenge to Western aesthetics, and both formalist and post-mod-
ernist understandings of the image. According to these regimes of 
thought, images exist as objects to be manipulated, viewed, appreciat-
ed and/or deconstructed by humans. Here, “compositional dynamism” 
is figured as operating purely within the frame of the work. We are 
perfectly safe, since it is only an image. However, in a materialist  
account, the function of imaging is never re-presentational. Rather, it 
is an event of picturing and mattering and in this encounter we are 
never safe. The task of imaging is not to illustrate the world, tell a  
story about the world, provide a stream of information or take a  
programmatic political stance. Rather, imaging provides the expansive 
force that undoes representation and creates something unimaginable 
yet precisely “true-to-life.” Where we see a figure, for example, I will 
ask us to consider not what it is, but what are the conditions through 
which it works. Whilst a figurative image may appear immediately 
welcoming, a materialist account invites us to go beyond the figure to 
the abstract frame-work that holds it together, and us with it. This en-
igmatic invitation builds us into the image. We are not outside looking 
at an image but actually become part of the teeming life of the work. 
How does one create something unimaginable yet precisely 
true-to-life? How does one go about achieving the event of imaging 
where we will be able to “live” the image rather than merely look 
at it or look out at it? Through returning to the so-called “formal” 
language of art and refiguring it through a materialist lens, I will map 
the dynamism of the imaging in which shapes push and shove, lines 
quiver, rhythms march, vectors pressure and accents glide – in order to 
demonstrate how the expansive force that is art undoes representation 
and produces something true-to-life. 
This mapping will be staged in three movements. Firstly I will 
chart an encounter with Benjamin Wood’s action improvisations 
and his photo-drawings to argue that images are bodies in fields of 
force. Secondly I will returned to the Bauhaus of the early twentieth 
century to consider how Johannes Itten’s teachings in his Basic Course 
on Design and Form allows us to understand how we may live an 
image. Finally I have an engagement with Stanley Cavell’s concept of 
automatism to step out an argument that picturing may be understood 
as an expansive force, a material-discursive automat that undoes 
representation and creates something unimaginable yet precisely 
“true-to-life.”
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Figure 1. Benjamin Woods, dispersing a body as a field of specked 
collisions, 2012, digital picture, variable dimensions.
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Ben Woods is a sculptor whose improvisatory practice engages with 
other people, instruments and specific circumstances and contexts. 
Through what he calls ‘tactful participation’ his aim is to actualize 
‘new possibilities for specific physical arrangements (concepts) and 
entanglements of bodies, instruments and the world’.2 Woods sees his 
action improvisations as a way of becoming aware of the dynamic 
interplay that occurs between humans and between humans and non-
human actants. Of this approach Woods comments that, ‘working 
with action as the redistribution of relations provides a platform for 
a process of opening or a physicality of openness […] I work to make 
visible an agential reality where action is that which forms relations 
that matter.’ 3
In developing his action improvisations, Woods began to work 
with the camera to document these actions. In responding to these 
“documents” he soon came to recognize that the ‘documentation 
images produced from these improvisations were not representational 
images for the indexing of action in a linear sequence’, but were 
actions in themselves.4 He see his photo-drawings, ‘as a process with 
its own kind of action, is a propellant of radically open futures for the 
becoming of the world.’ 5
The claim that pictures ‘are specific sets of dynamic physical 
arrangements with their own force’, which is a ‘propellant of  
radically open futures’, returns us to the question put at the beginning 
of this chapter: How does one create something unimaginable yet 
precisely true-to-life through picturing?6 This is not to invoke the 
view that through its mimetic functions the photograph gives us 
something “true-to-life”, but rather to posit that despite its mimetic 
and representational character, photography is an expansive force 
that undoes representation and creates something unimaginable 
yet precisely “true-to-life”. How do we go beyond the figure to the 
abstract framework that holds it together, and us with it? 
It is here that I wish to turn to the figure of Johannes Itten, and 
his Basic Course on Design and Form. The Basic Course was, for a 
short time (between 1919 and 1923) the foundation course for all 
Bauhaus students.7 Modelling his teaching program on that of his 
teacher, Adolf Hölzel, he developed a program of instruction that 
was dedicated to exploring the ‘means of design’ through the ‘study 
of pictorial composition and the fundamentals of colour’.8 In this 
course, Itten drew on Hölzel’s “means of design” (what we have come 
to know as the fundamental principles of design) – light-dark, colour, 
material and text, form, rhythm, expressive forms, subjective forms – 
B a r b a r a  B o l t
127
to construct the curriculum for this basic design course.
Itten’s teachings have been passed down to us in codified form as 
“design fundamentals”, where form is considered as the manipulation 
of the various (visual) elements and principles of design. Here the 
principles of design assume the status of “universals”, principles to 
be applied and manipulated by the artist. Thus in David A. Lauer 
and Stephen Pentak’s Design Basics, ‘content is what artists want to 
say’ and ‘form is how they say it’.9 This may be seen to equate with 
“technical composition”, rather than the aesthetic composition that 
Deleuze and Guattari speak of. We have no sense of the entanglement 
between the material condition of the artwork and the sensations as 
they come about. Here pictorial composition is reduced to the internal 
logic of the relation between content and form.10 This is what we 
understand by the term formalism, and forms the key principles that 
came to underpin formalist art.
The rise of formalist art is inseparable from the emergence 
of Clement Greenberg as a writer and critic. Through Clement 
Greenberg’s formalism, the “figurative” and the “abstract” become 
oppositional and abstraction became the privileged term. But is this 
how Itten conceived of his program or taught the “means of design”? 
He did not see the figurative and abstract as oppositional separate,  
but intertwined in each other. Through his teaching he was always  
asking students to go beyond the figure in order to understand the 
abstract framework that underpins it. 
Itten’s teaching methods, unorthodox at the time, aimed to 
prepare the body and the mind for work through the use of relaxation, 
balancing and harmonizing exercises. He considered this essential 
in preparation for the task of picturing. He exclaimed, ‘how can the 
hand express a characteristic emotion through a line when hand 
and arm are cramped?’.11 For Itten, experience and tacit knowing 
became the touchstones that prepared the artist for making pictorial 
composition. Thus, he believed that ‘the characters of […] materials 
had to be experience and represented […] not only seen but felt’, 
and he ‘always attached great value to this sensuous grasping of the 
characteristic quality of all things’.12 
Through building the world into the body, so that it became tacit, 
Itten’s teaching made a direct connection between the world’s textures 
and rhythms, and the body’s rhythms, as well as its manifestation 
in and through the work. He saw the preparation of the mind/body 
as a critical phase in the creative process. When, for example, he 
introduced the “principle” of rhythm in class, he took the students 
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through the experience of the change in rhythms:
First I had the students walk in march rhythm, beating time 
with their hands. The rigidity of this simplest rhythm was to 
take hold of the whole body. Then I counted off a triple rhythm, 
so that the stress fell first on the right foot, then on the left. 
Various changes followed, and sometimes two students would 
dance to the syncopated rhythm of a record.
Then these rhythms were drawn; the march rhythm was 
represented by stressed and unstressed stroke, the triple rhythm 
by circular elements. Varying intonation determined the motion. 
When a march or waltz rhythm was stopped after a few beats 
and continued in irregular intervals, the interruption of the 
rhythmic movement was felt almost painfully by everyone […] 
All exercises had to be repeated graphically […] rhythmic 
sensation is not mere schematic repetition but can be a flowing 
movement.13
These “felt rhythms” became inscribed in the work. In reflecting on 
this he observed that: ‘rhythmically handwritten forms have their 
own wind and breath which makes them a living family of forms. […] 
When the same letters are written without this breath, the letter forms 
stand there unrhythmically cold, unrelated and unyielding.’ 14 Thus 
for Itten the principles of design were not abstract “ideal” principles 
but were the forces that enabled life to get into the work and to create 
something “intensely present” so that we may “live” the image.
Through his eclectic teaching methods, Itten sought to draw 
together an intimate and tacit knowledge of materials, an embodied 
experience in, and application of the “means of design” and strategies 
to open up the imaginative possibilities in the work of the students. In 
Design and Form, he comments: 
We worked on geometric and rhythmic forms, problems of 
proportion and expressive pictorial composition. […] the 
study of polar contrasts, exercises for the relaxation and 
concentration of the students brought amazing successes. I 
recognised creative automatism as one of the most import 
factors in art.15
Automatism is a term that has recently re-emerged in the lexicon 
of photography and art criticism. In 2012, an edition of the 
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journal Critical Inquiry was devoted to ‘Agency and Automatism: 
Photography as Art Since the Sixties’ and Rosalind Krauss has written 
two monographs, Perpetual Inventory (2010) and Under Blue Cup 
(2011) in which automatism is central to her argument that, in the face 
of the postmedium condition, automatism allows artists ‘the freedom 
to improvise’ and invent new mediums.16 However, is there any 
relation between the term, as used by Itten and these contemporary 
elaborations of automatism? 
Itten was teaching his Design Course at the Bauhaus between 
1919 and 1923 at the time as André Breton and Phillipe Soupault 
wrote The Magnetic Fields, the first example of automatic 
literature. Whilst his mentor, Adolf Hölzel, was committed to 
the value of automatism in the arts, the “excitement” that was 
generated around automatism, as a technique to release creative 
imagination, centred around André Breton and the rise of 
Surrealism. Automatism, adopted by the Surrealists as the method 
par excellence to tap into the unconscious and escape the rigours 
of rationality and conventional thought, drew on the Freudian 
psychoanalytic technique of free association. In the first Surrealist 
Manifesto, published in 1924, Breton defined pure psychic 
automatism as the method: 
by means of which one intends to express, either verbally, or 
in writing, or in any other manner, the actual functioning of 
thought. Dictated by thought, in the absence of any control 
exercised by reason, free of any aesthetic or moral concern.17 
Through the technique of automatism Breton imagined that the 
oppositions between subject and object could be broken down and 
that perception and representation could instead be thought of as the 
‘products of the dissociation of a single original faculty’; for Breton, 
the eidetic (aesthetic) image opens up this realm.18
The notion of psychic automatism, that is central to the thinking 
and practices of Surrealism, seems to operate in a different order 
to the concept of automatism that has become associated with 
photography, particularly through the work of the philosopher and 
film theorist Stanley Cavell. While psychic automatism is concerned 
with a mechanism to allow psychic faculties to flourish,19 Cavell’s 
conceptualization of automatism in photography and film, appears, 
at first glance, to be concerned with the technology and the idea that 
the camera is an automat. In Cavell’s view, says Diarmuid Costello, 
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automatism, refers to the ‘brute automatism of the camera itself, the 
fact that cameras are capable of producing an image of whatever 
they record without subjective mediation.’ In the spirit of this “brute 
automatism”, all artist media could be seen to be automatisms. 
However, in an era of media obsolescence, observes Cavell, these 
automatisms are being lost to modern artists. Thus, he says ‘there are 
no longer known structures which must be followed if one it to speak 
and be understood. The medium is to be invented out of itself.’ 21
In Under Blue Cup (and also in Perpetual Inventory), Krauss 
concurs with Cavell’s assessment of medium obsolescence. She 
draws on his ideas of automatism to develop her thesis that, in the 
face of the post-medium condition, artists can or need to invent 
their own mediums. She argues that in the face of the exhaustion 
of traditional media-specific art forms and the paradigm shift that 
has ushered in the post-medium condition, artists have sought new 
technical supports from outside the conventional artistic media – 
often obsolete and outmoded commercial technologies and practices 
from mass media and mass culture. Through articulating the new 
technical supports invented by artists – Ed Ruscha’s use of the 
automobile; William Kentridge’s drawings for projection; James 
Coleman’s adaptation of the slide tape; Christina Marclay’s work 
with synchronous sound track of commercial films; Bruce Nauman’s 
adoption of the architectural trope of the promenade; Sophie Calle’s 
parody of investigative journalism; Marcel Broodthaer’s museum 
without walls; and finally Haun Farocki’s foregrounding of the video 
editing bench – Krauss argues that the artists had to discover the 
“rules” of their technical support and out of these rules forge a new 
practice. She proposes that Cavell’s notion of automatism accounts 
for the discovery of ‘the rules by which practitioners of a given 
discipline gain the freedom to improvise’.22 For Krauss, linking the 
notion automatism to the “technical support” frees artistic practice 
from the strictures of “medium specificity” and allows practice to be 
understood in terms of Cavell’s automatism. 
Costello suggests that Krauss derives her understanding of artistic 
media as ‘not simply as physical materials but physical-materials-in-
certain-characteristic-applications’, from Cavell.23 However, he takes 
issue with her interpretation of Cavell’s position on the invention of 
new media and proposes that Krauss’ notion of automatism is of a 
different order to Cavell’s. Costello proposes that while for Cavell, 
automatism is about the “brute” technicity of the camera – the 
fact that a camera can produce an unmediated image (for example 
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Henri Cartier-Bresson’s Visit of Cardinal Pacelli, 1938, which 
will be discussed below), Krauss’ conception involves two kinds 
of automatism: firstly a quasi-automatic automatism (automatic) 
that is associated with the interaction between the technology and 
the artist; and secondly a psychic automatism or “automatisms of 
the unconscious” (autographic), where unexpected connections, 
associations and solutions arise in the working process. Costello 
claims that Krauss derives her two senses of automatism from 
Kentridge’s description of his working process, where images are not 
preplanned but emerge through the regime of drawing.24 This may be 
immediately true, but the notion of “automatisms of the unconscious” 
relates back to Surrealism and the notion psychic automatism. 
This brings us back to Itten and the question raised earlier:  
Is there any relation between the term, as used by Itten and these 
contemporary elaborations of automatism? Can we figure a more 
nuanced understanding of “automatism” that sits in the interstitial 
space between Rosalind Krauss’ conception of automatism as a  
form of psychic automatism and Cavell’s technical conception of the  
brute automatism of the camera, and that takes into account the 
dynamics of picturing that is revealed through Itten’s mode of 
teaching? Cavell sets this thought in motion when he poses the 
category of automatism. In setting up the frame he says that he needs 
to (at least at the outset) ‘neutralize the presence of the physical 
mechanism of camera and projector’, and ‘free the idea of the medium 
[…] from its physical base’, since any consideration of automatism 
is both a historical and ontological question.25 This bracketing out 
allows Cavell to turn to modernist painting, and particularly Jackson 
Pollock’s embrace of automatism. 
It is part of the canon of art history and theory that Pollock’s 
adoption of automatism was influenced by Surrealism. However, 
drawing on Rubin, Cavell argues that for Pollock it was not the 
method or technique of automatism that was important. Rather it 
was the “idea” of automatism. Thus, whilst, ‘[t]he surrealists looked 
for automatism which would create images […] Pollock looked for an 
automatism with which to create paintings.’ 26 Cavell claims that the 
automatism that Pollock invented was not “action painting”. Rather, 
through the evolution of all-over line what was revealed as painting 
was ‘it’s flatness in that it is totally there’, in the sense that it is ‘wholly 
open to you in front of your senses as no other form of art is.’ 27 In 
other words, conditions of possibility of modern painting did not 
require a recession into another world. The apparatus or technologies 
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that were involved in the production of this “new automatism” 
included the rhythms of Pollock’s body, the “idea of automatism,” 
the automatism of the paint and canvas, the discursive framing and 
reception of the paintings and history material practice of painting.28 
If the automatisms of painting arise in the interplay between the 
material and the discursive, what are the automatisms of photography? 
Earlier I cited Costello who has argued that, for Cavell, it was the 
“brute automatism of the camera itself”. In The World Viewed (1979), 
Cavell made the statement that: ‘A painting is a world; a photograph 
is of the world.’ 29 Does this “distancing” from the world deny 
photography the means to allow us to become part of the teeming 
life of the work? Is the photograph’s fate to be of the world and never 
be a world? Ben Woods has certainly aimed at making his photo-
drawings worlds, presences that ‘enact invisible forces’.30 However, as 
we have seen, he has taken creative license with photography and has, 
as Hannah Hoch did before in her photomontages, pieced together 
shapes to define planes, joined planes to mark out a territory and 
activated a force field to create an aesthetic plane of composition.  
This is the “work” that the digital has celebrated.
In taking photography as photography-as-such, Cavell seems to 
have accepted the “brute” automatism of the camera. The fact of the 
camera’s mechanism, the fact that its material reality is “an opening 
in a box” that crops a slice of the world and brackets out the rest of 
the world is, for Cavell, ‘the best emblem of the fact that a camera 
holding on an object is holding the rest of the world away.’ 31 Thus, he 
concludes that while the camera has been ‘praised for extending the 
senses’ he suggests that the praise should be more for confining the 
senses, ‘leaving room for thought’.32
But does photography necessarily confine the senses, as Cavell 
would seem to be arguing? Does the “cropping” of a slice of the world 
cut the rest of the world out? At first glance, we would say that this is 
true of Olive Cotton’s Drain Pipes of 1937.33 Here the cropping does 
point to the world outside the frame, the pipes all lined up in a row 
and the world beyond them tantalizes for its absence. However, if 
we take our instructions from Itten and go beyond the figure to the 
abstract framework that holds it together, we experience a sensation 
of pressure as shapes push and shove, rhythms march and accents 
whip us around the picture. Through activating design principles, the 
aim has always been to keep our attention in the picture frame, but 
in Cotton’s Drain Pipes I would suggests that the dynamism builds 
us into the picture. Cotton’s Tea Cup Ballet (1935) also does precisely 
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this. We become caught up in the waltz of the tea cups and through 
the rhythms, repetition the force of vectors they produce we are deftly 
moved through around the space.34 I am reminded here of a painting, 
At the Cirque Fernando: The Ringmaster (1888) by Toulouse Lautrec, 
and how we are drawn into the world of the circus through the ring 
master and, through the line of his whip, we are led up the horse’s 
fine rump, and become swept up and catapulted around the circus 
ring at fast speed, egged on by the repetitions of the black and white 
of the gentlemen’s suits and the racy red of the rows of seating.35 We 
are moving so fast, one would fear being cast out of the frame and 
dumped, if it were not for the antics of the clown, whose cocky red hat 
catches us and draws us back round to the ring master, and once again 
off we go with incredible speed. 
But lets stop for a moment and return to photography, and this 
time to Cartier-Bresson’s Visit of Cardinal Pacelli (1938).36 When 
we view Henri Cartier-Bresson’s Visit of Cardinal Pacelli, we may, 
as Carol Armstrong has done, start with Barthes’ ‘Photographic 
Message’ and go on to marvel that ‘without any interventions of 
the photographer’s agency save for the quick gesture of raising the 
hand and clicking the shutter’ the camera automatically generated 
the content that we have come to accept as Cartier-Bresson’s 
photograph.37 This is of course true. But in addition to these, when 
confronted with the photograph, we are brought up close to through 
the generosity of the camera’s viewpoint. What we experience is a 
tight spiralling inward through the repetition of heads that creates 
intensity at the point of what Armstrong calls ‘the scene of the kiss  
of Judas’.
But what is the camera’s role in all of this? Armstrong calls 
her article, ‘Automatism and agency intertwined’, and tells us that 
(apparently) Cartier-Bresson held the camera high over his head 
and had no conception of what would be in the frame.38 Yet in her 
attribution of agency to Cartier Bresson, she seems to be suggesting 
that it is only the human who has agency. The automatism of  
the camera is just that, brute mechanics of the camera, the fact 
that cameras are capable of producing an image without subjective 
intervention,39 and the question of chance. Armstrong says of  
this photograph:
The photograph’s resemblance to the scene of the kiss of Judas 
in the history of painting is merely fortuitous, a matter of pure 
luck. So too is the host of details surrounding the heads and 
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kissing of hands at the center: the cardinal’s skull cap and its 
similarity to a yarmulke, a woman’s face between the two  
men, a partial profile above her, a Hitleresque face and medal 
in the upper-left corner, a grimacing face behind the shoulder 
in the lower-right corner, a gendarme peering forward in the 
upper right, and so on. These details come together with  
the pre-Occupation date of that Parisian moment as unwilled 
facts caught willy-nilly, automatically, and all at once by the 
camera […]. 40 
In his article, ‘Arts, agents, artifacts: Photography’s automatism’, 
Patrick Maynard introduces an ambiguity between brute automatism 
and the notion of the “self-acting” machine. For Aristotle, he claims, 
the term auto´maton, meant self-action or, as he would have it 
chance.41 He cites the nineteenth century art historian, Lady Eastlake 
(aka Elizabeth Rigby) to support the view that self-action is about 
chance. Thus he says that Eastlake meditated on: 
the medium’s strikingly accident-prone feature, its lack 
of “power of selection and rejection”, with emphasis on 
photography’s propensity for unnecessary surface texture  
and detail – that is, noise.42 
However, aren’t these “propensities” of the photograph what allows 
us to invent a new medium out of itself? This brings me back to 
Benjamin Woods and his accommodation (what he calls “tactful 
participation”) in relation to the other participants engaged as part of 
his action improvisations. Here he sees that in practice, tact is required 
so that one doesn’t ‘seize hold of or manipulate or possess’ and that  
he must be tactful, ‘not only towards other people, but other forces, 
other actions and other matters, that are “other” only because they 
enact’ an entanglement of difference.43 
In the constellation or articulation through which art emerges 
there is, as Donna Haraway proposes, no ontological distinction 
between ‘who makes and who is made in the relation between human 
and machine’.44 In fact it may be that through the intertwining of 
automatism and agency that a new automatism comes into being,  
as “self-action,” and thinks itself a cyborg – or what Haraway  
calls a material-semiotic actor. In the assemblage that constitutes 
the material-semiotic, the “actants” may be human or non-human, 
machine or non-machine, discursive or material, symbolic or 
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semiotic.45 What is critical to her position is that the material-semiotic 
“articulata” becomes an “apparatus” of production. Thus, the 
apparatus or technologies that were involved in the production of the 
“new automatism” in Jackson Pollock’s “drip paintings” included the 
rhythms of Pollock’s body, the “idea of automatism”, the automatism 
of the paint and canvas, the discursive framing and reception of 
the paintings and history material practice of painting. For Cavell 
too, automatism in photography involves the complex articulation 
between the mechanical, the material and the discursive. It is not just 
a question of the brute automatism of the camera. 
As I have encountered Wood’s photo-drawings from his action 
improvisations, returned to the Bauhaus of the early twentieth century 
to reconsider Itten’s Basic Course on Design and Form, stepped 
through Cavell’s explication of automatism and Krauss’ adaptation 
of it in Under Blue Cup, I sense that a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of the notion of automatism is emerging. This 
expanding sense of the term takes into account what Costello calls 
“the autographic” and the “automatic” but in a materialist rather 
than a modernist sense. For the autographic is not just the province 
of the human actor and the automatic is not just the domain of the 
mechanical technology. The automat becomes a material-discursive 
event that undoes representation and creates something unimaginable 
yet precisely “true-to-life”. In this re-articulation of the notion of the 
automat, we may move beyond representationalism, into the world  
of the event where the photography is an intensive reality that we may 
live in and with rather than merely look at. 
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Figure 2. Benjamin Woods, multiple positions, circumstances, times, bodies, 
cuts (thank you Megan Dennis), 2012, digital picture, variable dimensions.
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In my world, there have been at least three types of darkroom: (1) 
the laboratory, with its chemical baths and dull-orange exposures; 
(2) the backroom sex club, with its fetishized rhythms and differently 
organised friendships of circulation and exchange; and finally (3) 
the closet, with its secrets and wounds and dreams and escape plans, 
inserted neatly between shoes, trousers, shirts and suits. Each has its 
own set of rules and regulations, its own dangers and provocations, 
its own pungent aromas, mess, and light source poetics. All require 
a particular technical knowledge, a practicality laced with, and 
an expertise specific to each of those very different, darkroom 
heterotopias. To varying degrees, each might require some form 
of curiosity, experimentation and risk, tugging on the wider, and 
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sometimes, wilder, sensations of attraction, limit, destruction, reason, 
taste. But most of all, and no matter how different each darkroom 
might be from the other, they all have one thing in common, one 
thing that puts them into this realm of the dark: each, in their own 
way, explicitly colonises the present – makes it inhabitable and, indeed, 
makes the instant of time itself come alive. There is no abyssal logic 
or reference to self-reflexive unities so often characterising traditional 
notions of the “now” as something quite a bit different than the 
Hegelian reconfiguration of a negative/naught time. Lyotard might put 
it like this:
(T)his is what you, Western philosophers, understand under the 
name of reflection: the protracted unfolding, the extended run 
of concepts, answers, and dramatic actions through which you 
imagine the mind coming to itself. The slow odyssey you dream 
of – that the mind returns experienced, and in agreement with 
itself. Such returns are the law of the (hi)stories, even those (hi)
stories that narrate the absence of return. But reflection has 
nothing to do with them; it is their secret victim. […] Presence 
is sacrificed in these (hi)stories: holiness. So that, on this 
expeditious slope, the unthought dominates, as does the lay 
person, who believes her or himself to be in possession of the 
reason of her or his life, and of her or his thought, within her/
himself; who believes her or himself to have paid the price by 
sacrificing her/himself. But the holiness of the instant never 
finds reparation in a sacrificial (hi)story.1
Instead, each of these darkroom spatialities mentioned above work 
off the collapse of the past and the future into an immediate intensity 
that draws together, and indeed swallows up, subject, object, anything 
in between or in its path; swallowed all up into a black-hole cogito, 
a black-hole cogito dot of a “being-there”, right here, right now. 
Let’s unpack this last remark. In saying “a black-hole cogito dot of 
a being-there, right here, right now,” I mean that all the expertise(s), 
curiosities, wonderments and so on, specific to each spatiality as 
named above, creates a bond – let’s say it’s something akin to a 
“magnetic” attraction with rough-edged consequences; that is to say, 
consequences emerging out of something quite different than rational/ 
logical deduction. In this case, that is to say, in “the darkroom” case, 
one is not only “in the moment”, one is the moment. But there is more: 
for this “self” in that darkroom is not some kind of homogeneous 
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Sherlock Holmes in search of the Truth; nor is it necessarily a “room” 
with discreet boundaries (like walls and floors and ceiling wax). 
Rather, it is a multiplicity/slice-fragment of self, fastening onto what 
lies to hand, where the fastening (as it were), not to mention the “that 
which lies to hand” is couched (Heidegger might say, “enframed”) 
precisely by a double-helix set of relations. 
This “double-helix set” is, on the one hand, coloured by one’s 
actual abilities, established, say, through discipline, knowledge-
practice; (i.e., being good at your trade: be it art, sex, rock n roll). It 
is created on the other, by the spatial-temporality of a “being-there-
interior” (i.e. the darkroom itself), kitted out with well-chosen (or 
at any rate, more or less chosen) tools of that trade, ingredients 
including the smells, sounds and contours of the odd-bod materialities 
inadvertently or otherwise laying to hand. This heady, volatile mix, 
creates a “coincidence” in the strongest sense of the word to  
“co-inside” and, in so doing, drags the spectator-subject-fractal-sliced-
self into the mix, the “being-there-interiority” mix, simultaneously, 
violently, brilliantly, instantaneously, penetrating that “cogito-fractal-
self” and, immediately also, being penetrated by it.2 It sets up what 
Jean Luc Nancy calls a “contagion”, a “viral attraction” of distance 
and withdrawal alongside an immediacy (of intensity), a present/ing 
that creates, to quote Nancy, “a force that forces form to touch itself”.3 
And what is this ‘force that forces [makes/compels/demands] form  
to touch itself’ (in the fullest, sensuous, masturbatory meaning  
of “touching oneself”)? It is nothing more nor less, than a radical 
intensity, an immediacy shot through (and with), indeed “corrupted” 
by, the senses. 
Let’s try it again: And what is this ‘force that forces [makes/
compels/demands] form to touch itself: it is the attraction (erotic, 
curious, hungry, chemical) of a cogito dot of a “being-there-
interiority” right now, able to touch itself, whilst simultaneously able 
to dis-appear (as in to disjunctively take a step apart, create a distance 
all the while – durationally-touching, in the fullest sense to lick, to 
penetrate and be penetrated, apart and yet together). An odd kind 
of “black-hole” aesthetics, this ontologically productive, substantive, 
sensuous (forced to touch and be touched) cogito, both dis-appearing 
and, simultaneously, re-presenting “itself” – not as a “model” or as a 
“representation” – but as radical intensity. This “radical intensity” is so 
named because in this carnal dance of touch-and-be-touched surface 
interiorities, a kind of plural or multiply dimensional materiality – an 
ana-materiality – neither real nor unreal, neither time stamped but 
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completely temporal, is made manifest. The “thing” (das Ding) that 
is made manifest has a very common name: image. Thus, and as 
Jean-Luc Nancy neatly summarises in his The Ground of the Image: 
‘Cogito es imago’.4
And now, it gets worse (or perhaps it gets better). But for better 
(or for worse), three points follow from this claim: First: one begins 
to “see” that the “image”, not to mention cogito (both “the mind’s 
eye” and the cogito-dot of a being-there-interiority) is, to echo the 
work of Henry Rogers in his The Words I thought I Saw, and to 
paraphrase Nancy: the image is neither world nor language.5 It is a 
surface that eats and is eaten by this double dance, emboldened by 
darkroom aesthetics. Cogito es imago. Second: because this “cogito = 
image”, this “visual-thing”, is “forced to force form to touch itself”, it 
leaps out of the realm of the Hegelian “idea” to establish at the very 
instant of its “coming to presence” the “holy” – in the sense of the 
word “sacred”; that is, something able to “stand apart” whilst being 
“together”.6 Third and final: the image, which “stands apart whilst 
being-there” does not embolden or inhabit identity – or indeed have 
anything to do with identity. For this “standing apart, whilst standing 
together” touching, penetrated/penetrating etc., is not the same as 
the rather infamous Heideggerian restatement of the A = A identity 
equation, whereby the emphasis is placed on the “=” connecting A 
to itself.7 It is not about a Heideggerian “belonging” (or, indeed, any 
belonging) nor is it forming a totalised unity sutured and cohered 
via a thesis/antithesis sublation. For its very presence, the presence 
of “image” is precisely and nothing other than radical connectedness, 
radical sur-face self-coincidence, the fatal attraction of black-hole 
darkrooms, embodying/dis-robing the senses themselves in all their 
fractal iterative roughness. A “dis-identity”. Over to Jean-Luc:
In coming to the fore [the image] goes within. But it’s “within” 
is not anything other than its “fore”: its ontological content 
is sur-face, ex-position, ex-pression. The surface, here, is not 
relative to a spectator facing it: it is the site of a concentration 
in co-incidence. That is why it has no model [and that is why 
it makes no sense to speak of it in terms of “representation” 
“semiotics” or even dialectical materialism, not to mention 
“social agency”]. Its model is in it; it is its “idea” or its energy. It 
is an idea that is energy, a pressure, traction and an attraction 
of sameness. Not an “idea” ([in the Hegelian sense as] idea 
or eidolon), which is an intelligible form, but a force that 
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forces form to touch itself. If the spectator remains across 
from it, facing it, that spectator [self – she who stands in front 
and “rationalises” the image] sees only a disjunction between 
resemblance and dissimilarity. [But] If she enters into this 
self-coincidence, then she enters into the image, [she] no longer 
looks at it – though [she] does not cease to be in front of it. [He 
or She] penetrates it, is penetrated by it: by it, its distance and 
its distinction, at the same time. […]One could say that the 
image – neither world nor language – is a “real presence”. […] 
This presence is a sacred intimacy that a fragment of matter 
gives to be taken in and absorbed. It is a real presence because 
it is a contagious presence, participating and participated, 
communication and communicated in the distinction of its 
intimacy… But in this way, it does not exist, it is there. Sense 
exists, or rather, it is the movement and flight of exiting:  
of ex-ire, of going outside oneself, exceeding, exiling. Sense 
essentially disidentifies.8
We have travelled on the “there” of sense and sensualities, a 
complicated journey of image and imagination. Perhaps now, 
Heidegger’s well-worn phrase ‘technology has nothing to do with the 
technological’, may begin to make more sense, especially now when it 
comes to the discussion of photography, the digital, the human being 
(or any other kind of being) – and the image. Analogue or digital 
technological advancement/enhancement is not really the issue. But 
neither is it about a “logic of techné” nor a poetic per se (that is, a 
logic relying on the ability to grasp an “out there” (Dasein) to create 
that “relation” of “little b: being/entity” to “Big B: Being” in all its 
glorious folds, dwellings and onto-theo-logics).9 In fact we can go 
one lateral step further: the “gathering” is far more wildly libidinal, 
far more electric, far more uncertain, more jagged and though it 
is has its logic, it is without a necessary “rationality”. Indeed, it is 
radically uncertain, whilst being iteratively “connected” in the carnal-
knowledge cogito sense of the senses. 
Dirty, dirty: those darkrooms of life, those fractalities of 
sonorous, sensuous image/ing. 
As is well known, Baudelaire was very worried about photography. 
He thought (rightly) that it had a “common” alliance with “the people” 
(which he called “the mob”) and, just like the mob, photography, since 
its birth, has just refused to “know its place”. Like a rusty old school 
master admonishing an unruly pupil, Baudelaire tut-tutted his fears: 
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If photography is permitted to supplement some of art’s 
functions, they will forthwith be usurped and corrupted by  
it, thanks to photography’s natural alliance with the mob.  
It must therefore revert to its proper duty, which is to serve  
as the handmaiden of science and the arts.10
How upset would he be, were he alive today! For not only has 
photography gone and corrupted art; it has corrupted the very  
bastion of civilization: philosophy.
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However often it is used, [scale] is seldom questioned. 
– Philippe Boudon
What is important in the play of scales, in effect, is not the 
privilege granted to the choice of some scale so much as the very 
principle of a variation in scale.
– Paul Ricoeur 1
A Scalar Delirium and the Derangement of Scale
The fact that there are more photographs produced and 
disseminated than ever before in our era of networked digital imaging 
is often remarked and conventionally signalled with reference to 
the more than two hundred million photographs now uploaded to 
Photographic Scale
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Facebook on a daily basis.2 Disseminated globally and at ever-greater 
frequency, this unprecedented circulation of images is characterised 
by instantaneity, simultaneity, speed of exchange and changeability 
in both appearance and context.3 This is an image ecology in which a 
certain literal experience of scale is foregrounded and presents obvious 
and pressing issues. 
In light of this situation, I set out to develop a critical and  
theoretical interpretation of what scale means in and for photography, 
an investigation that is provoked by the expansive character of  
photography in the context of networked digital culture but that also 
involves questions relating to historical practices and theorisations  
of photography. Scale has very many different meanings in these  
contexts, whether technical, phenomenological, economic or  
geographical for example. These scales of the photographic are  
normally addressed separately in specialised discursive frameworks. 
Below, I explore an alternative, namely, that it is the relations  
pertaining between these diverse elements, which gives the clue to 
what scale means for photography. I will project a concept of  
“photographic scale” to delineate the relational form of scale as a  
concern for photography and argue that it is of ontological  
significance for photography. This concept denotes a ubiquitous, 
variegated and compound play between differing but necessarily 
associated scales that inform the spatiotemporality of photography, 
that allow for its sense as a form of visual representation, that 
structure its modes of materialisation and that describe key aspects of 
its determination as a global geo-political form.
There are few things more familiar in photography than the 
fact that photographs scale things up and down and that they come 
in different sizes. It is only slightly less obvious to note that they are 
made and reproduced according to techniques entailing and governing 
their scaling and rescaling, that they result from the use of formats 
infused with differently scaled values, that the photographic image  
can be useful as a tool of measurement but also grants a tendentious 
sense of omnipotence over otherwise unseen and distant things  
and, overall, that cameras and photographs take on a range of 
material scales to act within global circuits of social and economic 
exchange so that, somewhere down the line, a surplus of profit can be 
abstracted from their use. Even on the basis of this cursory list, it is 
clear that a wide variety of scalar operations, scaled phenomenon  
and forms of scaling are central to both specific photographic 
practices and to photography in general. 
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These different scales of photography operate within the 
contemporary image ecology in ways that temper and redispose the 
experiences and behaviours associated with photography. Modes 
of bodily comportment involved in taking up a device to make 
photographs have come to hinge on equipment increasingly evenly 
keyed into the horizon of networked global dissemination involving, 
for instance, expansive postures in which both eyes range over a 
screen held at arms length. This is a generalised mode of comportment 
between body and apparatus that compounds global commercial 
imperatives with only apparently immediate modes of perception. 
Such screens have tended, for example, to increase in size relative to 
the body of the device housing them, making perceptually emphatic 
the collapse of differences between what is viewed before the moment 
of capture, the resulting image and its unprecedented openness to 
publication.4 But the economic and technical imperatives that inform 
changes in this immediate seeming mode of experience also saturate  
it with laboriously prepared external interests, setting up the body and 
apparatus as elements of a performance that unfolds within globally 
scaled processes.
The act of looking at photographs is also recast. It is set in 
rhythmic and mobile relationship to other images and a host of other 
viewers that challenge investments that might be maintained in the 
face of a single photograph. And much of what’s important here 
occurs beneath the level of visual perception. As Mika Elo pointed 
out recently, the metadata that accompanies a digital image inflects 
its circulation with automatic linkages that ‘go beyond visual mastery 
of spatiotemporal relations’.5 This leads him to remark: ‘Photographic 
interfaces, i.e., the ways in which photography faces the body, provide 
something like an “aesthetic horizon” for the experience of digital 
culture by engaging the contradictions of our time at the level of the 
senses.’ 6 One might go as far to say that these contradictions take  
the form of a massively determined “face-off” between images and  
their users, a situation structured at and by various spatial and 
temporal scales.
Thus, issues of scale in photography cannot be limited to the 
visual forms and relative dimensions of things represented in photo-
graphs, though these too are inherently scaled.7 Scale is a broader  
condition of all encounters with photographs, tactile and kinaesthetic 
as well as visual. Whether we come across them in print, hung or  
projected on walls or view them on screens, one faces photographs, 
also, as a reader accustomed to shifting scales: moving habitually  
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between the scale of a momentary event, situation, life, history or era, 
as well as being bound up with a particular detail, feature, body,  
locale, nation or as having global scope and reach. And, though it 
might seem strange to say so, photography – in the form of its  
apparatuses and the images that result from them – might be said to 
“read” those who use it in much the same way. Photographic equip-
ment is designed around processes of scaling, as in the application of 
engineered ratios of aperture and focus that contribute to governing 
the composite process that is the making of a photograph. And these 
ratios take on social, aesthetic and affective scales as they take on 
meaning in their use, as they scale the world’s visual registers in the 
act of registration. Cameras stand, one might say, as “anticipations of 
perception” and as answers to questions that the desire to make  
photographs has not yet asked, which places them, their users and 
those who view the results at the centre of a knot of scalar operations.
Each photograph, at whatever scale it is made, encountered or 
addressed, harbours within it a plethora of other scaled relations  
and material facts of scale that, so to speak, spiral upwards and  
down-wards, inwards and outwards, to enable and to impinge upon 
what the image is and how it can be used. Thus it is that a generalised 
body of individuals is inscribed in photography’s technical and  
social process. In his essay, ‘Nous Autres’, Jean-Luc Nancy projects  
an inter-subjective account of photography inflected with just such  
a sense of scale:
Each “subject” in the photo refers tacitly, obstinately, to all the 
others, to this prodigious universe of photos in(to) which we 
all take ourselves and one another, at some time or other, this 
colossal and labyrinthine phototheque in whose depths there 
stalks – like a Minotaur – the monster, the monstration, and 
the prodigious image of our strangeness.8
As noted above, the explosion of production, dissemination and 
consumption provoked by photography’s networked digital condition 
encourages its description at engorged statistical scales. The ‘colossal 
and labyrinthine phototheque’ is metastasizing and with it the social 
uses and meanings of photography mutate. This has exciting and 
troubling implications, not least because photographs act within 
this sphere as ubiquitous vehicles for assumed human values whilst 
also undercutting what might ground these values. In Being Singular 
Plural, Nancy confronts expectations of sense conventionally ascribed 
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to the scale of the human with the infinitely scalable horizon of 
number, a confrontation that might be used here to inflect the 
familiarity of the human scale – as an expectation of photography – 
with questions arising at other registers:
Man as the measure of all things has taken on a new, excessive 
meaning: far removed from every relation to the human 
as some mediocre standard and also far removed from its 
remnants, this meaning relates humans themselves to an 
immensity of responsibility.9
This statistical and ethical extension of Nancy’s explicit theorisation 
of the photographic might be taken to figure the photographic, as such, 
in terms of its potential for sublimity. But it has also to be noted that 
other senses of scale are also at work in each instance and every event 
of photography. These combine to structure the enormity in which 
photography’s appearances and their subjects are lodged. The task of 
theorising the intersubjective form and ethical horizon of this massive 
economy of images is not exhausted by reference to its potential  
for sublimity. When such issues of scale arise in photographic 
discourse, there is a tendency to reach a little too hastily for the 
category of the sublime, which, with no little irony, comes to function 
as a familiar and reassuring conceptual reflex. Whilst, from certain 
perspectives the category of the sublime might offer theoretical 
traction on photography’s experiential registers of complexity and 
import, it also tends to short-circuit and to displace interrogation of 
photographic specificities, their contexts of mediation and how these 
combine in complex ways to constitute the photographic as such.10
At the outset, then, one might think scale separately according 
to the terms of one of its useful discursive frameworks, one might 
assume it to be an issue delimited by conventions of relative size or one 
might take it to invoke a sense of the sublimity of the photographic in 
general. But none of these assumptions exhaust the specific meanings 
of the term, nor do they help us to understand its general importance 
for photography. So how might one go about this? 
The Principle of Variation in Photography’s Play of Scales
The epigraph from Philippe Boudon above highlights the relatively 
unexamined concept of scale. The quotation from Paul Ricoeur marks 
the centrality of this concept to his theorisation of history, memory 
P h o t o g r a p h i c  S c a l e
156
and forgetting. But it serves here as a heuristic device to suggest how 
one might address scale as a question for photography, given that scale 
means so many different things in this sphere: its semantic diversity 
gives the clue to what the concept of scale means for photography. 
Indeed, I argue that the variation of its senses of scale – and not any 
one particular fact, phenomenon, technique, order or discourse of 
scale alone – have ontological significance for photography. The task 
is, then, to develop the implications of these suggestions by exploring 
what it means to conceptualise scale in this context, at this particular 
historical conjuncture and according to the “very principle of a 
variation” at work in photography’s “play of scales”. 
The term “photographic scale” might thus be reserved to denote 
a dynamic nexus of operations, phenomena and forms through which 
this variegated play of scale takes on material form and might find its 
principle. The scope of the concept testifies to photography’s profound 
ability to touch upon and be informed by other forms, practices and 
discourses. It therefore incorporates, but cannot be delimited by the 
explicit concerns for scale that have come to inform recent debates 
about different aspects of photography, such as those focusing on the 
imposing scale of the photographic tableau as a genre of artwork,11 
histories of the instrumental applications of various scales of measure 
in, to and with photographs;12 or the global scope of networked  
digital photography.13
Within the variegated field denoted by photographic scale, three 
aspects stand out as predominant. Firstly, that all of photography’s 
productions set space and time together and to scale in the form of 
an image. Secondly, all forms of photography necessarily find some 
kind of material form, however attenuated or dispersed, and do so 
in taking on scale. Thirdly, that photography not only has, so to 
speak, a weighty geo-political scale but that its geo-political import 
is grounded in and through the scaling operations and processes it 
operates within and serves to facilitate.
Photography’s representational character as a visual image form, 
questions of the materiality and/or immateriality of the photographic 
image and photography’s expanding and increasingly intensified 
roles in the global order of contemporary capitalism are bound up 
with one another in ways that invite conceptualisation as modes of 
photography’s variegated scale. The visual character of photographic 
representation, phenomenological encounters with things 
photographic and the fact that photography’s representations and its 
phenomenologies unfold within capitalism’s global order of abstract 
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exchange, threaten to remain partial unless thought of in terms of  
the play that structures their variegation at and as scale.
These claims need, however, to be qualified. Perhaps most 
importantly it should be noted that recent attempts to theorise 
photography as a social form in relation to capitalism are, I think, 
right to establish parallels between the forms of social abstraction 
determining of social life and those characterizing the digital 
condition of photographic images. A compelling example is Peter 
Osborne’s theorisation of the social ontology of the photographic 
according to its intrinsic historical-technical character and shifting 
cultural formations. He distinguishes between the “event of capture” 
and the “event of visualisation” to mark the distinctiveness of the 
digital image, including photography as one of its most important 
modes, and to reveal its relation to the forms of abstraction and 
exchange central to capitalism. Thus, in the digital image: ‘the infinite 
possibilities for social exchange generated by the abstraction of value 
from use finds an equivalent visual form’.14 And this form is one 
in which the “post-capture” life of inherently de- and re-realizable 
technical-image visualisations are opened up to the vagaries of  
infinite exchangeability:  
Via the multiplicity of visualizations, digitalization draws 
attention to the essentially de-realized character of the image.  
It is this de-realized image – supported in each instance by 
specific material processes – that strangely “corresponds” to  
the ontological status of the value-form.15 
This enables him to project a determining parallel between image 
and exchange-form in the context of the social abstraction of value. 
But it also provokes questions as to what mediating forms, processes 
and experiences might flesh out the space between abstraction and 
exchange, on the one hand, and the specific uses and meanings of 
photographic images, on the other hand. What relates the general 
correspondence between image and value-form to the many different 
ways in which ‘each instance’ of the photographic is ‘supported 
by specific material processes’? The concept of photographic scale 
articulated here is projected to elucidate this gap.
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Scales of Scaling in Photography
One can step back briefly so as to set these claims in the context of 
related discourses on scale and its existing uses in and for photo- 
graphy. In general, scale denotes relative magnitude, extent, degree or 
propor-tion and the application of some standard of calculation. This 
always entails setting things at some level in relation to each other and 
often also the establishment of hierarchies between them. Scale refers 
to apparatuses or systems used for measuring: the graduated marks on 
a line or rule used to measure distances and ascertain relative dimen-
sions; the equally divided grid-lines on the surface of a map, chart or 
plan that enable ratios of area and distance to be established; the ratio 
pertaining between a model and the reality it represents or projects.
Geography teaches that scale is a socially produced dimension 
of spatiality and that scales emerge from unevenly distributed and 
politically conflicted processes: ‘geographical scales are both the 
realm and the outcome of the struggle for control over social space.’ 16 
Debates about the geo-politics of scale have seen many critical 
modulations of the concept, from scales that appear nested one in the 
next – from body to family, locale to nation, region and globe – to 
those moments at which social actors might “jump” between existing 
scales of social organisation, to arguments about whether it is an 
appropriate tool for investigation of contemporary social life at all.17 
These critical developments inform understanding of photography’s 
globalised form and its social processes. But other photographic 
aspects of scale militate against taking geographical scale to exhaust 
the term in this context. 
The labile relative dimensions of things encountered in embodied 
perception can also be thought in terms of scale. Things emerge 
from the depths of one’s surroundings in sensible experience in 
ways that are organised according to what Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
named “spatial levels” of engagement and significance.18 These 
phenomenological dimensions are inflected by the technical processes, 
forms and uses characteristic of photography, as it fills social space, 
impacts upon everyday experience and inscribes bodily comportment 
into globally networked contexts. Remarking this highlights the 
tension between scale as calculable abstraction and the idea that, 
ultimately, scaled phenomena find their sense in an axiomatic 
reference to the capacities and values of the human body.19 But noting 
the phenomenological resonance of this fact does not simply return 
the notion of scale in photography to a defining homology between 
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visual perception and the representational functions granted to 
photographic images. Rather, it inverts the axiomatic reference to the 
scale of human embodiment, revealing it in, so to speak, eviscerated 
form as the condition of dispersed embodied experience in the age of 
the networked digital photograph. 
Photography specifies spatial and temporal relationships between 
things in constitutively variable frames, the horizons of which are 
always scaled and, in principle, remain open to being rescaled. Any 
photographic representation or visual experience is bracketed, one 
might say structured, by the other possible scales at which it might 
have been – and still might be – actualized. Photography’s mediation 
of actual size relationships with real things has always been subject 
to such shifting scalar possibilities and the ways in which they knit 
together discursive, phenomenological, technical and social processes 
in and at variable dimensions. It has always also held out the promise 
and/or levelled the threat that it will render the “natural” character of 
embodied perceptual experience and the “real” dimensions of things 
in technically contingent and radically changeable terms. And this 
aspect of photography is defining of its contribution to that nature and 
that reality of which it has come to form such a significant part.
Since its inception, photography has harboured scalar promises, 
for instance, that it might bring small, large, distant and hidden 
things into the range of human perception. It has also proven open 
to other uses – equally oriented to establishing the scale of things – 
that harbour scaled injustices. The development of these interrelated 
discourses of photomensuration has hinged on the establishment 
of increasingly expansive, increasingly manipulable and analysable 
photographically framed viewpoints. Photography also entails the 
creation of scalable spaces “within” the image. This is common to all 
photographic representation, but also underpins a wide range of  
specialised photomensuration strategies. For instance, the many  
projects that have set out to survey and measure the world 
photographically – in ethnographical, archaeological, geographical or  
geological terms – and the representational strategies these have 
adopted to establish the scale of things – rulers resting on rock 
formations, local guides standing next to pyramids, subjects of 
an ethnographical gaze posed against gridded backcloths – scaled 
abstractions organised according to rules that inscribe the self-
evident appearance of photographic measure with discordant 
meanings harboured in the image but exceeding its representational 
framework.21
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Questions about scale, forms of scaling and the application of scales of 
different kinds are obvious in photography and have been a recurring 
but notably muted concern for its critical and theoretical discourses. 
For example, scale is central to Walter Benjamin’s influential 
conception of photographic reproduction, the spatial and temporal 
expansiveness of the close-up and slow-motion and, especially, the 
“unconscious optics” introduced by the camera, a notion explicitly 
characterised as a scale-effect: ‘The enlargement of a snapshot does 
not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, it reveals 
entirely new structural formations’.22 Susan Sontag’s dour appreciation 
of the mass form of photography seeks to understand a closely related 
set of scalar concerns in a way that binds together the material modes, 
representational functions, aesthetic effects and world spanning 
cultures of the photograph:
Photographed images do not seem to be statements about the 
world so much as pieces of it, miniatures of reality that anyone 
can make or acquire. Photographs, which fiddle with the 
scale of the world, themselves get reduced, blown up, cropped, 
retouched, doctored, tricked out.23
What might previously have been thought of as the immutable 
characteristics of the photograph’s fixity and pastness have been 
rendered yet more unstable by, for instance, recent cameras that 
enable one to alter picture settings after the event of capture.  
Explicitly made to be “tricked out” in scalar terms, photography’s 
unconscious optics is thus inflected with possibility to dilate the  
event and the functions of its pictorial authorship. Benjamin’s and  
Sontag’s photographic world is transformed and the site of this 
transformation is the defining suite of scaling operations built into  
the camera, reflected in its image and found in their uses.
In phenomenological terms the rhythms of photography’s 
impact upon subjectivity find an enervating scalar outlet in Roland 
Barthes’s Camera Lucida. His eidetic reduction of photography’s 
normative use hinges upon a series of embodied acts – little moments 
of transformative interface between the privacy of affect and the 
banal enormity of photographic culture – that pivot from acedia to 
intense affect and, in doing so, project the ecstatic temporality of 
photography: ‘I was leafing through an illustrated magazine.  
A photograph made me pause’ being one such spur.24 Barthes’ subtle 
binding of affect to photographic temporality still rings true in 
A n d y  F i s h e r
161
many respects, but its resonance in the present is complicated by the 
loosening of his – always tendentious – radicalisation of photography’s 
realistic visual effects.
Vilém Flusser’s account of photography as the exemplary form of 
technical image treats the photographic apparatus as a programmed 
modality of the social production of space. The spatiotemporal scaling 
operations embedded in cameras structure the interface between 
photographic apparatus, operator and world: a relationship in which 
the apparatus, famously, has the upper hand. Mathew Fuller describes 
this well: 
Here, iterations of multi-scalar relations of causality and 
interpenetration are compiled layer upon layer. Base and 
superstructure shot through a kaleidoscope. Programs and 
metaprograms are never clearly defined as distinct. The  
relation is simply one of scale, or of order.25
The application of technical and scientific concepts predetermine 
the photographic apparatus as a tool for schematising space and 
time in symbolic terms. The apparatus delimits individual freedoms 
and meanings traditionally associated with the making and viewing 
images. This generates and gives spatiotemporal flesh to Flusser’s 
critique of technical image culture:
The photographer’s gesture as the search for a viewpoint 
onto a scene takes place within the possibilities offered by the 
apparatus. The photographer moves within specific categories 
of space and time regarding the scene: proximity and distance, 
bird- and worm’s-eye views, frontal- and side-views, short or 
long exposures, etc. The Gestalt of space-time surrounding the 
scene is prefigured for the photographer by the categories of 
his camera. These categories are an a priori for him. He must 
“decide” within them: he must press the trigger.26 
This might be taken as a signature form of photographic scale: its 
dissociation between the “human” quotient in imagination and the 
meaningful experiences taken to be embedded in visual culture. For 
Flusser, this dissociation is a core truth of the age of technical images 
and thus the source of critical potentials that might attain critical 
purchase on their era.
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When one approaches the history of photography theory more 
broadly one finds it to be suffused with a muted concern for scale, 
which tends to feature merely to set the scene for other questions and 
problems. There is an implicit truth in this, scale does set the scene for 
photography’s other questions and problems, quite literally. But it does 
so in more substantive ways than have been acknowledged to date. 
 
Photographic Scale
In light of these implicit and explicit traces of scale in photography 
and as a starting point for conceptualising photographic scale as a 
variegated and ubiquitous modality of the photographic, one might 
observe a truism: There’s no photography without it. That is, there 
is no photography of any kind without their being established a 
manifold of scalar relations which serve as material, conceptual 
and phenomenological horizons for the production, dissemination 
and consumption, as well as the form, appearance and meaning of 
photographs. There are always, as a matter of fact, multiple, different 
and overlapping scalar operations and scaled processes at work in 
each instance and every form of photography. These might be thought 
of as scalar adumbrations of the photographic that extend across 
the application of mathematically and scientifically derived technical 
scales in the design and operation of photographic equipment; the 
spatial and temporal possibilities held out by the photographic 
apparatuses so structured and the ways in which this sets the terms for 
decisions and actions performed in their use; the aesthetic experiences 
that any resulting photographs might engender; the possibilities 
of use that photographs as material objects might proffer; and the 
institutional, commercial and geo-political spheres of interest within 
which such uses and encounters may or may not unfold. 
A range of relatively discreet scalar phenomena, possibilities 
and contexts are always operative at these different registers and 
more. Whilst, at any one level, a particular question of scale may 
appear dominant, others are also operative, albeit in latent form. To 
put this differently, other senses of scale always haunt the manifest 
as its supplement. They resonate within the dominant as its under-
or overtones. And these relations change and shift from instance 
to instance, encounter to encounter, transmission to transmission 
as admixed scales that impinge upon the making and experience of 
photography at all levels. Photographic scale, it turns out, is modal 
and compound in form.
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The variegated play characteristic of photographic scale reveals 
it to be a complex and shifting, but nonetheless concrete, matrix 
of broadly social, phenomenological, and technical modalities of 
the photographic. One of the distinctive features of this notion of 
photographic scale is the relationship it foregrounds between specific 
and general aspects of photography. The variegated admixture  
of scales that play across each and every moment, event or object  
of photography do so in ways that pertain to whichever form, use  
or object of photography may be in question. And yet, precisely  
as such, photographic scale is always also concrete in and specific to 
that particular instance of photography which is in question. In this 
manner photographic scale suggests itself as having an ontological 
status; as being what one might call an ontological modality of 
the photographic. In contrast to other ontological categories that 
are conventionally projected onto photography, the generality of 
photographic scale remains intimately entwined in the detailed 
specificity of photography’s diverse moments and different uses.
At a range of levels, scalar operations and phenomena are central 
to diverse photographic processes, their uses and the discourses that 
frame these. But a basic function of all forms of photography is also 
to register the ostensible spatial and temporal state of things, to fix 
these together at a certain scale and according to a combination of 
prefigured and anticipated scales. One significant implication of this 
is that, in photography, one never encounters “space” or “time” – 
nor for that matter any place, thing, moment or event – other than 
through a combination of processes that entail the setting of salient 
aspects of appearance to scale in the more or less enduring but 
also changeable form of an image. If to scale in this sense is a basic 
function of photography – the interior horizon, so to speak, of the 
photograph as image – photographs of all kinds are also, as a matter 
of principle, subject to the demands of what one might contrastingly 
call “exterior horizons” entailing their being scaled and re-scaled. 
Any actualization of a photograph according to its particular scales is 
inscribed within a horizon of other scales not, or not yet, taken.
However much scale might be said to be central to photography, 
it cannot simply take over the theoretical roles ascribed to other 
categories of which similar generality is also claimed, for instance, 
photographic temporality and the persistent convention which tells 
us, after Barthes, that time as such is photography’s eidos. Having 
remarked this, however, it is also important to note that photographic 
scale is not reducible to the contingent form of an empirical given. In 
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the form outlined above, it is always a feature of all modalities of the 
photographic, and necessarily so. 
On the one hand, scale is integral to photography and 
the photograph but not in the manner of an essence, whether 
surreptitiously projected or made explicit. On the other hand, 
photographic scale allows for but is not contained by the self-evident 
empirical horizons of specific photographs. This latter horizon has 
often been central to claims on photography’s role in the construction 
of place and its entanglements at the scale of individual experience.27 
But, just as every compelling claim on the generality of “the 
Photograph” as a paradoxical temporal ecstasy has emerged from 
a particular encounter with one or other variation on the range of 
photography’s possible scaled materialisations (however attenuated 
its material form and singular its affective force), similarly, and 
without exception, all uses of photographs taken to enable meaningful 
engagements in and with particular places arise from an encounter 
with one or other scaled variation on photography’s very ability to 
set up such relationships (however strong the attractions and values 
of the photographic particularities thus presented may be). Yet this 
does not mean that time or place are denuded of importance, that 
they are simply displaced by photographic scale as a newly revealed 
metaphysical principle, or as the actual form of photography’s 
empirical contingency. Photographic scale does not displace these 
explicitly projected or implicitly assumed ontological categories, 
nor does it dissolve the strong affects and significant meanings that 
have been associated with them. Rather, photographic scale is that 
variegated play of concrete spatiotemporal possibilities through which 
these categories and particularities take on their form and force.
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Almost twenty years have passed since Jean Baudrillard sent 
out his warning cry that distinctions between the real and its 
representations were collapsing under the tyranny of the social genetic 
code of simulation, which he described as ‘the automatic writing of 
the world’.1 While, as Steven Shaviro claims, Baudrillard has ‘gone 
from being a prophet of urgency and extremity’ and ‘seems like a 
nostalgic whiner, yearning for past that never existed’,2 his theory of 
communication as code in which all signs and their messages operate 
according to the logic of the ‘mystical elegance of the binary system 
of zero and one’ can still be said to underpin the crisis in photography 
Oscillations Between Disciplinary and Productive 
Subjectivity in James Coupe’s Auto-Generative Online 
Film Project Today, too, I experienced something I 
hope to understand in a few days (2010).
M a r i a  W a l s h
10
172
generated by the digital.3 Digitality severed photography’s indexical 
relation to the real and ushered in an era in which images circulate, 
proliferate and are consumed as bits of information with which  
we interface rather than as representations of reality that we look at  
or through. If the photographic image preserved, both materially  
and semiotically, traces of the past like relics to be excavated by a 
viewer in the present, what happens to our subjectivity when the 
image becomes a sign to decode in reference to other signs, rather than 
to an indexical real? While we can of course celebrate the machinic 
and cyborg subjectivities that abound in accounts of technology 
that view ‘[a] reciprocal rapprochement between genetics, animal 
communication and linguistics’ as leading to ‘a complete science of  
the dynamics of semiosis’,4 theorists as diverse as Vilém Flusser to 
Steven Shaviro and Jonathan Beller insist that we need to decipher  
the images produced by the apparatuses that create the world-as 
screen in order to situate ourselves in relation to them rather than be 
positioned by them. As Flusser says:
[…] omnipresent technical images have begun magically  
to restructure “reality” into an image-like scenario. What  
is involved here is a kind of oblivion. Man forgets that  
he produces images in order to find his way in the world; he 
now tries to find his way in images. He no longer deciphers  
his own images, but lives in their function. Imagination 
becomes hallucination.5
Although Flusser is not a traditional humanist in the sense of elevating 
the human to a hierarchical position above both first and second 
orders of “nature”, his insistence on the necessity for breaking out 
of the magical circuit of hallucination links to Beller’s suggestion 
that ‘our encounters with images take place in a translinguistic 
environment that both utilizes thought and is beyond it’ and that the 
overall effect of this ever-increasing quantity of images is the radical 
alienation of consciousness into a mode of public unconsciousness, the 
reduction of consciousness ‘to something of the order of a free-floating 
hallucination, cut away as it is from all ground’.6 Beller actually 
situates this severing in relation to the photographic image in a way 
that counters the usual history and theory of photography as an index 
of the real. He refers to the German literary critic Wlad Godwich  
who states that:
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Where with language we have a discourse on the world, with 
human beings facing the world in order to name it, photography 
substitutes the simple appearance of things: it is a discourse of 
[not on] the world. […] Images now allow for the paradox that 
the world states itself before human language […] Images are 
scrambling the function of language which must operate out of 
the imaginary to function optimally.7
There are echoes here with Shaviro’s claim in Post-Cinematic Affect 
that, because of breakdown of the opposition between reality-based 
and image-based modes of presentation in the contemporary world of 
electronic media and global capital, ‘[t]oday the most vivid and intense 
reality is precisely the reality of images’.8 In this climate, the negative 
critiques performed for example by the Frankfurt school are no longer 
tenable, as, according to Flusser, in finding super-human powers 
such as capitalism behind the image, they themselves uncannily 
unleashed even larger spectres than the ones they sought to eradicate, 
thereby augmenting the hallucinatory magical realm they sought to 
destroy. Flusser recommends taking the position from the outset that 
‘programming is a stupid, automatic, unintentional process’ and, 
that photographs – we can substitute technical images here – ‘suppress 
our critical consciousness in order to make us forget the absurdity 
of functioning’.9 Rather than finding super-human powers at work 
behind images, we need to ‘create room for human intention in  
a world dominated by apparatus’.10
I begin with this brief account of where we now might be placed 
in relation to technical images, in an electronic culture in which 
images are ungrounded from medium specificity while nonetheless 
having distinct apparatuses, in order to create a context for the 
artwork that motivates the arguments in this chapter, James Coupe’s 
online film project Today, too, I experienced something I hope to 
understand in a few days (2010). It will be my contention that Coupe’s 
work, in exposing the automatic functionality of the apparatus and 
its programming, reveals the persistence of the human desire to 
recognise and be recognised by others, a desire which creates a new 
immaterial materiality that emerges beyond the capturing of the 
human by purely mechanical or automatic systems. Flusser states that 
apparatuses ‘automatically assimilate […] attempts at liberation, and 
incorporate them in their programs in order to enrich the programs’ 
rather than to enrich human experience.11 He sees the task of a 
photographic philosophy as being ‘to reveal the struggle between 
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man and apparatus in the realm of photography [or technical images], 
and thus to contribute to a possible solution to the conflict’.12 I am 
not proposing that Coupe’s work offers such a solution, but that it 
exemplifies the struggle. What in Today, too, I experienced something 
I hope to understand in a few days is ultimately a computerised 
programmable interchange between different types of technical 
images – video portraits, Facebook profiles, and YouTube video  
films – can also be read as performing a complexification of the digital 
flow of images and intransigent human desires for recognition.  
I shall explore how in this work something jars in the machinic 
apparatus, which offers a reflexive pause in the habitual modes of 
viewing and consuming images via screen interfaces. 
Today, too, I experienced something I hope to understand in a 
few days is comprised of three elements, engaging with and operating 
within the ready-made data banks of information and images that 
circulate in virtual space and that we unthinkingly use to encode our 
identities. The first element is a series of video portraits of volunteers, 
some shot by Coupe in Seattle where he is based, the rest shot in 
Barrow and Manchester in the uk,13 using poses and actions loosely 
based on Danish experimental film-maker Jorgen Leth’s 1967 film 
The Perfect Human. Coupe’s title is a line from the film which is 
perhaps better known as the premise of Leth’s and Lars von Trier’s 
The Five Obstructions, 2003, in which Leth attempts to remake 
his original film five times according to von Trier’s dictates. Coupe 
instructs his volunteers to grin, scratch, munch, jump and stare, 
against a clinical white background reproducing the same laboratory 
quality as Leth’s film which lends the protagonists a specimen-like 
aspect. The videos are uploaded to a database where a programme 
automatically edits them in the style of Leth’s film, the result lending 
a strangely mechanical appearance to the actions and gestures of 
the volunteers. The second element of the work uses text from status 
profiles submitted by Facebook users who voluntarily signed up on 
Facebook to participate in Coupe’s project. The Facebook posts were 
limited respectively to Barrow and Manchester for the specific and 
exhibitions, but afterwards, the project continued with footage from 
all three shoots, and status updates from anyone in the world. A 
software application automatically matches the Facebook profiles with 
the demographic of the video portraits, the Facebook profile texts 
serving as subtitles to the portraits, e.g. the profile ‘Male 22’ (fig. 1) 
refers to a video portrait of a grinning young man whose subtitle reads 
‘I am a bomb technician’. The final component of the project involves 
M a r i a  W a l s h
177
software using metadata tags that searches YouTube for videos and/
or images that link to code words in the subtitles, the final works 
being shown on YouTube as split screen films, the video portrait on 
one screen, its paired YouTube video/image on the other. Although all 
the protagonists in the project volunteered, watching the split screen 
films on Youtube raises questions about control and freedom in an 
era in which images and text are easily exchanged and substitutable, 
the work seeming to propound the neo-liberal idea of the subject 
as an unbound network of potential with the capacity for endless 
modulation. Does this work merely cleverly illustrate the way in 
which identity is territorialized by the virtual informational machines 
that track our movements and channel our desires in feedback loops 
of constant modulation – our user profiles and interactions giving 
feedback to the machine in the aestheticisation of everyday life that 
Felix Guattari calls ‘subjectivity’s entry into the machine’ 14 – or does 
the exposure of these conditions, the making visible of these virtual 
operations which are usually hidden in the flow of information, offer 
some resistance to the circuit of visual capture to which we are subject 
in this electronic age? Today, too, I experienced something I hope 
to understand in a few days exemplifies how text and image are 
circulated in our communication systems according to standardised 
frames of exchange, what Flusser might call ‘programmed magic’.15
The utilisation of the frame is key to this standardisation in which 
the “real” is fragmented into bite sized chunks and all fragments 
take on the same value. Taking Deleuze slightly out of context, 
Jonathan Beller says that: ‘“The frame ensures a deterritorialization 
of the image” because it “gives a common standard to things which 
do not have one – long shots of countryside and close-ups of the 
face, an astronomical system and a single drop of water”’.16 What 
for Beller is the cinematic organisation of the world, which can be 
linked to Flusser’s “photographic universe”, is determined by the 
logic of capital – equivalent value – and this moves us, Beller says, 
beyond representation and into simulation. The picture Beller paints 
is familiar from postmodern theorists such as Baudrillard, with the 
difference being that Beller sees this condition as productive. It is 
productive of ‘new affects, desires and identity formations’, which, 
while these latter can be exchanged as commodities whose value 
is interchangeable, are also open to counterlogical trajectories.17 I 
shall explore what a counterlogical trajectory might be in relation to 
Coupe’s artwork as I go through a series of theoretical manoeuvres 
in this chapter that lead away from postmodern theory per se to 
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reworkings of Freud and Benjamin in order to think about the 
ubiquitous imaging of the world as not simply a screen in relation to 
which we are posited as a stain, nor an interface in relation to which 
we have agency and choice, but something in-between.18
Today, too, I experienced something I hope to understand in 
a few days seems to me to operate, as does the social networking 
site Facebook, between the modalities of, on the one hand, Western 
capitalist disciplinary societies, in which the surveillance techniques 
of subjection are internalized, and, on the other hand, societies of 
control, which, as Deleuze stated in his 1980 essay ‘Postscript on 
the Societies of Control’, deploy the technique of surfing which 
transverses the internalized dynamics of subjection in favour of a 
dispersal of subject positions across a network.19 For many theorists 
and practitioners, including Coupe, this is a productive space which 
allows us to operate as agents of our own identities. He says:
An algorithm assumes a role previously performed by the State 
apparatus, and what results is a human petri dish in which we 
exchange data about ourselves for an opportunity to discover 
more about who we are. Inside this kind of environment, there 
is a “real” dimension that cannot find a parallel either in virtual 
or physical space, rather, it only makes sense between the two. 
Via training grounds like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, we 
are becoming virtuosic practitioners of this hybrid networked 
space, developing strategies that can be seen in a wide range of 
spheres. So increasingly such spaces constitute a form of reality, 
both in terms of their integration into our everyday lives and 
also in the influence they have on how we process information 
elsewhere. So in that sense […] Facebook is a portrait of us, and 
Today, too, I experienced something I hope to understand in a 
few days brings that to the fore.20
The issue I want to explore further is the double-edged aspect of 
how images of the world are pictured, circulated and exchanged via 
the digital algorithm. Can we say, after Walter Benjamin, that we 
enjoy our subjection to the technical apparatuses that constitute our 
subjectivity to such an extent that we are content to give ourselves 
completely over to them or is there still room to speak of a critical 
response in relation to the dominant trend in media theory that 
celebrates our capacities as users of technology to create versions 
of “reality” that evade forms of centralised power?21 Do the video 
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portraits simply transform their protagonists into informational 
data to be processed by the surfing (more specifically algorithmic 
linking) machinations of a disinterested programme with which we 
interface in a more or less disinterested way due to the endless layering 
and substitutability of images in screen space? Whose gaze, whose 
desire, is being addressed in this work? Is there enough of a pause 
in the exchange and conversion of selection data to necessitate such 
questions or are they redundant in the age of proliferating simulations 
of human interchange?
In considering technological apparatuses as a means of both 
presenting and producing self-styled communicative images, it is 
tempting to use psychoanalytic tropes of mirroring in which the self-
presentation or self-performance acts as a mirror that reflects back 
to oneself an image of oneself that conjoins with one’s narcissism.22 
Through the medium of online photography in Facebook, the 
narcissistic component of the gaze is accentuated. The user, him 
or herself, puts images out there that convey a sense or perhaps the 
style(s) of oneself that one wants to communicate to others; how 
one wants to be seen in order to attract other users. We might say 
that online self-presentation partakes of “an exhibitionist dispositif” 
which operates like an “attraction” in Tom Gunning’s sense of “the 
cinema of attractions”, a phrase which has been used to apply more 
generally to all media exhibitionist events that show rather than tell. 
In ‘Digital Attractions: Reloading Early Cinema in Online Video 
Collections’, Joost Broeren uses Gunning’s term to discuss YouTube 
videos in terms of how the latter are oriented towards the spectator/
viewer/user in a manner which relates back to my earlier point about 
how the world is now being imaged before being spoken about – the 
gaze and gestures of the participants is directed towards the camera, 
the presentation is frontal as in showing rather than telling a story, 
the frontal display and elicitation of the gaze allude to a present tense 
within the frame of capture.23 Within the circuit of continual exchange 
and the illusion of a present tense, value is flattened. However, in 
Coupe’s films, the system begins to repeat, as there are obviously less 
video portraits than Youtube videos, an aspect of the programme 
that exposes the recombinatory programming of online picturing 
and communication. While Coupe has abdicated responsibility in 
a parody of the technology he is deploying, nonetheless, on another 
level, his split screen machinic pairings tap into the sadistic voyeurism 
on the other side of the “exhibitionist dispositif” and in this, they 
expose a contradiction at the heart of digital communication, i.e. 
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that the flow of code can still be interrupted by a phenomenology of 
the body, albeit displaced across “deconnected” time-spaces. Not 
all the pairings exhibit the disinterested aesthetics of a seemingly 
benign global image bank whose recombinations might be judged 
and passed over according to how “cool” they might be, for example, 
the video portrait of a young girl which is subtitled ‘is tired n fed 
up’ and juxtaposed with a YouTube video of a young Asian man 
playing guitar crooning about being fed up.24 Aside from alluding to 
the ways in which the material we put out there on social networking 
sites is continually being electronically linked to form identikits that 
are ultimately of use somewhere down the line to some financial 
corporation, some of the juxtapositions are discomfiting, for example 
the pairing of the video portrait of a 50 year old woman with a toothy 
grin whose subtitles read ‘…so hypo’ with a YouTube video of Tina 
Turner, which appears unwittingly sadistic. But there are also other 
discomfiting moments that break through the blasé automaticity of 
the pairings and the purely narcissistic exhibitionism encouraged by 
the “exhibitionist dispositifs” deployed in the work. The films dated 
1 sep 2010 and 19 aug 2010 show the same supposedly 43-year-old 
man in an anorak, whose portrait is paired in the one with YouTube 
footage of Barack Obama trying to sell his vision of healthcare to the 
American public and with footage of a commentator on the current 
credit crisis in the other. In these pairings, as in the tradition of avant-
garde split screen film, the split screens begin to comment dialectically 
on one another – the resolute presence of the man in the video portrait 
makes Obama seem a merely silver-tongued performer not to be 
trusted. Instead of simply invoking a perverse gaze that gains pleasure 
in looking at others’ discomfort or laughs at the ridiculousness of an 
image in the spirit of the “attraction”, an inadvertent counterlogic to 
the unproblematic consumption of subjectivity emerges. Although it 
may be difficult to maintain this kind of critical reading in relation 
to a technology that uses code to automatically select and recombine 
images, there is still a general sense in which the capturing of the 
human body in the field of vision, a process that makes it both 
“dehumanised and excessive”, opens up a complex space between 
user/viewer and images that is irreducible to neither the embodied 
individual nor to the automaticity of the machine.25
On the one hand, the subjects of the video portraits elicit a 
to-be-looked-at-ness characteristic of the voyeuristic gaze, their 
look directed at the camera with which, in classical theories of 
spectatorship, we are said to identify. But at the same time, the 
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consumption of these figures is offset by both the text and by the 
juxtaposed YouTube clips, as well as the automatic editing which 
gives them a skittish animalistic look. As we watch these films, it is 
as if the subjects are caught in a diagnostic gaze that scrutinises them 
in their textual laboratories to evaluate whether they align with or 
diverge from the narratives that they are embedded within. But on 
the other hand, due to the surface exchangeability of information the 
diagnostic gaze, which harks back to modernity and the fascination 
with photography as a new technological means of revealing “visual 
knowledge” about a person’s interiority through the translation of 
bodily signifiers, transmogrifies into a virtual gaze, a free-floating 
gaze of consumption that simply scans the surface and forgets what 
went before in the seemingly endless flow and exchangeability of 
images.26 Yet, I want to persist with the notion that there can be 
moments of destabilization within the recombinatory aesthetic of 
digital image-generation processes. 
In order to address this issue, I want firstly to link the virtual gaze 
to the relay of positions intrinsic to scopophilia that Freud describes 
in his essay ‘Instincts & Their Vicissitudes’ and which unsettles the 
paradigm of seeing the spectator-users as voyeurs and the performers 
and/or the apparatus as exhibitionist. In ‘Show Me Yours: Cyber-
Exhibitionism from Perversion to Politics’, Julie Levin Russo contrasts 
the model of visuality that derives from Foucault’s panopticon with 
Freud’s account of scopophilia.27 In the former, the surveillance that 
characterizes disciplinary societies has been theorized as a hierarchical 
model wherein the looker sees all; the looked at sees nothing but 
internalises the imagined look of the other, thereby setting up the 
monitoring gaze within the self. This is in contrast to surveillance 
in control societies which operates on a horizontal plane where 
interiority has been emptied into the outside, prosthetic technologies 
modulating part selves and affects in a non-directional manner, except 
of course when the system registers an aberration to the usual flow 
of movement in public space. As opposed to the Foucauldian model 
of the panoptic which has been readily applied in media aesthetics, 
Russo’s point is that Freud’s model of display and consumption in 
‘Instincts & Their Vicissitudes’ sets up a chain of reversals that more 
interestingly corresponds to the way that cyber-communication 
operates fluidly between domination and dispersal. Although Russo 
is talking about webcam and livejournal blogs, her reformulation of 
the exhibitionist/voyeur dialectic in terms of the dispersal of positions 
in Freud is useful in considering the reversals of position between 
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subjection and empowerment that might occur in the interface 
between the video portrait films and their viewers/users. She could 
almost be describing Coupe’s piece in the following citation:
In their integration of writing and images, self-display and 
participation, present-tense transience and persistent  
traces, they demonstrate that while technology, desire, and 
hegemony are in transformation, we are in the midst of a  
murky confusion of boundaries more than a radical break  
with their modern forms.28
In returning to Freud’s essay, Russo attempts to go beyond the 
reduction of cyber-communication as representing “compliant 
subjects” caught in structures of domination that replicate the cultural 
epidemic of micro celebrity which is exacerbated by the “Broadcast 
Yourself” injunction of the YouTube company slogan.29 She attempts 
to invoke a model of engagement that allows for slippages between 
activity and passivity that characterises the modulations of identity 
that seem to characterise our habitation of images today. 
In Freud’s account of scopophilia, rather than either simply 
subjecting another to a controlling gaze or being subjected to the gaze 
of the other, the phenomenon is conceived of as a four part process, 
whereby the initial auto-erotic taking by the subject of its own body 
as the object of desire is redirected towards an extraneous object. 
This leads to voyeurism per se, but then this energy is redirected back 
to the subject’s own person resulting in a new aim – to be looked 
at, which, in turn, constitutes a new subject to whom one displays 
oneself (as subject) in order to be looked at (as object).30 This kind of 
splitting of the self into both subject and object can be applied to the 
ways in which we inhabit public space today, the internet being such 
a public space. In effect, we need to do this kind of splitting in order 
to operate between the domains of domination and dispersal in which 
we find ourselves in relation to contemporary technologies.31 While 
it would be too schematic to map this model onto the presentation 
and consumption of these online portraits and the automated 
recombinatory effects of the computer code, the point I want to 
make is that our technologies not only tap into this component 
instinct for self-display as an object, but, in giving it prosthetic 
expression in a technical image, they might allow us to connect with 
the “real” dimension that Coupe describes as not having a parallel 
either in virtual or physical space, but only between the two. Via 
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the disinterested seeing of the camera and the disinterested selection 
processes of the computer optic, the subjects on either side of the 
screen experience their own objecthood as both virtual and physical. 
Linked, at least in time, to Freud’s ideas about the flow and 
conversion of energy between different psychical and physical 
registers is Walter Benjamin’s concept of innervation.32 Innervation 
was a concept Benjamin explored in relation to how to engage 
with technology in a redemptive, i.e. humanising, way. While most 
commentators from Miriam Bratu Hansen to Celia Lury agree that 
the redemptive moment vis-à-vis technology is no longer politically 
tenable due to how technology has been deployed for destructive 
ends beyond Benjamin’s wildest dreams, it is still important to find a 
way of articulating the intersubjective nature of our engagement with 
disinterested machines. If the Freudian model proposed by Russo 
suggests a space of oscillation between subjection and subjectification, 
Benjamin’s notion of innervation proposes a mimetic incorporation 
of technology in which images given to us by the mechanical eye of 
the camera or the disinterested computer optic, while not having an 
intentional target as such, generate connective energies like neural 
pathways that operate between humans and machines. ‘Technology 
becomes an organ of the collective’, producing emotion in the beholder 
through bodily movement converting ‘mental, affective energy into 
somatic, motoric form’ and also ‘reconverting, and recovering, split 
off psychic energy through motoric stimulation’.33 This mode of 
reception creates a mimetic transduction between different entities 
that generates relations between them in an affinitive rather than a 
possessive or defensive manner. Through the affinitive connection 
that stems from innervation, we can be in a connective relation to that 
which we do not like or which is not the same as us, e.g. machines, 
part selves and affects, and code. For me, the motoric movements 
that engage our sensoriums in Today, too, I experienced something I 
hope to understand in a few days are the movements of the humans, 
captured and edited by the apparatus, whose puppet-like animation 
generates an excess through which we connect with something 
beyond the frame, that sense of the “real” between so-called reality 
and virtuality. Ultimately, this leads me to the earlier version of 
Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay in which he discusses innervation and 
alienation by contrast to the infamous later versions in which these 
concepts either disappear or are relegated a minor place.34 In the early 
version of the ‘Work of Art’ essay, Benjamin discusses how mediation 
has created a shift in the phenomenology of performance. As Lury 
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explains, he speaks about how, when the screen actor confronts the 
apparatus, the audience is constructed as identifying not with the 
critical impersonal attitude of the camera as in the later version of the 
essay, which of course has become the sine qua non of film and media 
studies, but with the actor as:
their stand-in, as a representative of their own daily battle with 
an alienating technology who takes “revenge in their place”. In 
the mimetic identification, gestures and emotions are enlarged 
the way reality is enlarged by the camera lens:
‘The actor’s forced self-alienation in front of the camera, 
microphones, and klieg lights, the extreme presence of mind 
required in the absence of the aura of live performance, show 
the masses how “one’s humanity” (or whatever may appear to 
them as such) can assert itself in the face of the apparatus.’ 35 
For Steven Shaviro, ‘alienation is a quaint luxury’ in our electronic 
world of ‘forcible involvement, relentless inclusion, compulsory 
monetarisation’.36 However, he also admits that ‘something needs to 
remain incommensurable, non-negotiable, unexchangeable outside 
the circle of capital’.37 Watching the protagonists who have given 
themselves to be imaged in this project, who act as stand-ins for our 
sense that in life we are already taking part in a bad film,38 something 
happens in the oscillation between object and subject positions or the 
awareness of these positions being traded or exchanged. We can laugh 
at the “stupidity” of the programme, but we can also become aware 
of an excess on the side of the image that is not simply commensurate 
with the technological sublime of data, but rather that stems from 
the mismatch between this and the intransigent performances of the 
volunteers who give themselves over to the programme. Alienation 
in this respect is not negative but is a productive realisation inscribed 
via the automaticity of technology. It is located neither in the text as a 
play of signification nor ‘in a sentient organism [such as the spectator] 
but rather is constituted in a two-way (reversible, reciprocal but not 
symmetrical) relation of mimesis between the image and the viewer’.39 
For Lury, the open productivity of ‘the 0/1 dimension of time’,40 
with all the latent immediacies of readymade image banks that are 
ready to erupt into the time-space of the individual to ‘disturb the 
pre-mediation of the already completed personality’ is characteristic 
of the splitting of viewpoint afforded by digitalisation.41 While there 
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may be a naïveté to the notion, stemming from both Freud and 
Benjamin as read in this article, that technology can be used in a 
playful manner (this would include sadistic relations as well as more 
fluid ones), I would suggest that Today, too, I experienced something 
I hope to understand in a few days proposes ways of thinking about 
digitalisation that re-imagines the world, which is key to how we are 
to continue to live and survive with images. As Flusser stated: ‘we 
can observe nearly everywhere how apparatus of every sort tend 
towards programming our lives for a kind of dumb automation’.42 
It is important to be cautious in relation to the celebratory techno-
aesthetics of much current thinking that claims that because we seem 
to be no longer passively consuming information, but making it over 
– for example uploading our own videos, making and exchanging 
our own images – that we automatically create virtual communities 
with the potential for subversion. By contrast to this approach 
Flusser argues for photographers ‘to show that there is no room for 
human freedom in the realm of the automated, programmed and 
programming apparatus; and having shown this to argue how despite 
apparatus it is possible to create room for freedom’.43 By exposing the 
conditions of capture and mediation in relation to the recombinatory 
principles of 0/1 code, Coupe’s work offers a limit situation for us 
to consider the humanity implicit within technologies of visuality, 
enabling us to imagine the function of the apparatus in generating  
new narratives of human engagement and interaction. To imagine 
another kind of magic, one in which we are not held in thrall by the 
image, but which allows us to find ways of reflecting on the world  
and of maintaining the zero degree of difference between appearance 
and intention. 
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The 7th Berlin Biennale can be taken as an example which shows 
that the task of political representation, or rather the representation 
of politics within the field of art, necessitates a thinking beyond the 
logic of the representation of the real. However, I will argue that 
there is no possibility of escaping or getting beyond representation 
tout court. The act of display within the gallery as such determines 
the paradoxical impossibility of direct representation, in the same 
way that political representation within current forms of democracy 
precludes the possibility of direct presentation of the desires and 
demands of the polis. As such, representation must be problematized 
from within rather than stepped over. This problematization requires 
an operation from the demand of display which depends upon the 
registering of the traumatic relation that art has to the presentation 
of the real. As such, the possibility of a “beyond representation” is 
a necessary, but false, conceit. In contradistinction to this I propose 
Beyond the Beyond
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a realism of art that follows a logic laid out in the work of Quentin 
Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, Reza Negarestani and Gabriel Catren, 
which embarks via a further traumatic wounding of art’s narcissism.
In his foreword to the 2012 Berlin Biennale catalogue, Forget Fear, 
the curator Artur Z
.
mijewski expounds his dissatisfaction with much 
of contemporary art. His mood when viewing art, as he describes it, 
has gone from one of elation to one of depression and lassitude. His 
disappointment stems precisely from the lack of political engagement 
and social critique proposed by artists of the current generation. The 
diagnosis is severe but, in the most part, accurate. He identifies the 
dominant curatorial strategy as an administration of art objects, 
which are still, he asserts, imbued with the belief in the magical power 
of the object: 
[…] it seems as if producing an object and distributing it among 
people is sufficient to effect change, political change as well. 
The art object alone, whatever else it may be, is expected to 
perform the social and political work assigned to it, without 
human agency, without any work at convincing, without 
difference of opinion or conflict, and thus essentially without 
any politics.1
This impotent art practice, he asserts, doesn’t act and doesn’t 
work. Limited political ambition stems, he suggests, from the lack 
of commitment of the artist or viewer; art ‘usually goes no further 
than presenting ideas that no-one has any intention of putting into 
practice’.2 Art is safeguarded against real politics by the institutional 
borders, practiced by both artists, curators and the administrative 
staff, who imagine the world of art to progress by, what Z
.
mijewski 
calls, the “logic of the miracle”. Anything can happen, because art 
(but not the system of art) is miraculous, the figures in it can somehow 
transcend the banalities of the system and produce something 
truly radical, sexy, or wonderful. Art under this logic is seen as the 
theological curative for the ethical misadventures of the art system 
(theological because it proceeds by way of the miracle, the eruptive 
event from the outside). Z
.
mijewski rightly decries this formulation, 
admitting that the true miracle would be the abolishment of the 
system of regulation and the liberation of art from the ideology of 
impotence. Velvet critique emerges from the radicalism of the artist, 
as though the curator, as a professional figure, shears art from its 
radical potential in order to adhere to a caffeine free version of reality 
T o m  T r e v a t t
193
to be presented in the institution. ‘The curator has become a traveling 
producer of exhibitions, one who speaks of social issues in the soft 
language of pretended engagement.’ 3 
Z
.
mijewski, an artist turned temporary curator for the Biennale, 
admonishes the curatorial for its inability to represent the radical 
or political claims of art, instead declaring art, in the absence of 
the curatorial shield, as the pure site of political engagement. The 
problem for Z
.
mijewski is that the artist is a victim of the system that 
surrounds her. She engages in an ‘individualistic politics of survival’, 
against a system that otherwise batters her with, from one side, the 
expectations of the market, and from the other the misrepresentation 
by the culturally dominant curator or hyper-bureaucratic institution.4 
And, because the curator cannot directly engage the artist in discourse 
about her work, lest the discussion lead to dissent or a break-down of 
relations, the artist’s position is at one and the same time protected 
from intrusion and victimised by the system within which it operates. 
Through the safeguard of the institution art is drained of its own 
power, foreclosing the possibility for it to act in the world. 
In another essay Z
.
mijewski, bifurcates the field of art; 
autonomous art is opposed to socially engaged art.5 Yet, this 
bifurcation results ultimately in the denial by the viewer of the art’s 
capabilities. Even the most engaged practice cannot get purchase in 
the world because the velvet critique of the institution smooths it out, 
flattening its otherwise hyperbolic affects. I would argue in addendum 
to Z
.
mijewski, that the audience’s expectation of this type of velvety 
smoothness has been embedded so deeply into our consciousness 
that we find it difficult to extricate ourselves. Z
.
mijewski asks, how 
are we in the position whereby artists, perhaps capable agents in 
the production of new realities, have such limited political scope 
that their work is incapable of producing real political change? The 
platitudinous answer to this question comes down to a distinction 
between “true” art and the vapid institution, whereby the institution 
occupies the shadow of totalitarianism in its bureaucratization.  
The statement in his essay that ‘[w]e have all bought about this 
situation together’, indicates Z
.
mijewski’s nuanced understanding of 
the problem, despite his characterization of the bifurcation.6 However, 
this does not reduce his sustained belief in the delimitation of art 
(contemporary, autonomous) from political art. 
As a corrective to these tendencies, Z
.
mijewski has proposed 
Forget Fear, the 7th installment of the Berlin Biennale. Without 
embarking on a thoroughgoing critique of the biennale, and it 
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certainly has been attacked from many quarters, I want to pin-point 
one distinct example of the contradiction between the project and the 
extra-diegetic claims of the catalogue essay, and assert why this might 
be interesting in thinking the question of representation that I am 
claiming is inherent in this discourse. 
Upon entering the ground floor of the Kunst-Werke, the perennial 
location of the biennale, the scene is immediately set. Occupy 
Berlin has been invited to “occupy” the lower part of the building, 
erecting tents, displaying placards, distributing hand-drawn notes. 
Scrawled wall texts, graffiti, blankets, bookshelves stacked with 
German translations of Marx, Althusser, Hardt & Negri, etc.; an 
improvised, but fully operational radio studio; long, laboriously 
transcribed texts and so on adorn the imposing space lending an air 
of amateurish camaraderie not usually seen inside an art gallery. It is 
not immediately clear whether the participants live here, however the 
remnants of sleeping, washing and eating appear scattered around  
the “campsite” and the implication is certainly that the Occupy 
movement is here for the long haul. 
The banal linguistic fact that an occupy movement cannot be 
invited to “occupy” without logically defeating the very status of 
the occupation leads fruitfully on to the real crux. If Z
.
mijewski has 
invited Occupy Berlin into the kw to promote them as an example 
of his attempted shift from one framework for contemporary art to 
another, then his precise framing of them in the institution forecloses 
the effectiveness of this action and proves, perversely, his point 
about the art world. To extrapolate it is necessary to address his 
introductory proposition in more adequate terms. To summarise 
and paraphrase Z
.
mijewski’s account, contemporary art proceeds by 
these three main logics: (1) It produces a subject (the viewer) who is 
incapable or unwilling to follow-through on the radical claims of the 
art (if it has those claims in the first place). (2) It is both the victim 
of and safeguarded by the institution, and as such proceeds by a 
victimological individualism. (3) It is a sop to the voodoo capitalism  
at the heart of the art market. 
The subjectivity that contemporary art interpellates is riven with 
the conditions of our current ideology, and differs by degree from 
previous regimes. My claim is that art, far from being a victim in 
this logic, is in fact, in part, an agent in the creation of it. Tactically 
withdrawing from the system, opposing it from a position of authority 
or ethical purity, or suggesting that art is somehow a corrective for the 
worst traits of the market/world misunderstands, in truth, the ways in 
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which art itself is implicated in the production of this scenario. 
If contemporary art can be characterised, under Z
.
mijewski’s 
auspices, as a practice of increased autonomy (and its failure to “do” 
politics) then autonomy, in contradistinction to engagement, cannot 
be political. This bifurcatory move not only restricts politics to social 
practices, creating a hierarchy of politicality, but also underestimates 
the power of the image. The poor image can never engage with 
politics, and must therefore be limited to a non-politicality, incapable 
of impeding on our systems of distribution. This formulation, however, 
rests on a particular assumption: that the difference between  
engaged and autonomous practices is measured by the latter’s capacity 
to produce an immanent fidelity, or in other words in the capacity  
to concretize with no excess. On the one hand I would argue that the 
material presence of the engaged practices – the fact that they exist 
in a world striated with atelic materialities – prohibits their direct 
representational capacity, and on the other, that it is precisely these 
atelic affects, which are distinguishable in both regimes of art practice 
that Z
.
mijewski describes, that prehend politics. 
My claim, contra to Z
.
mijewski, is that contemporary art is not 
marked by an increased autonomy of objects (bad) in distinction from 
a relational practice (good), but that all contemporary art is precisely 
an ideological operation that interpellates a type of subjectivity that 
defends and reinstates the project of correlationism that presupposes 
the human subject as independent from and in priority over the 
object.7 What I will call the condition of the contemporary – that 
is, the conceptual and contextual apparatus art both engenders 
and engages with – is precisely the project of private individuation 
determined firstly by the specular relation between subject and object, 
and secondly by the confirmation of this as ground. The reason the 
Berlin Biennale example is important is that Z
.
mijewski presupposes 
that the presentation of the Occupy movement in the gallery is an 
example of “real” politics, but does so through an occlusion of the 
problematic of representation which undermines his own position 
in relation to the real. I propose that the inclusion of the Occupy 
movement is an action akin to the Duchampian readymade, and 
as such should be treated as part of that history. Furthermore, the 
Duchampian gesture produces a fantasy of bifurcation between the 
human subject and art object that reinstates and defends the dogma 
of the absolutisation of human access that has, under Quentin 
Meillassoux’s telling of it, haunted much of post-Kantian thought 
and as such cannot think the reality of the non-correlated real.8 In 
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contradistinction to this I will go on to propose that art as such always 
already engages in a presentation of the real that is not correlated  
to human thought, and does so through a cut from interpretation 
that Duchamp cannot account for. However, because contemporary 
art proceeds via a Duchampian logic, we act as though this is not the 
case. Instead the viewer is given priority in the formation of meaning 
as though they were free to do so. I will argue that this freedom 
interpellates a type of subjectivity that plays out within and, in part, 
produces the conditions for neo-liberal politics.
In Marcel Duchamp’s short text ‘The Creative Act’, he outlines 
the phrase that comes to shadow much of the last 60 years of art 
production; the art coefficient:
[…] in the chain of reactions accompanying the creative act, 
a link is missing. This gap, representing the inability of the 
artist to express fully his intention, this difference between 
what he intended to realize and did realize, is the personal “art 
coefficient” contained in the work. In other words, the personal 
“art coefficient” is like an arithmetical relation between the 
unexpressed but intended and the unintentionally expressed.  
To avoid a misunderstanding, we must remember that this  
“art coefficient” is a personal expression of art à l’état brut, that  
is, still in a raw state, which must be “refined” as pure sugar 
from molasses by the spectator;9
For Duchamp, and his legacy, this refining process is the process of 
acting as a viewer on the work of art. As he continues, ‘the creative 
act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work 
in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its 
inner qualification and thus adds his contribution to the creative act.’ 10 
Contemporary art precisely produces a scenario whereby the viewer is 
interpellated as a free subject within the realm of decision about the 
work. This space opened by the work for the viewer to occupy is what 
I will call a correlate space, determined by its openness to the viewer’s 
interpretive impulse. 
In the setting up of a local field of apolitical openness which 
makes a universal appeal to the viewer to co-produce meaning, 
contemporary art repeats the Duchampian gesture of the ready- 
made. That is, it privileges the performative gesture of the artist  
and the interpretation by subject as the site of meaning production.  
The Duchampian art-coefficient proposes, as we know, the  
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co-determination of the work of art by the subject-viewer. This “co-” 
moment rests on the productive agency of the artist and, in the face of 
extant materialities, or as Duchamp calls it “art in its raw state”, the 
viewer as refiner of emphatic materiality. This configuration invites 
the spectator to complete the artwork by the way of interpretation; 
that is the debt the spectator has to pay in order to safeguard the 
specular circle. As Duchamp put it, the viewer “refines” the artness  
of the work. Precisely, this coefficient presupposes an active figure,  
the artist or the audience, and a passive material, the art object.  
As an active subject, the viewer is privileged, capable and unrestricted. 
This is art’s political ambition, to produce a type of subject that can 
enjoy their own freedom within the experience of viewing art. Yet, I 
would argue, this is exactly what predisposes the viewer to understand 
themselves as the pre-determined privileged figure within the relation. 
And thus confirms the dominance of subject over object, culture over 
nature and man over the object of the world. 
So, if the artist-coefficient is the sine qua non of contemporary 
art, and the net result of this openness to the viewer is the 
interpellation of a certain kind of subjectivity – a subject who finds 
itself as the locus of meaning production – then art in this category 
builds into itself a teleology of interpretation. The subject as inbuilt 
addressee precipitates a conservative logic of humanism that 
places art as a communicative device determined by its relation to 
cognition. Art, then, is forever seen as an object, as Meillassoux puts 
it, “for us”.11 The problems with this conception are twofold. The 
prioritisation of the human subject in its relation to the art object is 
an anthropocentricism which continues the work of post-Kantian 
thought to place humanity at the core of existence. And, this occludes 
the truth of the art object: that its materiality, its “objectness”, is 
indifferent to our experience of it. This occlusion presupposes a 
dominant subject-viewer who sees the work of art as open to their 
own interpretation, and all interpretations as equally valid.
I want to draw a correlation between the kind of subject 
interpellated by this openness and the type under the governmental 
project of neo-liberalism; that is a free, unregulated individualised 
subject, with the personal freedoms that the politics of liberalism 
promised. As Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford explain in their 
essay ‘Ethical Socialism’, the historical declination of the welfare state, 
Geoffrey Howe’s 1981 “austerity budget” that cut public spending  
and increased taxes, and Thatcher’s degradation of socialism, were 
crucial in the destruction of social responsibility and the creation of  
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‘a new popular compact between the individual and the market’ which 
‘displace[d] the old statist, social welfare contract’.12 This creation of 
a new type of individualism has, through its linkage of the individual 
to capital, eviscerated the idea of the public sphere as a political space, 
thus confining politics to an elite political class and producing a form 
of hyper-consumerism driven by desire. I would go so far as to suggest 
that contemporary art has been at the avant garde of the creation  
of this form of political subjectivity, has laid the ground for the shift 
to individualism and, through its appeal to the private experience 
of the viewer, devalued the idea of a common. Contemporary art, 
then, despite its claims to ethical or critical politics, is both the worst 
expression and progenitor of neo-liberalism.
Neo-liberalism marks not just the political-economic nexus 
of the ideology of no ideology, but the period during which  
the individual subject took firm root in the public consciousness. 
In an interview for the Independent newspaper in May 1981 
Margaret Thatcher said:
What’s irritated me about the whole direction of politics in the 
last 30 years is that it’s always been towards the collectivist 
society. People have forgotten about the personal society. And 
they say: do I count, do I matter? To which the short answer is, 
yes. And therefore, it isn’t that I set out on economic policies; 
it’s that I set out really to change the approach, and changing 
the economics is the means of changing that approach. If you 
change the approach you really are after the heart and soul of 
the nation. Economics are the method; the object is to change 
the heart and soul.13
Born from Thatcher’s so-called “revolution of the soul” that produced 
a subject in compact with the market, this type of neo-liberal subject 
was no longer engaged in the public realm of politics, but in the 
private realm of material accumulation. The individual was to take 
greater and greater responsibility for their position in life, their 
compact with the market allowing the government to dismantle 
the welfare state. Whereas before the nation state had taken moral 
responsibility for its citizens’ well being, through the economic shift 
towards individualism the state was able to renege on this promise  
and offer a very different one, that of the freedom of the individual  
to consume.
My claim would be that it is our responsibility now to rethink 
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what art can be outside of the framework of the contemporary. The 
relational or cognizable prioritising, the production of correlate space 
in other words, inherent in contemporary art necessarily occludes  
the reality of the art object – a reality that we cannot account  
for through cognisance, the reality of ‘an anterior world expressed 
as indifferent to humans’.14 What remains now, beyond the 
contemporary, is to account for that exterior reality. To do so would, 
I suggest, problematize the humanism of contemporary art, thus 
eviscerating the correlate space, claiming art as part beyond the 
realm of the “for us”, part entangled in that realm, and not operating 
through the aegis of the private interpretative mode.
The artwork can neither be contained by thought nor is it 
produced merely as a vehicle for thought. However it both brings 
with it and is instaurated by atelic affects that are reliant upon the 
contingency of materials which, pertaining to no idealism, may or may 
not perturb other objects, including the viewer, but are not activated 
by or for the viewer. Art is capable of making, and regularly does 
make, propositions about the world in a non-conceptual way. That 
is to say, the work of the work of art is extra-philosophical, it can 
produce determinations that are beyond thought, beyond philosophy, 
beyond the human. The artwork, instead of being a purely relational 
or communicative device, is an irruption of non-thought. This non-
thought touches upon an “unknown” that is both the horizon and 
beyond the horizon of what thought can think, and may or may not; 
and this possible but not necessary condition is important as it may  
or may not cause things to happen. There is, to reiterate, no necessity 
for the unknown to make itself self-evident through affectivity.  
It is as likely as not that the irruption of non-thought within the work 
will contingently act upon anything else. So, the atelic affect is not 
necessarily affective but contingently so. This contingency of affect 
that perseveres through the logic of the unaddressed expression – 
the material quality of all objects not addressed to a viewer, just 
emphatically there – is, I am claiming, a challenge to the Duchampian 
model of contemporary art. 
If we understand the contemporary as a condition of the 
absolutisation of the co-relation between artwork and viewer, then it 
follows that this condition cannot be the basis for understanding the 
contingencies at stake within the materials of the work. As Iranian 
philosopher, Reza Negarestani suggests:
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If we consider art as a material-driven process of production, 
these anonymous materials enjoy an autonomy of their own; 
and such autonomy continuously interferes with the artwork 
itself regardless of the decisions of the artist – that is, whether 
or not the artist determines to be “open” to their influence. In 
other words, the contingency of the artist’s materials cannot be 
the strict subject of the artist’s openness. Contingent materials 
cannot be directly embraced.15
As that which cannot be encompassed, contingency erupts from the 
object. Expressed through the immanent materiality of the work of 
art, as something that surprises and leads the artist rather than being 
controlled by them, contingency names the unknown of the infinite 
reality that lies beyond the horizon of thought. It is the eruption 
of non-thought. Materiality, then, is the site for the post-human to 
express itself through a non-intentional affect: 
Incognitum Hactenus – not known yet or nameless and without 
origin until now – is a mode of time in which the innermost 
monstrosities of the earth or ungraspable time scales can 
emerge according to the chronological time that belongs to the 
surface biosphere of the earth and its populations. Incognitum 
Hactenus is a double-dealing mode of time connecting abyssal 
time scales to our chronological time, thus exposing to us  
the horror of times beyond […] anything can happen for some 
weird reason; yet also, without any reason, nothing at all 
can happen. Things leak into each other according to a logic 
that does not belong to us and cannot be correlated to our 
chronological time.16
For Negarestani, material comes with a set of affordances that can 
channel or determine the process of production, so, instead of the 
openness of the contemporary period, art should be based on what 
he calls the “formidable ascesis of closure”. Materials afford certain 
aspects of themselves to be produced as such.
In the quote from earlier in this chapter Duchamp, in a way 
presaging Negarestani’s description of autonomous materials, 
formulates a gap between the expressed but intended and the 
unintentionally expressed. For him the unintentionally expressed is 
what is given over to the viewer by the artist for the production of 
meaning to occur. However, contra Negarestani, Duchamp suggests 
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that the viewer’s refining of the work of art is complete, that the 
materials lose their autonomy in the refining process which apparently 
leaves no excess. What occurs in the Duchampian paradigm is the 
internalising of the expectation of apophenia, or rather, contemporary 
art attaches itself to the production of subjectivity through the appeal 
to apophenia alone. What the atelic affect engenders is a thinking  
of the work of art shorn from its attachment to the addressed subject. 
Instead, it institutes a thinking that moves beyond the humanism 
of the contemporary focus on the subject towards a radical object-
focused thought. To quote Ray Brassier: ‘it is no longer thought that 
determines the object, whether through representation or intuition, 
but rather the object that seizes thought, and forces it to think it […] 
according to it’.17 However, and this is the key, contemporary art acts 
as though this is not the case. It registers this reality, but then papers 
over that by returning the work to the realm of interpretation.
As Slavoj Žižek suggests, according to Freud man has experienced 
three humiliations, three “narcissistic illnesses,” as he calls them:
First, Copernicus demonstrated that Earth turns around the 
Sun and thus deprived us, humans, of the central place in the 
universe. Then, Darwin demonstrated our origin from  
blind evolution, thereby depriving us of the privileged place 
among living beings. Finally, when Freud himself rendered 
visible the predominant role of the unconscious in psychic 
processes, it became clear that our ego is not even a master  
in his own house.18
These scientific de-centring moments in the history of, at least the 
West, are examples of the process of thought towards a deepening  
of the knowledge of the absolute, or to put it in another way,  
the production of discourse that accounts for a non-human correlated 
world. The task of a realism that understands itself as continuing 
the trajectory of these three humiliations is to propose a universal 
continuum of the real from which the human is cut. This scission, or 
trauma, is the differentiation of the organic from the inorganic, and 
thus marks the production of the human from the non-human.19 The 
obverse tendency in post-Kantian thought as registered by Meillassoux 
has been to return the human to the centre of the universe, thus 
pursuing a counter-revolutionary logic of humanism that presupposes 
a dominance of culture over nature and subject over object. I want to 
propose the possibility of following a Copernican logic that can think 
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the radically immanent materiality of the artwork as an expression of 
its indifference to the human, and as such a presentation of the real 
that traumatizes the dominance of the relational within art. 
The original trauma that cuts out a slice of the real from which 
the human is formed is registered by art in two ways. Firstly, by 
the nature of the artwork as an object that withdraws from our 
experience of it into its inaccessible real core (vis à vis Graham 
Harman’s object oriented philosophy), a withdrawal that discloses the 
materiality of the object. And secondly, by the rehabilitation of the 
trauma via a privileging of the human in the subject/object relation 
as the occasion of meaning production. Which is to say, the subject 
re-gains dominance over the object via a specular process of the 
encounter. This twofold registering of the trauma, the disclosure and 
subsequent rehabilitation that the artwork performs, problematizes 
the process of presenting artwork to a public. To evidence this 
traumatic cut and the de-monstering of the real via the exhibitionary 
act requires a fidelity to the real, or complicity with the ‘true-to-the-
universe logic’ that the thought of Copernicus demands.20 Art is not 
any less real than that which is outside it, however, through the act 
of display it presupposes the primacy of relations, and as such cannot 
think the true-to-the-universe thought.21 This inability to think 
beyond the relational creates an immunising layer that protects art 
from the incursions of the real, describing a predetermined critical 
distance from which art operates.
The surficial limit of contemporary art is safeguarded by the 
liberal tolerant institution’s economic openness to non-art. As 
described by Negarestani, for such openness, ‘the outside is nothing 
but an environment which has already been afforded as that which 
does not fundamentally endanger either the survival of the subject or 
its environing order’.22 As such, art’s institutions, and by that I mean 
the institution of art itself, protects its borders by the operation of 
tolerance, whereby the monstrous outside is brought into the realm 
of art via the act of representation, or more precisely, demonstration. 
The de-monstering of the demonstration supposed by the readymade 
is performed by the gatekeepers at the limits of contemporary art; 
the artist, the curator, the institution and so on. We can think this 
through the myth of Medusa. Perseus decapitates the monster, holding 
the snake-haired head aloft in a ritual form of demonstration. From 
then on he wields the head as a weapon of his own, thus re-presenting 
the monster (that which is outside the limit) in a form of de-monstered, 
or humanised, figuration. Perseus stands in for, and operates as, the 
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figuration of the narrativised real within the regime of contemporary 
criticality; he stands as the exception within the generic. Thus, the 
act of the presentation of art as a readymade, cut from the “real” and 
re-presented within the gallery, relies precisely on the human figure’s 
dominance over the real and, furthermore, occludes the traumatic cut 
via a fantasy of dominance at the point of encounter. The inaccessible 
real that registers as the trauma of the non-correlated world without 
us, and is expressed through the unintentional materialities of the 
work, is foreclosed by an insistence on a humanist agenda that 
proposes art as an object of human encounter whereby, as Duchamp 
suggests, the viewer “refines” the artness of the work. In this scheme 
the human apprehension is the prioritised relationship that determines 
the decisional field. The human makes the cut, the “scission” of the 
decision, which papers over the truth of the work of art. 
The viewer, like the gatekeeper artist, safeguards the work 
from the radical outside by their already negotiated openness to 
it. To pursue a Copernican logic whereby the work partakes in a 
humiliation of the humanist centering of the subject would demand  
an alternate understanding of art. Focused not on the production  
of meaning via only the encounter of the artwork by the human, but 
by an understanding of its distributed affects through an ecology of  
true-to-the-universe objects, this logic would de-centre the human 
from the production of art, replacing the logic of the specular relation 
between subject and object with a mesh of objects to which the artist 
must be complicit. 23
This cleaving to, and the cleaving from, the object, or eruption 
of subjectivity from the objective, the cut of the organic from the 
inorganic, expresses an understanding of the real synchronous with 
science, rather than conditioned by thought. As demanded by Gabriel 
Catren in his essay ‘Outland Empire’, this synchronous relation 
between philosophy and science, exercises a speculative absolutism 
that deepens the ‘narcissistic wound’ inflicted by modern science.24 
With the true-to-the-universal thought of de-centred artwork – an 
artwork that understands its relation to the human as contingent – 
and not as the primary site of meaning production, we can witness a 
continued deepening of that wound. If we have always returned the 
artwork into the “truth of the human” through the rehabilitation  
of the traumatic cut, then Catren’s insistence on the fidelity of thought 
to science can overturn the reliance of art on thought. It is worth 
quoting Catren at length here:
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The infinite process of theoretical knowledge does not advance 
by attempting to grasp an “uncorrelated absolute” through a 
philosophical “ruse” capable of discontinuously leaping over 
the subject’s shadow, but instead through a continual deepening 
of scientific labour seeking to locally absolve it from its 
conjunctural transcendental limitations, expand its categorical, 
critical, and methodological tools, and progressively subsume 
its unreflected conditions and presuppositions. Far from any 
“humanist” or “idealist” reduction of scientific rationality, this 
reflection upon the transcendental localization of the subject of 
science should allow the latter to radicalize the inhuman scope 
of knowledge by producing a differential surplus value of un-
conditionality and universality. In other words, such a reflexive 
torsion should permit the subject of science to continuously 
go through the transcendental glass and force its progressive 
escape from the transcendental anthropocentrism of pre-critical 
science: it is necessary to think the particular – empirical and 
transcendental – localization of the subject of science within the 
real in order for theoretical reason not to be too human.25 
Far from proposing we abandon the human, as some reactions to the 
expanded field of philosophy to which Catren’s essay nominatively 
belongs suggest, Speculative Realism instead pursues a logic of 
scientific realism. This interpretation of scientific realism describes 
the universal absolute not as an intimate or an alternative outside 
but as a continuum of an immanent real that necessarily includes 
and implicates the human. Art has yet to address adequately the 
implications of these demands from Catren. The eradicable desire 
for the new, the expansion of art into non-art via the demonstrative 
arm of the gatekeeper, the figuration of the hero artist from the 
generic field, the exoticisation of the “other”, the romanticism of the 
alternative and the expectation of the bolt of inspiration from the 
blue are just some examples of the platitudes by which art progresses. 
Catren’s ‘Outland Empire’ overturns these age worn clichés through  
a simple but effective re-design of the landscape confronting us.  
It is beyond the scope of this text to do justice to the extent of this 
intense and rich essay, but instead I hope to point towards a few 
instructive moments.
The operation of reflexive analysis that Catren proposes for the 
‘different “transcendental” conditions of research’ that can go beyond 
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anthropocentricism, the limitations placed on the experiments of 
science by the limits of the human, implicates us in a speculative 
mode of thought.26 A wound has been stitched up by the Kantian 
conservative revolution; to perform a dehisence we must analyse the 
conditions under which thought is performed. This dehisence, Catren 
suggests, will finally make philosophy modern; ‘Philosophy will 
finally be modern only if it can sublate the critical moment, crush 
the Ptolemaic counter-revolution and deepen the narcissistic wounds 
inflicted by modern science’.27 From a philosophy synchronous  
with science, Catren proposes a speculative absolutism that can 
think beyond the limits of the correlation between human and world 
that has been transcendentalised in post-Kantian thought. The 
transcendentalised correlation supposes that we can never think the 
real without thinking our relation to it. A Copernican revolution must 
be capable of thinking the absolute, which in Catren’s terms comes to 
mean the real, un-correlated to human access to it. We must perform  
a traumatic cut between the real and human access. 
Through a decentring logic of true-to-the-universe thought, we 
can re-understand art’s role as one not of the production of the fantasy 
of human dominance, but the furthering of the work of the absolute. 
With this in mind the Berlin example might operate rather differently. 
Art’s recuperation of a form of life, on this occasion championed by 
Z
.
mijewski, needs to be problematized as an act of representation that 
cannot be escaped. Therefore, under the logic of the readymade there 
is no possibility of a “beyond representation” as such, and we must 
abandon the belief that we can step over the problem of representation 
in one bound. 
As Maya and Reuben Fowkes point out in their essay on 
the instrumentalisation of the Occupy movement’s forms within 
contemporary art, ‘# Occupy Art’, ‘If 2011 witnessed the euphoric 
phase of the movements as they burst onto the flat screen of global 
consciousness, 2012 has seen contemporary art rush to capitalise, with 
a stream of major art events referencing the Occupy phenomenon’.28 
Art here operates through a logic of voracious capitalisation, thus, by 
adopting its very operating structure, repeats the forms of capitalism 
it naïvely supposes it resists. To pass beyond this recuperation of 
political movements into art in arguably exploitative terms, art must 
think otherwise than this form of appropriation. If Occupy is the 
“real” as such, that is the extant material substrate of existence from 
which politics draws its motifs, language and power, then Z
.
mijewski 
exploits the power of the institution to tolerate the real in a move  
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that reasserts the power of the human rather than acknowledging 
human finitude’s limit form. Which is to say that a true-to-the-
universe art would make a third move beyond the twofold registering 
and rehabilitation of the trauma. This third move would involve 
a further dehisence of the stitched-up wound in human narcissism 
expressed not only through the work of art as such, but by the 
production of new institutions of art that can operate to expand 
on the speculative absolutism that is the otherwise occluded real 
of art. To do this would require a radical adjustment in all aspects 
of art production, reception and distribution to account for the 
entangled reality from which art is shorn, to ensure art not be, as 
Catren proposes, “too human”. If we can understand that rather than 
determining the object, thought erupts from the object, so much  
that subjectivisation is the process of the eruption of the organic  
from the non-organic, then we can begin to account for the ecological 
entanglement of objects that engenders a radical new politics  
of interdependence and commonality, which butchers the human-
prioritised correlate space of the encounter.
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The relationship between optical technologies and human 
perception may be relatively young when compared with distant star 
clusters and galaxies, however it is a relationship that has proven 
to be intensely co-dependent, particularly within the space sciences. 
Technology has enabled the extension of our limited vision and image-
making capabilities, going well beyond what the naked eye can see 
and exposing remote or hitherto unseen aspects of reality. Today, 
sophisticated space-imaging technology such as the Chandra X-ray 
Observatory and the Hubble Space Telescope reveal the cosmos in 
every wavelength from infra-red to ultraviolet and X-ray, continuing 
to provide what Susan Sontag describes as a ‘unique system of 
disclosures’ that shows us reality as we have never seen it before.1
Eyes of the Machine: The Role of Imaginative 
Processes in the Construction of Unseen Realities 
via Photographic Images.
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From the first telescopes onwards, we have found fascination with 
the seemingly magical way in which imaging technologies could 
transgress the physical limits of scale and distance, but it is their 
mechanical capacity to present the external world as a seemingly fixed 
and objective reality that we truly hold in awe. Modern photography 
arrived at a time when Western thought was predisposed towards 
logical positivism, laying the ground for the ever-present association 
of the photograph with an indexical relationship to reality.2 The so-
called death of analogue photography may have shaken our faith in 
the veracity of the photographic image but the rhetoric of objectivity 
and transparency, particularly within the epistemic framework of 
science, prevails. Indeed, without some form of continuing faith in the 
indexical link of image to reality, knowledge construction within the 
framework of science would become problematic. As Bruno Latour 
so aptly puts it: ‘[y]es, scientists master the world, but only if the 
world comes to them in the form of two-dimensional, superposable, 
combinable inscriptions’.3 The advent of photography provided the 
sciences with a method of observation that matched a post scientific-
revolutionary desire for evidential disclosure of the world. The camera 
became the eye of science and, when combined with technology 
such as rocket propulsion and satellites, a hitherto unseen world was 
opened up before us. At the core of contemporary unmanned space 
exploration sits the remote sensor, the disembodied eye of science 
that completely relies upon the axiomatic nature of the relation that 
the photograph is supposed to have with reality. In the case of the 
remotely sensed image, the camera does not lie but more importantly 
it must not, because no one is there to see otherwise. 
Just as Fox Mulder wanted to believe in ufos, we want to 
believe in the reality presented to us by photographs. The potentially 
problematic way in which photographic technology transforms reality 
– via the transgression of normative vision – is set aside in favour of 
an ideal, objective truth. However, the link between the photograph 
and reality is not as clear-cut as the sciences would hope and it is 
also a topic that has been well addressed by others in various fields.4 
I shall touch on certain elements of that discourse, but my primary 
concern here is to explore the possibility that the photograph forms a 
perceptual bridge – an interface – between what we know and what 
we can imagine, playing a pivotal role in constructing our perception 
of unseen realities. Through various image examples, primarily 
from the space sciences, I will explore ways in which the mechanical 
“vision” of the photograph acts as a starting point: a pictorial space 
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that invites the construction of a more holistic reality and one that 
may begin with “objective” knowledge but which is completed by the 
“subjective” imagination. 
The Inner Eye, The Photograph, The Non-finito
The word “imagination”, despite its everyday and frequent use, 
remains as ambiguous as the act itself. A dictionary definition 
describes it as ‘a mental faculty forming images or concepts of 
external objects not present to the senses’, which places it firmly 
within the realm of perception.5 However, imagination has also been 
attributed with privileged links to the productive powers of creativity. 
Edward S. Casey’s phenomenological account points out that when 
it comes to philosophy, imagination has historically occupied all 
manner of places within an hierarchical structure of the mind and 
has been assigned a diversity of roles therein: subordinated by some 
(Plato); superordinated by others (the Romantics and the Surrealists), 
and placed squarely in the middle by more (Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, 
Kant).6 Even psychology provides a muddy account as it seeks to 
explain imagination by associating it with sensation, memory, and 
imitation.7 Casey ultimately laments the lack of recognition of 
imagination as a particular and unique function of the mind and is 
disappointed that ‘imagining has almost invariably been relegated 
to a secondary or tertiary status in which it merely subtends some 
supposedly superior cognitive agency such as intellect or (more 
frequently) modifies some presumably more original source such as 
sensation’.8 Instead, Casey proffers a ‘multiplicity of the mental’ with 
no hierarchical structure, ‘only a proliferation of unforeclosable 
possibilities’.9 Imagination is not a self-contained or autonomous 
bubble of internalized images but part of a broader process that can be 
productive and affective, spontaneous and unstructured, intentional 
and controlled. 
If we return once again to the dictionary definition mentioned 
above, we find a second, yet ultimately as important, aspect assigned 
to imagination: images or concepts of external objects not present 
to the senses. Casey may malign the fact that imagination was often 
described as a mere modifier of ‘some presumably more original 
source’ but this is what it must be. What is imagined must always be 
something other to what I receive via my senses. This is not a mere 
rhetorical statement, but a phenomenological truth. Suppose you are 
looking at a photograph of an apple. Concentrate on looking at that 
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apple, be aware of your act of looking, of seeing and perceiving the 
image of the apple. Now, as you continue the act of seeing the apple 
before you, imagine the apple, internalize the image. You will quickly 
realize that it is quite impossible to simultaneously see and imagine the 
apple.10 The imagined must remain unseen. What is imagined is never 
immediately available to the senses but this does not mean the removal 
of imagination from any perceptual “hierarchy” or “multiplicity” if 
one exists. Imagination is an integral part of our everyday perceptual 
processes, from daydreams to scientific analysis.
For Wilfrid Sellars, the imagination is productive. It is the binding 
ingredient between the phenomenological and conceptual components 
of perception. For him, the imagination plays a role in bringing the 
sensed external object (which for him exists independently of any 
observer) to the subject’s conception. But more importantly, in this 
context, the ‘imagination “converts” the subject’s visual sensing – 
the underlying non-conceptual phenomenal state – into something 
altogether much richer, through the fusion of images with the visual 
sensing of a coloured, spatial array’.11 The result is what Sellars 
calls a “sense-image-model”, or, what others have referred to as a 
schema: an underlying model of perceptual experience, constructed 
by and continually modified by sense experience that allows me to 
understand what it is like to perceive something from various points 
of view. Furthermore, Sellars claims that even if we are unsure of the 
specific type of object we are looking at, we can have some idea of its 
physical properties due to previous sense experience of similar objects. 
Paul Coates takes this one, albeit subtle, step further stating that:  
‘The imagination produces in the perceiver an implicit awareness, or 
set of expectations, of the likely ways in which the phenomenal,  
or sensory, aspect of an experience will be transformed’.12 We become 
prepared for further, differing types of sense experience, imaginatively 
and – productively. It is with our imagination that we bridge the 
gap between what we already know, what we see, and the infinite 
possibilities of what we are yet to see. 
English clergyman and writer/artist William Gilpin (1724-
1804) thought that the imagination was a truly creative force that 
could ‘aid the poet’s or the painter’s art; exalt the idea; and picture 
things unseen’.13 On his many walks through the picturesque 
English countryside Gilpin made countless sketches and written 
descriptions of the landscape he encountered, many of which were 
published as armchair travel guides intended to provide the reader 
with an evocative, albeit dislocated, experience of the places he had 
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witnessed first hand. He declared that when the viewer’s imagination 
was applied to the non-finito (unfinished state) of the sketch that it 
had ‘the power, of creating something more itself’, in effect actively 
constructing a new reality.14 Not an external reality signified by 
the sketch, but an internal, unseen reality of the mind. By using the 
imagination to complete the sketch, the viewer creates a reality that 
sits outside the constraints of the image.
Although history and discourse have yielded variations on the 
definition, role, and importance of the human imagination there are 
certain aspects to which I will remain allegiant. The imagination is 
a productive perceptual interface, not a passive receptacle for sense 
data. Imagination must construct from previously received sense data; 
there cannot be simultaneous input and output as illustrated by the 
apple example. The imagination plays an important, yet ambiguous, 
role in the construction of a “sense-image-model” or schema and 
as such imagination allows us to understand objects we have not 
encountered previously by referring to what we already have. The 
imagination’s capacity for data combination is literally infinite. Each 
image it produces leads to another resulting in Casey’s “proliferation 
of unforeclosable possibilities”. And finally, the reality created by 
the imagination is a counterpart of, but not indexical to, an external 
reality. The reality of the imagination remains internalized: resolutely 
unseen. It is from this place of vivid darkness that we have the 
potential to see the world afresh. 
Sights Unseen
Prior to the invention of the hot-air balloon, it was only by exercising 
our imaginations that we could see the Earth from a distance. In 
1500, Jacopo de Barbari produced a truly visionary print commonly 
known as, ‘A Bird’s Eye View of Venice’ (fig. 1). In order to create this, 
albeit flawed, depiction of Venice as seen from an elevated perspective, 
Barbari needed to draw on his existing experience of seeing things 
from above and then attempt to imaginatively add to that basic 
schema. The resulting image clearly shows an artist grappling with 
unknown territory, pushing the outer limits of his established visual 
knowledge in order to create the as yet unseen reality proposed by 
his imagination. Unless I use my imagination, my visual perception 
remains restricted by space, time and physics. However, I can use my 
imagination to fill in the blind spots, the gaps in representation and 
experience and free my perception of its physical bonds. Thus, 
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Jacopo de Barbari could perceive of a view of Venice he had never 
seen: the city as if seen by a bird in flight. 
Once photography was established as a stable process, did 
our imaginations yield to the authority of the mechanically made 
image? Did this internal process waiver, after photography had so 
emphatically recreated the external world? If the camera can so 
easily reveal unseen aspects of reality for us, do we need to imagine 
it any more? Don Ihde has claimed that transformations imposed 
by technologically mediated vision are “non-neutrally acidic” to 
traditional visual culture.15 In other words, once we have learned 
how to see via the photograph we cannot go back, the eye can no 
longer be naked. Others, such as Marx Wartofsky, have claimed that 
photography didn’t merely change how we interpreted what we could 
see; it actually changed what we could see, integrating itself into our 
perceptual processes like a discreet virus. He holds that – although the 
camera may not see – we can now see like cameras and perceive of the 
world as photographs, pictorializing the reality we encounter via the 
eye.16 However, it remains to be determined whether this “acid attack” 
on our perceptual processes includes the expulsion of the imagination.
 According to Wartofsky the ‘hidden or tacit presupposition that 
the camera “sees” what we would see, were we present’ is the most 
deceptive piece of “knowledge” we can take to any new observation.17
In our enthusiasm for the so-called objectivity of the photograph, 
we often forget how narrow and abstracted its field of vision is. The 
Figure 1. Jacopo de’ Barbari, ‘A Bird’s Eye View of Venice’, 1500.
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photograph is a tenuous representation ripped from an infinite 
continuum of reality: it is fragmented and incomplete. Furthermore, 
the transgression of normative vision via technology leads to an aura 
of fascination surrounding the photographic image and distracts 
us from the fact that the very process of taking a photograph conceals 
as it simultaneously reveals.18 In effect, the photograph entirely 
alters the context in which we see the object and yet we continue to 
equate the way our eyes work with the workings of the camera.
This shortcoming of photographic representation was 
conveniently overlooked in the early days of space exploration. 
The fascination with what the technology could reveal completely 
overshadowed what it left out. In 1946, the United States Army 
launched the third of a number of German V-2 rockets that had been 
captured during World War ii. On board was a 35mm motion picture 
camera that made a continuous record of the rocket’s journey: from 
the ground, through the atmosphere, into “outer-space” at an altitude 
of approximately 65 miles (just under 105 km), and then back down 
again. The pictures revealed just a thin slice of the Earth’s cloudy 
surface, not an entire globe. Compared to today’s satellite technology, 
this rocket-propelled photographic mission may seem rudimentary. 
Figure 2. The first view of Earth from space from a camera on V-2 #13, 24 October 
1946, (White Sands Missile Range/Applied Physics Laboratory). 
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Figure 3, The first television image of Earth from space showing a sun-lit area 
of the Central Pacific ocean, Project Explorer vi, 14 August, 1959, (nasa)
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Figure 4. Half-disk mosaic image of Mercury, Mariner spacecraft, 1974, (nasa).
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However, this image (fig. 2) provided us with a glimpse of something 
we had never seen before, something that prior to the camera (and 
the rocket) had lain beyond our capacity to represent: ourselves. Here 
was a powerful example of the capacity for technology to reveal the 
unseen, devoid of any human or subjective intervention. 
Suddenly, the military were thinking about what they might be 
able to see, not just shoot. In 1957 the Russians sent up Sputnik, but 
it was not equipped to take photographs. In response, the usa rushed 
out Project Explorer in 1958. Three satellites and only one year later, 
Explorer iv took the first television images of the Earth from space 
(fig. 3) and the potential for space-borne cameras to see what we could 
not was realised. The newly formed nasa immediately identified the 
technology’s potential for meteorological studies and the Department 
of Defence was keen to explore any military applications. 
This prompted President Johnson to say at the time: ‘Without the 
satellites I’d be acting by guess or and by God. But I know exactly how 
many missiles the enemy has’.19 He didn’t need to imagine anything, 
let alone use his own eyes: the satellite eyes showed “everything”.  
In his enthusiasm for this new-found omnipotent view Johnson turned 
a blind eye to the fact that technologically mediated images can only 
provide selective access to unseen realities, restricted as they are to  
the very mechanism with which they reveal: the frame. The fragment 
of the Earth’s surface revealed by a camera atop a V-2 or an  
orbiting satellite is just that: a fragment. President Johnson may have 
thought he saw all the enemy’s missiles, but no doubt “God” still  
had a better view. 
One method of getting around the fragmentary nature of the 
photograph is to bring the pieces together in order to make a greater 
whole. In the days of pre-digital, unmanned space exploration just 
such an approach was necessary if high-resolution images of large 
bodies such as planets were to be obtained. Individual photographs 
had to be manually stitched together to form mosaics such as Figure 4, 
a half-disk mosaic of Mercury, comprised of images taken by nasa’s 
Mariner 10 spacecraft in 1974. Here, each raw image is clearly visible 
and no attempt has been made to hide the fact that the image is 
incomplete. Each image seems to maintain its individual integrity, as it 
simultaneously becomes more than itself. In this case, I use my 
imagination to see beyond the individual images, beyond the errors in 
contrast or brightness, beyond the evident borders between one image 
and its neighbour. As viewers we actively participate in the act of 
deception that the mosaic asks us to complete internally, beyond the
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Figure 5. The Orion Nebula (m42) as imaged by the Hubble Space Telescope, 
(nasa, esa, M.Robberto [esa/stcci] and the hst Orion Treasury Project Team). 
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picture plane itself. Within the internal space of our imaginations the 
incomplete, patchwork image of Mercury becomes unified and whole. 
Today, the Hubble Space Telescope takes multiple images in 
order to superimpose them into one, “complete” image. It is tempting 
to think that what one sees in an image produced by Hubble is the 
raw “reality”, but this is not generally the case – or at least, not what 
is released to the public. As is clearly stated on the Hubble website, 
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‘Hubble images are made, not born. Images must be woven together 
from the incoming data from the cameras, cleaned up and given 
colours that bring out features that eyes would otherwise miss’.20 
Evidently, when it comes to seeing the unseen, too much is at stake to 
rely on physics alone. 
One full-colour Hubble image, such as Figure 5, begins as seven 
black and white images from three different cameras. Each image 
is scaled and aligned in photo-editing software before data gaps 
and other errors, such as dropped pixels, are filled in with information 
from another camera. Each image is then assigned a colour, and  
when combined they make a single, full-colour image. Because  
the final image is comprised of photos taken on the very edge, or even 
outside the visible spectrum, they contain aspects of reality that we 
would never have seen with our own eyes. To reveal these features 
– and show us what we might see if we could see beyond the visible 
spectrum – red, blue, or green are assigned to specific images: blue to 
those from short wavelength filters, red to those from long wavelength 
filters, and green for those in the middle.21 The resulting images have 
little to do with what our eyes would see had we been present. Rather, 
they are complex models, riddled with subjective choices that render 
them just as much art as science. These images are truly revelatory, 
truly fascinating, and truly transgress any sense of normative vision, 
whatever that normative vision may have been. These images  
have moved away from any original connection to an external reality  
and have become heavily layered constructs. No longer a trace 
of nature, these images are the visual equivalent of theatrical 
performance, all made-up and set for the stage which, in this case, 
means the Hubble website, coffee-table publications, and a vast  
array of printable merchandise. 
As visually attractive as these images may be, they successfully 
deflect any attempt by the imagination to add to their visual presence. 
Casey’s “proliferation of unforeclosable possibilities” has been well 
and truly foreclosed. The construction of these images requires a great 
deal of subjective choice, but not by the viewer. In this case, all the 
imagining is done before we even get a glimpse at that nebula, galaxy, 
or star cluster. Once again everyday vision has been transgressed 
by a technologically mediated version and we are left blinded by 
fascination and a post-production “pop” aesthetic. And yet, there 
remains one imaginative possibility: the idea that something this 
spectacular and alien to our everyday experience can exist – out there, 
somewhere – in a non-locatable space which can only be verified by 
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the eyes of a distant machine. The possibility of the object, as implied 
by its photographic image, is therefore interred within the equivalent 
non-locatable space of the imagination.
Bringing it Back
The majority of our internal image of the Earth from space has been 
constructed by hand-held photography conducted by nasa astronauts. 
Since nasa’s Gemini program of the late 1960s, astronauts have been 
extensively trained in Earth-observation including landmark location 
and colour matching through the use of photographs. And yet, despite 
such training astronauts are literally left speechless when actually 
faced with the Earth slowly spinning below them in real-time.22
As I have explored in previous work, the gap between what 
astronauts see and what they have been prepared to see, via 
photographs, is vast.23 It appears that their visual schema of the Earth 
from space, developed through the use of photographs without  
first-hand visual knowledge of the referent, is somehow inadequate. 
This visual incongruence seems to prove Wartofsky’s theory that 
‘we are saddled with a model of human vision based on the notion 
of pictorial representation’, expecting that the reality we encounter, 
particularly if we have not already seen it with our own eyes, should 
look like its photographic counterpart.24 In this case, the reality of 
the Earth from space is found to be more spectacular, more beautiful, 
more luminescent than any photograph could ever portray. 
Astronaut Andrew Thomas spent a considerable amount of time 
looking out the window and taking photographs when he completed 
his residency aboard the Mir Space Station in 1998. Although all 
Earth-observation photographs are ultimately of scientific value, 
Thomas’ primary reasons for taking the photographs were as a 
personal record of his journey, expecting that the photographs would 
allow him to return to that moment arrested within the frame.25 In 
this case, the photographs fell remarkably short of what Thomas saw 
and experienced and so he decided to draw. The process of drawing 
allowed him to mentally escape the confines of the spacecraft and 
to explore things he ‘could not photograph, but could only imagine’, 
making them ‘much more unique than any photo’ and a more accurate 
representation of his time in space.26 Within his drawings, Thomas 
was able to imaginatively attend to what he felt was hidden or absent 
from the photograph, left free to engage subjectively with the view 
from the window and thus to create a personal record.
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The astronaut-photographer in the pursuit of quality Earth 
observations, very carefully avoids subjectivity and the potential for 
“error” with which it is associated. Over the years, the technique of 
taking photographs in space has been gradually perfected; from John 
Glenn’s drugstore-purchased modified 35mm rangefinder in 1962, 
to the Space Shuttle’s “workhorse”, the Hasselblad; and finally to 
today’s Nikon digital cameras.27 The likelihood of aberrations, such 
as motion-blur and sun-glare is minimized by carefully following 
pre-established photographic procedure. Margins of error for all 
variables are taken into consideration: obliquity (look angle); lens 
optics (primarily focal length); spacecraft altitude; film type, and 
high-contrast objects. Also, the conditions of space-flight photography 
make getting a blur-free photograph challenging. The astronaut-
photographer on the Space Shuttle floats in near zero gravity, 
attempting to point the lens of the camera through a small viewing 
window at a slowly rotating target and around which they orbit 
every 90 minutes. However, even this has been carefully minimized 
by astronauts on the International Space Station who have learned 
to use feedback from their digital cameras to track the moving Earth 
below as they take their photographs.28 In short, all “extraneous” 
phenomenological and experiential data has been filtered out in the 
pursuit of image clarity and the highest resolution possible (currently 
a spatial resolution of under six meters). The result is a body of 
beautiful, informative but essentially homogeneous photographs 
that disclose little of the phenomenological experience of seeing the 
Earth from space (fig. 6). As Thomas said when he first viewed his 
own photographs of Earth, “Anyone could have taken them” because 
any mark of the maker has been eradicated by uniform technical 
process.29 For Thomas, without any mark of his making – erroneous 
or otherwise – any attempt to imagine himself back into the image,  
to rebuild his phenomenological experience, was thwarted. 
As photographers, astronauts are at the mercy of nasa training, 
procedures that are designed to get the best photographic observations 
possible. However, as astronaut Marsha Ivins once explained, there 
was nothing in her training that prepared her for the sight of the Earth 
as seen from the unique vantage point of the Space Shuttle.30 One  
look at the real thing revealed that the disparity between photograph 
and reality was immense. But this mismatch goes much deeper  
than the surface of the photograph. In this case, the photograph 
provided the astronaut with an incomplete schema or model, a broken 
code.31 Bruno Latour reminds us that the Latin origin of the word 
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Figure 6. Earth as photographed from the Space Shuttle, sts-77, (Image courtesy 
of the Image Science & Analysis Laboratory, nasa Johnson Space Center).
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“reference” is referre, “to bring back”.32 If the schema is the point at 
which representation and observation meet in the feedback loop of 
perception, here we find that what has been brought back by 
the photograph is somehow incomplete or corrupt. The photograph 
has become a fraudulent “ready-made” whose feedback to the referent 
has been prematurely halted, effectively circumventing the productive 
process of imaginatively adding to an initial schema. Photographs 
of the Earth from space can never hope to provide a window on reality. 
The gap between what the astronaut knows and what the photograph 
presents will remain difficult to bridge. 
The success of “making and matching” a representation to an
observed object is dependent on the original choice of schema to 
be developed.33 Without some sort of initial schema there is nothing 
to go on with, nowhere to look. Through the process of drawing, 
Thomas attempted an on-site upgrade of his deficient, internal, 
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schema. Unfortunately, Thomas’s schematic upgrade was doomed to 
fail as, in order to draw, he resorted to working from video stills of 
the scene from out of the window. In doing so, Thomas was blind-
sided by the two-dimensionality of the image plane – seduced by its 
flat abstraction – and no modification of schemata could take place. 
Thomas once again failed to make contact with the referent and 
became perceptually trapped into looping back on the same deficient 
schema he had all along.34
Photographic images of our home planet from space may stand 
on shaky schematic ground but they are all we have got to go on. 
They add, ever so gradually, to our collective schema of the Earth, 
contributing to the construction of our inner vision of space. However, 
if we continue to fall prey to the prevailing belief in photography’s 
connection to the world, if we continue to see the world through 
the persuasive lens of pictorial representation, then we will be sorely 
disappointed. We must free the photograph of the Earth from space 
from its indexical responsibilities and begin the process of imagining 
an alternative. 
The Moon Considered as a Model, as a Photograph: 
Occlusion and Imagination
The problem of an obscure referent is not a new one. In the early 
days of photography it was difficult enough to picture what could be 
seen let alone what could not. Photographic technology in the 19th 
century was complex and required lengthy exposures to produce 
an image. Clumsy processes hindered the translation of reality to 
image, particularly in astronomy where the photographer needed to 
account for the subtle movement of celestial targets across the sky 
without the aid of automated tracking systems. This often resulted 
in blurry images that lacked detail and were thus only useful, in 
scientific terms, to an observer already well accustomed to the sight of 
the “real” object through the telescope.35 An extraordinary example 
of a “work-around” solution to this problem can be found in the 
lunar photography of Scottish engineer and accomplished amateur 
astronomer, James Nasmyth. In 1874 he published a book called The 
Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite.36 It contained 
extraordinary images of the Moon, that proved to be a curious blend 
of both knowledge and imagination (fig. 7). The crisp, clear and 
detailed images were produced after a process of careful telescopic 
observation and drawing combined with plaster modelling techniques 
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that Nasmyth had learned from his landscape-painter father. The 
intricate models of the lunar surface were then photographed in a 
manner intended to create the illusion that the moon depicted in 
the image was the same moon that Nasmyth had seen through the 
telescope. But of course, this is far from the case. Due to the technical 
difficulties mentioned above, Nasmyth could not provide the viewer 
with the perfect view of the Moon as he had seen it because the 
referent was occluded by the very process that sought to expose it. 
Instead, Nasmyth arrived at the clever solution of shifting the photo-
graph’s indexical relationship from the referent to its model. These 
complex images ask that the viewer do several things simultaneously. 
One is to accept the plaster model moon in place of the actual Moon, 
not merely to acknowledge the model as a stand in but to allow the 
viewer’s imagination to convince them of the model’s status as the real 
Moon. The success of this unspoken contractual arrangement between 
viewer and representation is aided by the fact that this representation 
is presented as a photograph, in particular, a 19th century photograph 
at a time in which the veracity of the photographic image was as yet 
unchallenged. Boosted by such faith in the photograph’s capacity 
to render reality truthfully, Nasmyth was able to ask the viewer to 
use their imagination to traverse the distance between the copy and 
the real. But, here lays a double deception with both model and 
photograph claiming an indexical relationship to a reality that quite 
simply remains out of sight. In this way, Nasmyth’s photographs 
of the lunar surface provide the viewer with a veritable “babushka 
doll” of indexical relationship: a Moon, inside a model, inside a 
photograph. The resulting photographs become the encoded presence 
of dual realities: the moon that Nasmyth saw through his telescope 
with his own eyes and the one that he asked us to forge within our 
imaginations, and which is truly more than the sum of its parts. 
Nasmyth’s curiosity about the Moon extended to its geological 
formation. In order to help describe the various processes that 
Nasmyth thought might have formed the lunar landscape his book 
included images such as the wrinkled back of a hand, a shrivelled 
apple, and a cracked glass orb (fig. 8). In this way, Nasmyth 
could ignite a chain of analogous, visual relationships within the 
imagination of the viewer and any indexical relationship between 
photograph and object is forced to take second place. It is upon this 
potentially infinite string of association, that the viewer constructs 
knowledge of the Moon, from a cracked glass orb to the cratered lunar 
surface. Any recourse to indexical relationships, in this case, would 
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Figure 7. Lunar craters as modelled and photographed by 
James Nasmyth, The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, 
and a Satellite, 1874 (second edition 1885).
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Figure 8. A photograph of a cracked glass orb as analogous reference 
to the geological forces that shaped the Moon, James Nasmyth, The Moon: 
Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite, 1874 (second edition 1885).
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be a meaningless transgression. Indeed, analogy – as Barbara Maria 
Stafford points out – is a process of connecting the disparate. 
It is the proportion or similarity that exists between two  
or more apparently dissimilar things: like the tensile harmony 
that Parmenides maintained fitted together fire and earth,  
or Empedocles believed conjoined love and hate, or Anaxagoras 
thought tied the visible to the invisible realm.37
Nasmyth thus takes his lead from Anaxagoras and reveals geological 
forces that we shall never see, via the photographic image of an 
everyday and accessible object. Our knowledge of the processes that 
shaped the lunar landscape is thus forged within the intermediary 
space of the imagination as it hops from image to image, from the seen 
to the unseen.
Mikael Pettersson has recently explored the relationship 
between the seen and the unseen, and the role the imagination plays 
in traversing the two, in relation to Richard Wollheim’s theory of 
pictorial “seeing-in”.38 According to Wollheim’s theory, we undergo 
a twofold perceptual process when we look at an image: we see the 
content/subject of the image but also the medium/surface in which it  
is presented.39 For example, when I look at Nasmyth’s cracked  
glass-orb, I see the orb itself but I simultaneously see that it is printed 
on paper. Because of this twofold process, we are not always able to 
say exactly “where” we see the picture. Pettersson takes this further in 
an exploration of how visual occlusion or quasi-occlusion within  
an image (for example, one object obscuring another, a cat with its  
tail behind) can lead to a non-localized experience of seeing-in or what 
he describes as a “non-localized pictorial experience”.40 By this, he  
means a perceptual experience that is “seen” in the non-locatable  
and intangible space of the imagination. In short, when an element of 
an image is occluded from our vision it is our imagination that fills  
in the gaps. 
However, let us take this proposition one step further again. 
What if we accept the photograph as a total visual occlusion? For 
Vilém Flusser, the photograph itself blinds us to that we wish to see, 
putting itself in front of the object. In his eyes, “technical images” 
such as photographs are not windows on reality, but ‘computed 
possibilities (models, projections onto the environment)’ that have 
no indexical relationship to the world.41 He refers to a kind of 
“programming imagination” (Einbildungskraft), one that is capable 
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of recognizing that, although ‘the last vestiges of materiality are 
attached to photographs, their value does not lie in the thing but in 
the information on their surface’.42 The examples I have examined 
thus far would seem to correlate such a proposal and espouse the 
concept of photograph as simultaneously an occlusion – to an a priori, 
external reality – and a threshold to an infinity of possible realities 
of the mind. Photographs ask that we accept their encoded surface in 
place of the real, diverting our line of sight and blocking access to the 
external reality we so desire. They simultaneously occlude what they 
present, literally arresting our gaze as we attempt to “see in” to the 
reality of the image. This occlusion forces us to internalize the image 
and thus render the world imaginable. Each image we encounter, 
each occlusion, adds to an internal mosaic of our subjective reality as 
imperfect and as incomplete as the 1968 image of Mercury.
Fragments, Torrents, Models
The contemporary experience of images – in particular, the 
photograph in all its diversity – is such that we have a myriad of 
images upon which to draw, in order to fill any gaps in our direct 
experience of the external world. Reality itself has become fragmented 
by pictorial duplication, dispersed amongst what Siegfried Kracauer 
once described as a “blizzard”, a blizzard that has now well and truly 
become a “torrent”.43 In order to see anything nearing a degree of 
totality or wholeness, we must adapt, casting aside our craving for 
the assurance of a concrete reality reinforced through the relentlessly 
monocular view of the traditional perspectival, isolated image. To 
truly perceive the unseen, we must discard our normative vision and 
trust in the eyes of the machine to provide, not a link to a traditional 
reality but the code – the fragments, the model – from which we are 
to build our own. By shifting the angle of our viewing, by bringing 
images together within our imaginations, we just might find that they 
can provide more than the sum of their parts. Just as two images 
taken from slightly different angles can be combined to realize a three-
dimensional image, so too can a more holistic “vision” of reality be 
achieved by the imbrication, layering, and interposing of images in the 
non-localized zone of the imagination. 
Photography is now as difficult to define as it is to contain; its 
practices are fluid and its physicality near to invisible. As the blizzard 
of the 1920s became the image torrent of today, a subtle shift occurred 
in how we use photography to relate to the external world. Artist 
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Penelope Umbrico recently went so far as to state that the ‘image 
torrent is actually alive, emergent and perhaps more indexical than 
photography has ever been in the past’, and that all images ‘function 
as a collective visual index of data that represents us – a constantly 
changing and spontaneous auto-portrait. The index has shifted 
from visually descriptive truth to accumulative visual data’.44 We 
now construct our concept of reality upon this accumulated visual 
data, each fragment of information scaled and aligned by the editing 
software of the imagination. 
We may never see Earth’s blue disc from space with our own eyes 
but we can construct our own perception of this, via a multitude of 
images presented to us in both print and electronic form. Personally, 
I have often wondered what it might have been like to be nasa 
astronaut John Glenn when, in 1962, he became the first American to 
orbit the Earth and the first human to take photographs of its surface. 
I wonder what aspects of the reality of that journey are not brought  
to me via the photographs and the films; what truths remain  
untold, what parts remain unseen in the gaps between the images.  
The photograph can no longer hold us with naïve realism; no longer 
tempt us with the seductive powers of positivism. Instead, the 
photograph reveals the world in a manner akin to the best form of 
striptease: always leaving something on, always covering what the eye 
desires and therefore leaving the rest up to our imaginations (fig. 9).
The photograph may bring us the world in pieces, but it is via the 
photograph that we are able to “imagine” ourselves into a broader 
field of reality. The photograph can only ever be a surface of code, 
a model – plaster moon or otherwise – a sketch, a non-finito, or a 
fragment. We add to this seductively incomplete rendering of reality 
with our own experience, drawing on existing schemata, other 
images, and visual impressions to construct an unseen reality within 
our minds. In some cases the foundations upon which we build 
these internal impressions may be shaky, our visual schemata may 
be lacking and this is a problem inherent in any concept of reality 
based solely upon the photograph. To use the parlance of space image 
processing: there will always be “data gaps” or “hot” or “dropped” 
pixels. However, it is in these inconsistencies, absences, and occlusions 
that we find the potential to see through the eyes of the machine in a 
truly imaginative and human way. 
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Figure 9. Astronaut John Glenn as photographed by a 16mm 
motion picture camera on board Friendship 7, 1962, (nasa).
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Introduction
In current architectural practice, visible traces of digital 
production represent a key trope, signifying technological 
advancement, and thereby historical progress. In James Bridle’s bang-
up-to-date formulation of the “new aesthetic”, the defining feature 
of the trend he identifies in design, architecture and imaging is ‘the 
eruption of the digital into the physical world’, the foregrounding of 
the material trace of computer generation via pixilation, artefacts 
or other signifiers.1 In the context of such a statement of faith in 
an unproblematic notion of progress, it is worth pointing out that 
probably as many projects exist which use digital construction and 
visualization technologies to reference historical architectural or 
cultural traditions. In both cases, such technologies could be argued 
The Spinning Index: Architectural Images and the 
Reversal of Causality
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to facilitate the production of signification as much as completed 
architectural structures. In this light, it is irrelevant as to whether a 
new, digitally facilitated construction project conforms to the  
“new aesthetic” or the “neo Georgian” – what is specifically “new” 
is the radical acceleration and streamlining of the chain linking 
concept, image and realization. The pixel is an artifact which emerges 
specifically from the realm of digital imaging, as opposed  
to construction.
It could be claimed that the digital revolution represents the 
final cutting loose of the mechanisms of production and distribution 
from local and social circumstances. Virilio’s argument, in Speed 
and Politics, is that it is precisely this speed which separates producer 
from consumer: digital practices accelerate the movement of capital 
and commodity beyond the speed of critique.2 In Virilio’s globally 
militarized society, production usurps the place of debate: a war 
machine needs to mobilize and fortify regardless of local opposition. 
Indeed, certain recent architectural structures arise with about as 
much local consultation as an army sequestering temporary barracks 
– the recent labelling of certain architectural agencies by Michael 
Speaks amongst others as evidential of a “new pragmatism” – such 
as the practices of Rem Koolhaas and Foreign Office Architects – is 
precisely in response to this will to build.3 In such cases, digital 
technologies are central to both the acceleration and complexity of 
processes of conceptualisation and realisation. Overwhelmed by the 
complex beauty of shiny new technologies Bridle views Koolhaas 
as an autonomous agent who constructs prominent symbols of an 
exciting stylistic trend, not the collective which collaborated with the 
government of Beijing to clear the long established and culturally vital 
Hutong districts to make way for the cctv building.4 Later, the links 
between militarisation and architectural fantasy will be explored in 
reference to specific projects.
Speed, of course, is a vector function which can be defined as 
movement through space over time. For Virilio ‘the speed of light does 
not merely transform the world. It becomes the world’.5 Extrapolating 
Virilio’s thesis, it is possible to claim that, in certain key circumstances, 
time can be said to move backwards, as if it is the pixel, not the 
quantum particle, which possesses the ability to move faster than the 
speed of light. 
This hypothesis – in relation to architectural as well as other 
forms of photographic imagery – is only viable if the digital image 
is considered to be an assemblage of both material and discursive 
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elements. If the image arrives at its intended destination ahead of the 
circumstances which the receiver, in consensus with others, considers 
to constitute its genesis, then time travel is achieved. In the case of the 
urban development of Kamengrad/Andricgrad, interrogated below,  
a digital construction pre-empts the resolution of a contested 
territorial claim in favour of one ethno-cultural group. In another 
example, that of a speculative residential project in London, complex 
digital renderings are deployed to signify a referent that is not yet 
there, in order to increase the likelihood of the project coming into 
existence. A critical perspective on such projects makes it theoretically 
possible to reverse the direction of the causal sequence which gives rise 
to the indexical sign. Such a paradoxical formulation of indexicality 
arises in relation to the generation of certainties – in the form of social 
consensus, market conditions or constructions of identity – in advance 
of their reification in the form of physical entities – images, buildings, 
states. Rosalind Krauss provides a succinct summary: ‘indexes 
establish their meaning along the axis of a physical relationship to 
their cause. They are the marks or traces of a particular cause, and 
that cause is the thing to which they refer.’ 6 The function of the 
trace, or the existence of things that appear to be traces, in the digital 
production of space, serves to indicate a point of agreement,  
a constructed truth.
In the following interrogation of such images, it becomes clear 
that, pace Virilio, the acceleration of production relative to critical 
attention is part of the function of the technologies deployed in their 
manufacture: their development and dissemination could be viewed as 
a form of de facto deregulation of planning and consultation processes 
by means of automation. Koolhaas’s structures in Beijing are a case 
in point. Furthermore, the development of new software/hardware 
assemblages which subsume visualization and construction processes 
on a single platform is indicative precisely of a new understanding 
of the role of reception in the process of production. The journey 
of building from desire, to model, to construction, and finally to 
occupancy, can finally be said to mechanize not only the processes of 
modeling and building, but also the positioning of the architectural 
structure as object of desire. In the process of spatial construction, 
taken as a whole, desire and reception are arguably the most 
important stages in a cyclical movement, as the following examples 
are intended to demonstrate.
As imaging and construction technologies advance, it similarly 
becomes possible and necessary to apply the tools of critical 
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enquiry through the entire process of construction. In a sense, the 
“imagification” of architecture, the notion that ‘architecture has 
now entered fully into the realm of the new communications and 
entertainment industries’ opens up the possibility of the deployment 
of critique derived from contextual examination of the image to all 
stages of the construction process.7
Time Travel on the Installment Plan: Highbury Stadium, London
It is not the development of the architectural mega-project which 
brings these issues into relief, but the multitude of smaller, speculative 
building projects which arose in the full heat of the property-
fuelled boom of the Noughties. It is in this historical context that 
the technologies in question were developed and refined, and their 
spread was not principally due to their uptake by specific high profile 
architects, but their dissemination amongst the global speculative 
construction industry. The true nature of the financial relationships 
underpinning this industry is outlined by, amongst others, Wouter 
Vanstiphout, who remarks on the relationship between speculative 
building in Dubai, and the alienated flow of capital, which can lead 
to speculative structures generating more money unoccupied than 
occupied – in which case, the building functions perfectly well as sign, 
entirely cut free from functions of occupancy or use.8 As Marshall 
Berman predicted, it becomes a pure unit of exchange value.9
As an example of the reception of such a building-as-sign, it is 
pertinent to begin with a speculative building project in London: 
the redevelopment of Highbury Stadium, formerly a football 
ground, retaining its form in the process of redevelopment – subject 
to conversion into dwelling units, and the famous pitch having 
undergone landscaping of a formal nature. The redevelopment process 
commenced in 2000, with the submission of a redevelopment plan to 
Islington Council, and the commissioning of developers Vision Four 
and architects Allies Morrison to oversee the project. The first of the 
units hit the market in October 2005, and 90% of apartments were 
pre-sold by 24th August 2008.10 The project was officially opened by 
Arsene Wenger, manager of Arsenal Football Club, on 24th September 
2009, the timeline of the project thereby bridging the crash of 
September 2008. The choice of a project which so neatly bridges this 
Rubicon would appear to be fortuitous (fig. 1). 
The Highbury development mobilises issues of multiple histories, 
the city as playspace and a curious rotation of the architectural gaze.
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Significantly, the development in question was originally conceived
as a site of spectacle. Looking at visualisations of the interior private 
garden which will take the place of the pitch, and to which the public 
will only be admitted by the retention of a right of way along one side, 
one can map a complex relationship of views. From each of the flats 
surrounding the pitch, owner-occupiers will be able to gaze over this 
view in a perverse reconfiguration of the panopticon. The importance 
of this central visual feature to the appearance – and hence the value 
– of this development depends upon preservation of the spectacular 
function of the pitch. Such a spectacle subsumes desire, self-projection, 
and identity in a complex mesh the psychology of which could be the 
subject of another paper. From the terraces formerly tribalised by 
fans, the new cadres of owner-occupiers survey their property in 
an architectural configuration that places itself and its inhabitants 
centre stage. It is like the set of Rear Window turned inside-out, 
only with the residents in doubt as to whether they have witnessed 
a murder, a goal or a rise in the market value of their investment. 
The communal experience of the stands has been replaced by the 
individual, sound-insulated living unit, and the crowd now watches 
itself with a peculiar narcissistic gaze.
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Figure 1: Rendering of the pitch at the Highbury Stadium development, which 
has been turned into a formal garden (designer: Christopher Bradley-Hole)
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As the new occupants move around the central garden, unless they 
slip into one of the carefully designed bowers which allow a degree 
of privacy (and which are modeled on Arsenal’s famous tactical 
maneuvers on the field of play by designer Christopher Bradley-Hole), 
they are fully under the gaze of their neighbours, who can presumably 
deduce the rising or falling value of their investment based on  
the kinds of people they identify. Residents take to the pitch as  
players, in the idiomatic sense of having had the nous to make a  
canny investment.
Unusually for an English residential property, for which the  
desire not to be overlooked is a key consideration, Highbury stages  
the act of overlooking and the condition of being overlooked by  
retaining the form and foregrounding the iconic status of the site.  
This cleverly elides negative connotations of intrusion and curtain-
twitching by preserving the spectacular function as a key element  
of the building’s form.
Tracing the Details
Exploring the techniques exploited by the producer of the renderings 
to create this impression of a possible reality, one key feature is  
the introduction of elements which are introduced after the  
form is finalised. Trees, people, commodities and other details are 
added which generate an impression of completion (fig. 2). 
The visualisation deploys an array of details, without which 
the image itself would fail to signify potential habitability. Even the 
clean lines of contemporary architecture and interior design need 
interruption and texture to function as traces (or in this case  
pre-traces) of occupancy. Such details stuff the image, deploying 
a version of the “reality effect” identified by Barthes in relation 
to literary form, by introducing the impression of plenitude from 
which each individual viewer can abstract his or her punctum.11 In 
this way, the image could indeed be regarded as a text, deploying 
as it does a specifically literary device. The viewer is acknowledged 
in the generation of fake chance events, features which have no 
structural function. In alignment with Barthes’ idea, such elements are 
deliberately introduced into the “text” so that the viewer receives  
the sign of indexicality, able to conceive either (a) that they are looking 
at a possible real photographic image – an image “stencilled off a  
future real”, or (b) that the developer hassuch confidence –  
and such competence – so as to have imagined every detail, to have
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already preconceived all of the elements necessary to produce a 
habitable space. 
The craft of the renderer is to create a simulacrum which is 
seamless – as is the conventional photographic image – but which 
allows for the substitution of the specific details introduced by the 
designer, with those arising from the desire of the potential purchaser. 
The viewer performs the operation of looking at an inhabited space 
and imagining it uninhabited. Paradoxically, the more the image 
exploits the appearance of the Real to generate interest and credibility, 
the more effectively the viewer can remove the traces of other 
(imaginary) people’s actions from the image and replace them with 
their own, in a digital version of the forms of “staging” performed by 
real estate agencies to create a simulacrum of habitation in advance 
of property viewings: lifestyle as theatre. 
The Pre-Trace & the Rotating Index
Digital imaging – and this category covers a range of technologies 
– is positioned somewhere between a depicted past and a projected 
future, but the rupture is not nearly so clear-cut. The causal chain of 
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Figure 2: Rendering of interior courtyard, with trees ‘flipped’ 180 degrees 
horizontally, Highbury Stadium development, London 2005.
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visual production dictates that one can never depict the future, only 
generate projections. The “reality” of the future has not yet come into 
being from which an image can be stenciled according to the accepted 
trajectory of indexicality. However, in the production of renderings of 
future architectural projects, digital technologies do depict the future 
as if it existed already.
The purpose of such images is wholly to mobilise investment and 
assent for construction of the properties depicted, by the deployment 
of both form and content. They are designed to appeal to specific 
identifiable audiences: investors, purchasers, local authorities and 
media, for whom the issue of credibility – a truth function – is central, 
if differently inflected in each case.
It is possible to claim that in constructing an appearance of an 
existing lived reality, which previously arose from the camera’s re-
presentation of the trace of past circumstances, it has now become 
possible to speak of the trace of future events. With regard to 
property as commodity, the more believable such projected forms, 
the more capital may be invested, and the more likely it is that the 
depicted building will be constructed. Notwithstanding questions of 
transparent or deceptive intentions on the part of developer, architect 
or image-maker, an excess of signification becomes directly linked 
to the eventual existence of the building in that the more realistic it 
appears, the more likely it is to become reality.
Cross Platform, Crossing Causalities
One key aspect of these new technologies is their ability to merge 
on a single platform formerly distinct processes of architectural 
construction – imaging, costing, analysis and construction.  
Tor Lindstrand, in an interview by Heather Ring, remarks that  
‘[the spreadsheet software package] Excel has had a greater impact 
on contemporary architecture than Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid and 
Frank O. Gehry have managed together’.12 Later in the same  
article, he enlarges on this point: ‘the representation of objects as  
we see them and their measured description, two tasks that  
are conventionally distinguished in architectural drawing, will  
be shown to have been unwittingly, and in many respects mutually 
determined and transformed’.13 The functions of recording, 
representing and projecting, once specific technical domains 
(perspective drawing, writing, engineering drawing), are  
now subsumed in one operation. For Vilém Flusser, this was already 
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implicit in the development of photographic technology: 
all apparatuses (not just computers) are calculating machines 
[…] the camera included, even if their inventors were not able 
to account for this. In all apparatuses (including the camera), 
thinking in numbers overrides linear, historical thinking.14
Via Flusser, it is possible to observe that it is digital photography 
which ultimately reifies the core program of photographic practices, 
as if the supercession of analogue technology by digital was the mere 
stripping away of superfluous and restrictive elements, allowing 
mechanisms of exchange, mediation and bureaucratisation to fully 
realize themselves.
In ‘Visualization and Cognition, Drawing Things Together’,  
Bruno Latour restores focus to the media in which scientific  
observations are recorded: means of inscription, charts, data,  
projective geometry, and industrial drawing.15 The ability to record 
multiple registers and fields of activity on paper or other portable  
media confers agency on those with the ability to interpret them.  
Latour considers two functions of the document: recording and  
projection. Beginning in the apparently closed world of the laboratory, 
in which recording media function as means of transcribing the  
outcomes of causal processes – evidence which is temporally anterior – 
he moves on to means of visualisation: engineering drawing,  
projective geometry and economic forecasting.16 On the flat surface  
of the page, all these fields of operation come together: 
Industrial drawing not only creates a paper world that can be 
manipulated as if in three dimensions. It also creates a common 
place for many other inscriptions to come together; margins  
of tolerance can be inscribed on the drawing, the drawing can 
be used for economic calculation, or for defining the tasks to be 
made, or for organizing the repairs and the sales.17
Latour questions the supposed objectivity of laboratory processes 
by insisting on the primacy of the record: in his early writing, which 
radically remodels scientific method, he argues that experimental 
design and its results become significant only in relation to  
the situations in which they are deployed – the evidence emerging 
from the lab is taken as proof, and the supposed objectivity 
and repeatability of natural processes (the notion of which is a 
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development of the enlightenment split between “nature” and 
“society”) becomes the Modern equivalent of the absolute authority of 
religious faith and the divine right of the monarch.18 
The truth function of the photographic has its germination at this 
point. The camera itself could be described as a little laboratory, in 
which an experiment is endlessly repeated and its viability confirmed. 
Barthes himself is well aware of how, for photography to generate its 
specific force, one has to possess knowledge of the technical processes 
which give rise to the photograph. ‘The first man, who saw the first 
photograph, (if we except Niepce, who made it) must have thought it 
was a painting.’ 19 The difference between Niepce and this imaginary 
spectator is, of course, knowledge of the process by which the image is 
generated, the knowledge of which generates its referential power.
For Latour, ‘a present day laboratory may still be defined as 
the unique place where a text is made to comment on things which 
are all present in it.’ 20 By extension, such a text could indeed take 
the form of a positive review in an architectural journal, a contract 
or an entry on an accountant’s spreadsheet, which in its turn could 
lead to future construction. This gives a contrary spin to Flusser’s 
notion that a camera is a direct product, and the photographic image 
an indirect product, of scientific texts.21 For photographic theory 
after Latour, (or indeed Deleuze) anything definable as a product is 
simply an assemblage located within a circulating network of forces, 
some able to be described as “material”, some as “social”. In such a 
circulating system, the accepted order of causality is scrambled, and 
the continuous restless redrawing of the network is a function of 
the forces that animate it from inside and outside. The accretion of 
previously distinct processes of building design and construction on a 
single prototyping platform merely represents the coming-to-maturity 
of such an assemblage. The “product” which is the contemporary 
software package capable of conflating these functions – Autodesk, 
Rhinoceros 3D amongst others – represents a new “thing”, similar 
to a “camera”, or a “stunning loft apartment”: it gains the ability to 
signify in and of itself, and it acquires agency. 
·A Flag the Size of the Territory: Kamengrad
The final image interrogated here is taken from the published 
renderings of a project initiated by Sarajevo-born film director Emir 
(now Nemanja) Kusturica, on a peninsular location in the city of 
Višegrad.22 Višegrad is located in the Serbian controlled territory 
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known as Republika Srpska, which was established as one of the two 
entities of the newly partitioned Bosnia after the signing of the us/
eu brokered General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at Dayton in 1995. The partition is purely administrative 
– Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a single state, albeit with a porous 
internal set of borders separating the previously warring self-identified 
ethno-cultural groups into their respectively cleansed zones.
Kamengrad is significant for a number of reasons: it brings the 
thread relating to the war machine full circle – for Virilio, the territo-
rial struggles in the Balkans represent signal examples of the symbiotic 
development of information and military technology.23 In describing 
the alignment of American propaganda, military power and control  
of information infrastructure in the Kosovo conflict, Virilio uses  
the terms “total cinema” and “total dramaturgy” – describing a  
cycle of psychological preparation via propaganda, the pursuit of  
conflict by the deployment of sophisticated aerial weaponry, and the  
control of the dissemination of images of the conflict itself.24 The 
Kamengrad project achieves these goals simultaneously – it functions 
as propaganda, it territorializes (and as we see later, demolishes),  
and feeds its own representations back into the global field of  
image exchange. 
Kamengrad also presents a further twist in the notion of reverse 
causality. If the deployment of signs of the photographic in the 
marketing of residential developments generates capital in the form of 
pre-sales, thus making the project more likely to become concrete, the 
renderings of Kamengrad perform a similar operation by keying into 
notions of statehood, the self-identification of a nation aligned to a 
geographical location, and the importance of traces of past habitation 
in a territory subject to the violent displacement of people over a long 
period. In Kamengrad technology is deployed to territoralize and 
reify a “state”, a reverse operation to the radical deterritorialization 
described by Virilio.
Bojan Aleksov writes tellingly of the construction of nationalist 
monuments in Belgrade, focusing on the construction/reconstruction 
of the Serbian Orthodox church of St. Sava, in the district known as 
Englesovac.25 The church was substantially designed in 1930 in a style 
described as “Serbo-Byzantine”, but has endured a tortuous process 
of interrupted construction, falling prey to economic, political and 
military circumstances. As Aleksov outlines, “Serbo-Byzantine”  
is essentially a pastiche of medieval ecclesiastical styles, referencing 
existing churches in Serbia, but also importantly in Kosovo.26 
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Architectural form is thus deployed to underline a territorial claim.  
In Kamengrad, Kusturica is constructing a church with similar 
referents: ‘at the place where the small river connects to the big river, 
you have a kind of church that will be designed as if it was made in the 
Kosovo region 700 years ago.’ 27
Aleksov remarks how Serbian writer and poet Matija Bec´kovic´ 
recycled a well known communist era motto in support of the project – 
“We are not building the Church, the Church is building us”: 
Few remembered that some forty years earlier communist 
propagandists used the same motto in mobilizing the youth to 
volunteer their labor in the reconstruction and industrialization 
of the country. Their version was: “we are not building the 
railway, the railway is building us”.28
The building exists as idea in order to generate assent and confer 
a sense of identity. In the case of Kamengrad, the function of the 
rendering is to generate the sense of a fait accompli, a sign of a pre-
sign. When Aleksov’s article was published, in 2003, the St. Sava 
church project had stalled due to economic circumstances in Serbia 
proper – and at the time of writing it is still partially unfinished.  
This paper therefore represents a pertinent (and thorough) critique  
of a building that has had a longer and more significant existence  
as idea than as bricks and mortar. 
On June 18th 2011, the Serbian festival of Vidovdan, Kusturica, 
internationally acclaimed film director (Underground, Black Cat 
White Cat, The Time of the Gypsies), laid the first stone for the 
construction of Andricgrad, which also possesses the alternative name 
of Kamengrad (Stone City). This development project is intended to 
form the backdrop for a future film based on the novel The Bridge on 
the Drina, by Ivo Andric´, Nobel Prize winner and former resident of 
Višegrad. The project will be funded to the tune of 15 million Euros by 
the government of Serbia proper, with contributions from Kusturica 
himself, and the government of Republika Srpska.29 The funding 
of the project is controversial at a time when a huge section of the 
populations of both Serbia and Bosnia are living in dire poverty, but 
has also been criticized for allegedly transgressing local regulations 
relating to procurement.30 Digital renditions of the new city quarter 
show a church, a museum dedicated to Andric´, and the reconstruction 
of a 16th century town square which will form the backdrop to the 
movie. Kusturica has a track record in the creation of ethno-villages 
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in the construction of the wooden town of Kustendorf, also known 
as Drvengrad (“wooden city”), on the border of Serbia and Bosnia. 
The winner of the Phillippe Rothier Architecture Award in 2005, 
Drvengrad hosts an annual film festival, and served as the backdrop to 
Kusturica’s 2004 film Zivot je Cudo (“Life is a Miracle”).
Kamengrad is projected to come to completion in 2014 in a 
location which in recent history has been the site of bloody territorial 
struggle. In the turmoil of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the town 
of Višegrad and its surrounds was subjected to a program of ethnic 
cleansing by Bosnian Serb forces and paramilitaries, amongst them 
the notorious White Eagles, led by Milan Lukic´, who was convicted in 
2009 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(icty) in the Hague.31 Over the course of 1992, more than 3000 men, 
women and children were killed. Significantly, on Vidovdan 1992, 60 
people were burnt alive in a house in Pionirska Street, by paramilitary 
fighters under the command of Lukic´. Serb paramilitaries are recorded 
as having cut the throats of local residents and dumped their bodies 
over the parapet of the famous Mehmet Pasha Sokolivic´ Bridge,  
the town’s most famous landmark, and a unesco designated heritage 
site.32 Over the course of the attack, the Muslim population of 
Višegrad was virtually eliminated by murder or expulsion, and both 
the town’s mosques were destroyed. A town which was once ethnically 
mixed, with a 60% Muslim population, is now almost wholly 
composed of those who would define themselves as Serb, and remains 
so to this day – those who were expelled have not returned, despite 
the restoration of some traces of the city’s Muslim heritage, and the 
return of a very small number of former residents. Though the icty 
has stopped short of using the term genocide, the events represent one 
of the most clearly identifiable acts of ethic cleansing in the history of 
the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.
However, this is not the history that Kusturica is hoping 
to commemorate in his new “city”, but the city of Višegrad as 
immortalized in Ivo Andric´’s nobel prize winning novel. The identity 
of Andric´ in relation to current Balkan formulations of ethnicity is 
contested: throughout his life he lived in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, 
and his novels chronicle the mixed ethnic and cultural history of 
the region. Milorad Dodik, president of the entity of Republika 
Srpska, at the unveiling of a statue to Andric´ in the construction 
site of Kamengrad on 28 June 2012, stated ‘This stone town should 
change the image of the whole municipality [of Višegrad] but also 
send a clear message that Serbian people do not want to give up on 
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their great men.’ 33 Kusturica and Dodik’s efforts to claim Andric´ as a 
Serbian celebrity, and locate his memorial within Republika Srpska, 
simultaneously identifies Andric´ as a part of Serbian heritage, and 
endows Republika Srpska with the ability to confer such an honour. 
Essentially, the act of monumentalizing Andric´ is mutually reinforcing.
Kusturica’s published statements appear to make a claim 
for Kamengrad as ‘a city of peace and tolerance’,34 and yet in 
uncritically enlisting the financial support and endorsement 
of the governing entities and figures of Republika Srpska – in 
particular its controversially nationalist president Dodik – prove 
the opposite, by promoting the continued existence of an ethnic 
enclave which was formed by the violent expulsion of its Muslim 
population. In the absence of a thorough process of reconciliation 
and reparation, Republika Srpska could be said to represent the 
fulfilment of nationalist plans for an ethnic Serb state in Bosnia. 
The commencement of construction on June 28th 2011 – Vidovdan 
– is interpreted by both sectors of the community as a clear act 
of triumphalism: the chosen date is loaded, grimly pitting the 
commemoration of one set of victims of violence – the Serbs killed at 
the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, who are commemorated annually 
at Vidovdan – against another, victims of ethnic cleansing in Višegrad 
in 1992. To the outside world, this is just a stone laying ceremony. 
Locally, it is deeply symbolic. 
Contemporaneous with the publication of the Kamengrad 
renderings, local controversy erupted regarding the erection of a 
monument to Muslim victims of ethnic violence at Višegrad. The 
erection of the monument by organisations including Bosnian ngo 
Cupria (“Bridge”) and Women, Victims of War was the catalyst for 
a legal action brought by local Serbian community organisations 
over the use of the word “genocide” on the monument, a case which 
found against the defendants, but which is under appeal.35 Since the 
inauguration of the monument in May 2011 it has been vandalized 
by the erasure of the word “genocide” with white sticky tape. It is 
significant to contrast the qualified but mainly positive international 
reception which greeted Kusturica and Dodik’s announcement,  
with the lack of global reporting of these events. But then cenotaphs 
never were a big feature of the entertainment industry.
In Višegrad, the origin of stone is significant. An online 
tourist guide to the town coolly recommends a visit to the newly 
reconstructed Emperor Mosque, yet claims that, as ‘the original 
materials (Biggar stone) were not used in the reconstruction, […] the 
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mosque lost its original architectural value.’ 36 Architectural integrity 
is in the eye of the beholder. Kusturica’s original construction plan 
for Kamengrad involved the appropriation of stone from historical 
military monuments in Trebinje, remnants of the presence of Austro 
Hungarian forces in the time of empire. The process was under way, 
including the demolition of parts of the fortress, until his actions 
generated sufficient controversy amongst local residents.37 Here, the 
destruction of traces of one historical narrative and the construction 
of another relate directly to the obfuscatory processes of digital 
construction. The provenance of the stone used in the construction of 
Kamengrad is not factored into the operations of the machine, but it is 
very much in the mind of its maker.
The notion of architectural form itself can be said to refer to an 
ideal physical state that a given structure will always aspire to, an 
ideal to which its condition under the effects of use or circumstances 
can be related, and that reconstruction will attempt to re-form. In 
relation to the image, M. Christine Boyer describes how:
pictures and traditional architectural arrangements have come 
to be the standard by which many contemporary cityscapes 
are judged. Even though the city constructed in reality out of 
heterogeneous fragments and fortuitous juxtapositions is in 
fact alien to such formal and orderly scenery, the traditionalist 
conceives of this regulated re-presentation as an ideal return  
to the original, claiming that this replication of place  
is a fantastic duplication and perfect modeling of traditional 
compositional forms.38 
Such stylistic reconstructions in no way represent the city’s actual 
form – the city post-occupancy, hacked about, adapted and detourned 
by its occupants. As in the state architecture of Albert Speer, buildings 
constructed according to the primacy of form over occupancy fit 
into the category of the pre-ruin. In Speer’s theory of ruin value, the 
architecture of a state deploys constructional principles – the use 
of stone being one – in order to decay aesthetically, anticipating its 
discovery in ruined form.39 The digital “form” of Kamengrad could 
be said to be a representation of a future pre-ruin. Kamengrad’s 
renderings are distinct from the photographs that will be produced of 
the site once construction is complete: they represent a proposal for a 
self-identified state’s future remembrance of it’s past – a constructive 
program for generating reminiscences untroubled by any complex 
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questions or dark passages. It is as if to say ‘in the future, we will 
remember our past like this’.
In Kamengrad, the “reality effect” of the rendering plays its part, 
demonstrative of the will to build masquerading as the will to rebuild. 
The renderings are transmitted worldwide, and as with conventional 
photographic images wrenched from their context, the human 
narrative within which they come into being is elided, characteristic of 
the function of the reproduction of the image-without-text to obscure 
political history, as described by Barthes.40 The absence of which  
they so tellingly speak – through the centrality of an Orthodox church 
to the layout of the site, the absence of balanced signifiers of a strong 
Muslim heritage, is legible only to those who know, or know of,  
the previous multi-ethnic, heterogeneous form of the city of which 
this cleansed digital construction represents a true ruin.41 Vanstiphout 
remarks on how the absence of a minaret can be as significant as the 
presence of one: 
If it is true, as in Rotterdam for example, that the minaret of a 
mosque can be the focus of such a huge political effort to ban 
them, then the way that buildings look does have a political 
relevance. If people look at minarets in a political way, just as 
they look at the absence of minarets in a political way, then 
they look in a political way.42
There are no visible minarets in any of the published renderings of 
Kamengrad. Vanstiphout’s argument foregrounds the importance of 
the politics of visuality in architecture and planning. With regard to 
the context of reception – looking – the photograph, the rendering,  
are as political as the photojournalistic image. In full awareness  
of the context of their production, the renderings of Kamengrad are  
as genuinely chilling as anything a war photographer could produce.  
It no longer matters whether the representation of human suffering 
features an identifiable human subject – human history can be read as 
powerfully from the architectural image.
Photographic representation can be claimed to both represent 
and anticipate form, whether it be photographic (the trace) or digital 
(the trace in reverse). The development of new digital assemblages 
challenges critical practice to reconsider the longstanding alignment 
of photography with representations of an existing reality, in relation 
to the status of the photographic message as a projection of desire. 
Barthes’ Camera Lucida includes a single architectural image: Charles 
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Clifford’s photograph of the Alhambra, Grenada, produced between 
1854-1856. The represented building features ‘crumbling Arab  
decoration’ – the Alhambra being, of course, the formerly Moorish 
district of Grenada. From this image, Barthes takes a desire to dwell: 
‘it is quite simply there that I should like to live’.43 However, he goes 
on to state that, ‘looking at these landscapes of predilection, it is as if 
I were certain of having been there or going there’.44 Photography of 
place, for Barthes, brings about both past and future certainties. The 
rendering appropriates this function of the photographic message, and 
renders it a function of will.
Conclusion: the Absent Centre.
My prime critical tool has been the interrogation of computer generat-
ed images in the light of various configurations of indexicality, some 
straightforward, some perverse. If indexicality is the key property of 
the photographic image that enables it to embody a truth function – 
its role as proof, as trace – then the photography-like images produced 
by digital prototyping technologies manifest the semblance of certain-
ty as the root of a similar form of truth function. If one can say ‘in 
this projected building, all algorithms support its structurally integrity, 
its construction appears to be cost effective, and audience/market re-
sponses to the visualisations are positive’, then, by virtue of uncritical 
acceptance of its machinic origins, it comes to embody a form of truth. 
Consensus thereby proves the most important outcome of the three 
functions of the digital modelling process – structural integrity, cost, 
and market/social reception. 
Margaret Olin, exploring anomalies regarding Barthes’ use of 
photographs in Camera Lucida, makes strong claims for the primacy 
of reception over production: 
the most significant indexical power of the photograph may […] 
lie not in the relation between the photograph and its subject, 
but in the relationship between the photograph and its beholder, 
or user, in what I would like to call a “performative index” or 
“index of identification”.45
Olin contrasts the primal scene of photography, as it were, in  
which an image is germinated within the camera, with ‘another, 
equally important moment, the moment of identification.’ 46 She 
undertakes a subtle analysis of how many of Barthes’ photographs 
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in Camera Lucida are indexical of an absent referent: it would seem 
that the identification of a punctum in many of the images is cut 
loose from the actual trace of the identified object in the photograph 
in question: that which moves the viewer (Barthes) is not actually 
there. The necklace, ‘a slender ribbon of braided gold’, that apparently 
transfixes him in his viewing of James Van der Zee’s 1926 family 
portrait, is seen on inspection to be a pearl necklace.47 However,  
Olin argues that this does not necessarily subvert the indexical status 
of the photographic image. It is the power of what Olin calls  
the “index of identification” that prompts him to identify with details 
which may be absent. 
Camera Lucida contains many such paradoxes and elisions – such 
complexity reinforces its power as a critical text. The absent centre of 
the contemporary photographic assemblage underlines the significance 
of a discourse of absence that runs through the whole history of 
photography. In the projects under discussion here, that absence 
takes specific form – the absence of a guarantee of stable economic 
value with regard to the speculative building industry, and the 
forced absence of a section of the population of Višegrad against the 
background of the absence of recognised statehood. Each absence is 
legible from the rendering under examination, against the operations 
of an indexical link that reifies a contrary presence by the deployment 
of the machine and its apparent truth function. 
Here, Olin’s critique supports Latour’s reconfiguration of the 
operations of the laboratory: it could be argued that scientific method, 
and by extension technological processes, have as their primary 
function the generation of assent, through processes of identification. 
Their intended outcome is not the experimental result, or in the case 
of the camera the image, but the effects of such an assemblage:  
the uncritical perpetuation and acceleration of cycles of production 
and reception. 
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Photographs as “Living Images”
In his book What Do Pictures Want, William J. Mitchell tries to 
break away from the perception of an image as an object.1 He sees the 
image as an entity with a life of its own:
Images are like living organisms; living organisms are best 
described as things that have desires […] Therefore, the 
question of what pictures want is inevitable.2
Mitchell proposes relating to pictures as to living entities with needs, 
which we should try to relate to on their own terms. Thus, reference 
to them should derive from the unique character of the spaces in 
which they operate and from the historical contexts latent in them, 
The Image as a Networked Interface: 
The Textualization of the Photographic Image
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from learning the meaning of their continuing life and their possible 
effect and attempting to enquire into the unique voice emerging  
from them. 
The suggestion that we attribute a subjectivity of their own 
to living images, as opposed to examining them according to the 
meanings they create, can be seen as sequential to thought rooted in 
the theories of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and later, in the works of 
other theoreticians such as Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Luc Nancy, who 
sought to relate to a work of art using the question of its “being”.3 
The image, according to them, has its own being that is not derived 
from the object it represents. It is not a copy or an imitation of 
something external to it; it is an autonomous entity in its own right. 
But at the same time, the existence of the image is always linked to 
the fact that it is observed by an external subject. The visibility of the 
image is inherent in its unique visuality and is embedded in the ways 
it is looked at. I will relate to the photographic image as a “living 
image” and show the substantial impact of digital technologies on 
the way photographs “function” and “come to life”. In addition, with 
reference to Mitchell’s suggestion that we see the particular visibility 
of an image as the source of its “life”, I will suggest that its “life” 
stems, in many respects, from methods of distribution and accessibility 
via Internet and cellular communication platforms that are based on 
textual mechanisms. These mechanisms are embedded within the 
pictorial information of the image and inherent in it. I will present 
the “life” of the photographic image in the context of perceiving it as 
an entity existing in a network in which economic, political, cultural 
and social factors largely influence its visibility. I will show, how in 
different contexts, photographic images become interfaces for a wide 
range of information, much wider than presented on their surfaces.4 
Although Mitchell is one of the key representatives of the “pictorial 
turn” in cultural studies, I will suggest seeing textualization as a 
key factor in the “living” attribute of the photograph as analyzed 
by him. The living mechanism of the photograph in the digital age 
is essentially linked to procedures of textualization derived from the 
unique characteristics of photography’s new apparatuses and from  
the mechanisms of making those photographs visible.
Textualization and visibility mechanisms include many aspects 
which present a variety of means of “granting life” to the image. I 
shall begin with an example of a photograph that appeared in Israeli 
media on the day Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit returned after more than 
five years in captivity in Gaza. It represents one of the most touching 
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moments during the release, as Gilad and his father are reunited while 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu watches from the sidelines (fig. 
1). The photo was published by the Governmental Advertising Bureau 
and appeared on the front pages of the newspapers and websites that 
covered the event in Israel. It was part of a government campaign, 
during the return of Shalit, presenting Prime Minister Netanyahu as a 
responsible and authoritative leader. One can regard this photograph 
as a part of the mechanism used by the state to establish its power, 
as demonstrated by Althusser in his essay ‘Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses’.5 Althusser points out that ideology, which is the 
basis of state power, always rests on a “big Other” and grows around 
it, while the other subjects are defined in relation to it and receive 
their subjectivity from it. Ideological apparatuses include media 
organizations such as the press (whether state controlled or otherwise), 
and function most effectively when their workings are “silent”,  
when their political message is passed off as simple fact. However, 
the attempt to depict Netanyahu as a “big Other” in this photograph 
failed to remain a disguised message and responses were soon  
to come.
The new means of image distribution led to dozens, if not 
more, of satirical meme versions of the original photo shortly after 
it was published. They were distributed using social networks, 
smart phones and email. The consumer of images having access to 
relevant databases strengthens the potential possibility to implement 
what is referred to by Roland Barthes as the recalcitrant and anti-
authoritarian nature embedded in them.6 In a spoof of the movie 
Forrest Gump, Netanyahu’s image was planted into pictures that were 
taken from a visual database, available on the Internet, of historical 
cultural and political events which have played a significant role in 
the construction of a shared Israeli identity. At a later stage, this series 
of photos evolved into a more complex dialogue offering a reflexive 
reading not only of the specific situation of the original photo, but of 
the photographic act itself. This could be seen, for example, in the 
use of a photograph that had triggered a great public uproar in Israel 
about a year before the release of the captive soldier.7 It showed a 
soldier having her picture taken with Palestinian detainees whom she 
has been assigned to guard. The picture was publicly revealed after 
being published in her Facebook album where she proudly presented it 
as a source of personal empowerment. The meme using his image  
(fig. 2) relates to Netanyahu’s explicit awareness of the power of media 
in general, and photography in particular. 
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Figure 1. Moshe Milner (photographer) Israeli Government Press Office, 2011.
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Figure 2. Eden Abergil, Roni Brot. Bibi Gump, http://room404.net/?attachment_id=45642
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In response to the series of images distributed on the net, Netanyahu 
published an image in his Facebook album. In this image he is seen 
observing his own speech at the session regarding the foundation of 
a Palestinian state in the un General Assembly a few months earlier, 
a speech for which he was even praised by his rivals, not only for his 
rhetorical capabilities, but also for his mastering of the television 
medium – for being aware of the power of the photographic image.
For Mitchell, the image always precedes the word, evading 
complete explanation and often ascribing an idea or a concept 
before existing vocabulary is able to contain it and create any kind 
of expression in language for the image. Despite the fact that the 
memes I have related to are, for the most part, not accompanied by 
any text, their ironic dimension is a direct outcome of the existence 
of an implicit text concealed in the original photograph of Netanyahu 
observing the reunification between father and son. The “life” of 
the images in the context in which they appear can be seen as being 
derived, first and foremost, from the resistance of the recipients 
to receiving the requested “translation” of the image into verbal 
language. The source of this resistance is in the identification of the 
visual mechanisms which have been directed towards a reading of the 
photographic text as one which can clearly be seen as propaganda.8 
The implicit text in the original photograph could be seen as 
constituting a kind of direct translation, whereas the transformation 
of the photograph to meme images can be read as an attempt to shift 
the mechanism of translation from dealing with the representative 
aspect of the photograph with the various components presented  
in it, to dealing with the meanings derived from the photographic 
syntax which is being used. In this way, meaning is given to  
the contents of the photograph in the wide contexts of its method of 
creation and distribution. 
The dialogue which is created in the back-and-forth movement 
formed between the meme image and the source images can also 
be viewed on the basis of an important distinction indicated by 
Rosalind Kraus in her article ‘Photography’s Discursive Spaces’.9 The 
article demonstrates how the same image, which was photographed 
at Pyramid Lake in Nevada, functions at first appearance as a 
photographic model of quiet and mysterious beauty, while its 
lithographic copy appears as a formalistic representation lacking 
inspiration. Kraus argues that the reason for this lies in the fact that 
the two images serve different purposes, and thus, they represent 
two different discursive regimes.10 If we relate this to the picture of 
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Gilad Shalit’s return home, the aim of the picture was to unify two 
regimes of discourse – the personal-emotional and the political – in 
which the picture was meant to exist, in a kind of dual convergence 
between subject and ideology as explained by Althusser. By use of the 
meme, these two discursive regimes are separated from one another, 
so that the discourse becomes a satirical political text, while being 
completely severed from the emotional elements which were at the 
centre of the discursive regime to which the picture was related at 
its source. The ability to create an illustration of this text repeatedly 
and in a renewed manner, through a variety of images, retains the 
meanings of the textuality of the images in their different versions. But 
at the same time, it creates a new syntax of visual text, constituting 
a basis for its repetition, which then intensifies the satiric element 
lying at the basis of the “vitality” of the image. The memes to which 
I have referred are, as noted, based on mechanisms of textualization 
which are a function of the closed text-image relations of propaganda. 
However, beyond the translation mechanisms that I have pointed 
out, it is important to note that a central and significant component 
in the “living” mechanisms of the photograph, which constitute the 
basis of the cited memes, is their availability on the Internet and on 
web-based and cellular platforms of distribution. The availability of 
images on the basis of which the memes were prepared, and the speed 
of their creation and distribution, constitutes a significant element in 
their viral character and contributes to the variety of versions which 
developed from the source photograph. If Mitchell relates to the 
conditions of image existence, we could say that time becomes an 
essential component in the life of an image. Photographic images have 
never functioned in empty space, but the age of Internet and cellular 
devices has enabled minimal reaction time from the moment of image 
reception to its distribution in its renewed version, and this affects 
the character of the dialogue between the creators of images and their 
recipients, who are able to devise a variety of interpretations of the 
photographed text.11
The Photograph and the Database Apparatus – Photography  
and the Big Picture 
The digital era proposes a fundamental change with regard to the 
interface between mechanisms of photographic life and new systems 
of textualization. Both Marshall McLuhan and Vilem Flusser, to 
whom I will relate at length later on, viewed the photographic 
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medium as heralding an age of information and a telematic 
society, even in its analogical period. McLuhan, in his seminal 
text Understanding Media, writes that the photograph plays an 
important part in the transfer from mechanical industrialization to 
a graphic era of the electronic man.12 While Flusser, writing 20 years 
after McLuhan, maintains that technical images are a completely 
new type of media, and despite the fact that in many respects they 
remind one of traditional images, they can definitely be viewed as 
a cultural revolution.13 Several years later, Lev Manovich continues 
this line, based on knowledge of the innovative means posed by 
digital technologies, and argues for a direct association between 
the photographic medium and databases, predicting that this link 
portends a significant paradigmatic change. 
In his 1998 article ‘Data-Base as a Symbolic Form’, Manovich 
argues that the main characteristic of the digital era is a fundamental 
change which he views primarily as a transition from the paradigm of 
linear perspective (on which the principle of Camera Obscura is based) 
to the perspective of databases.14 The database functions not only 
as a cultural structure that changes its appearance with innovations 
in technology, but also as an expression of new cultural conditions. 
Databases represent the essence of the digital era because they are 
perceived as a way of thought, and not only as vessels for information 
preservation. In his book The Language of New Media Manovich 
points to the parallel development of media technologies, starting 
with photography, and progressing to information technologies based 
on computerized systems.15 As these technologies maturate, they 
converge into a single technology via the computer. Manovich marks 
two central points in time for this linkage. The first dates from the 
1830s with the invention of photography and Babbage’s development 
of the analytical engine. The second marks the invention of the 
motion picture in the 1890s, only a few years after Hollerith’s data 
processing machine was built and used by the American government 
for a population census. The linkage between these technologies today 
is reflected not only in technological devices that can perform both 
functions simultaneously, but rather in their integration, as embodied 
in various new Google applications. This link places the visual in new 
territories and has deep cultural implications.
 In her book, On Photography, Susan Sontag points out the 
double function of the photographic medium.16 Her premise,  
that anything within our world can serve as camera material, is based 
on two essential ways that cameras define reality for an advanced 
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industrialized society: as a spectacle for the masses, and as an object 
of surveillance for sovereigns (by building photographic databases). 
Sontag’s argument is completely relevant in the post-capitalist era, 
in which surveillance exists not only in the context of authority but 
expands its boundaries to include giant corporations that control 
the information expanse. This is explicit in the genealogy of Google, 
but it is valid as well for Facebook, Microsoft and others. In the 
following section, I will refer mainly to recent applications developed 
by Google and to artistic reactions to them. The examples I present 
will demonstrate the novel ways that new photographic apparatuses, 
which are related to the concept of the database, redefine the 
photographic image. 
The creations of photography-based databases are at the core 
of Google’s current activity. The firm, which started off writing 
algorithms for textual search engines in the virtual world, has 
become a company deeply invested in developing and producing 
photographic techniques and practices in the actual world. As the 
Google Earth project focused on mapping Earth through existing 
satellite technologies, Google Street View moved on to building 
physical “vision machines”, which were also used as the platform for 
the Google Art Project.17 The mission Google set for itself in the  
visual context is to represent space by producing the “big picture”  
of the world, a representation that can be perceived as “Big Optics”.18 
Google presents a new kind of space takeover on a global scale.  
The ability to present space using the medium of photography has 
become an instrument for Google to deepen its control over global 
databases and strengthen its economic, and therefore its cultural  
and political power. 
 The “vision machines” built by Google over the last few years 
distinctly exemplify the assertion made by Vilém Flusser. As early as 
the 1980s, Flusser rejected the perception of the act of photographing 
as representation, and instead argued that it was a conceptual action 
which essentially consisted of decoding and re-encoding reality. In  
his book Towards a Philosophy of Photography he argued that, rather 
than perceiving the photographic apparatus as a tool or machine 
which affects the physical activity of the user by simulating an action, 
we should understand it as having a symbolic function, and as such 
producing a simulation of thought.19 Its purpose is to influence  
the way we perceive the world, by enabling the creation of images 
that relate to reality, within the predetermined norms and parameters 
and the possible permutations. Flusser’s perception of the semiotics 
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of photography, more than creating “traces” of what is real, defines 
the processing achieved with the apparatus, in whose framework the 
translation of the visual phenomenon into signs takes place. Thus, 
the apparatus serves as a means of providing meaning. ‘It is not what 
is shown in a technical image but rather the technical image itself 
that is the message.’ 20 So images, whose source are technical via the 
apparatus, serve as projections directed outside – and therefore they 
can play a significant critical role.
Because technical images are projections […] they must be 
decoded not as representations of things out in the world 
but as signposts directed outward. It is their projector, their 
program that is the object of criticism. What technical images 
show, depends on which direction they are pointing. That is to 
say, their significance is their meaning. In their case, the two 
coincide. The semantic and the pragmatic dimensions of the 
technical image are identical.21
Flusser wrote this text referring to the photographic apparatus 
without having been able to predict the future development of digital 
technologies and their effect on the realm of photography, as we are 
witnessing at present. Nevertheless, in an analysis of platforms for 
visual presentation of photographic reality developed by Google, the 
distinction made by Flusser is fundamental. 
Analyzing the new Google photographic apparatuses, it can be 
argued that these apparatuses – by photographing and representing 
space – reconstruct this space and create visions of second, third  
and fourth order that mediate and influence the way it is represented: 
the driverless cars that are equipped with automatic vision 
mechanisms; the multiple camera “photographic machines” that 
enable 360 degrees of vision; software that integrates photographs 
taken by different cameras; and a set of symbols and textual 
representation for navigating in the photographed space that interfaces 
with other visual and textual representation systems of the same space, 
and with Google’s general database. In this context, photographic 
images do not function autonomously, but rather constitute an 
integral part of one reservoir of data in which the text and the image 
function as different levels within a complex structure of data. 
A good method to examine the meanings of the use of Google’s 
new photographic tools is to have a look at the critical projects 
that have been created by various artists which play on or respond 
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to these meanings. Indeed, we have recently witnessed how artists 
relate to the new spaces of Google Earth and Google Street View: 
Among these projects are Jon Rafman’s Nine Eyes, in which he tries 
to find frames that refer to photographic genres from the field of 
artistic photography; A Series of Unfortunate Events by Michael 
Wolf; and No Man’s Land by Mishka Henner which presents a 
series of photographs of call-girls in different places in the world; In 
this context, I relate to two art works which focus on the symbolic 
function of the Google photographic apparatus. One is Ariel Caine’s 
After the Bechers based on photos taken by the apparatus of Google 
Earth, and the second is Street Ghosts by Paolo Cirio, which refers 
to Google Street View’s inclusion of coincidental pedestrians in their 
visual databases. 
Using Google Earth, Ariel Caine presents photographs taken of 
industrial buildings that were previously documented by Bernd and 
Hilla Becher as part of their typological research.22 In these works, 
we clearly view the ways that meanings of the image derive primarily 
from the specific use of the photographic apparatus. In general, the 
new mechanisms of vision which are supplied by the Google Earth 
application enable an overview whose visual representations in 
culture exist primarily in relation to virtual reality – it is a view that 
almost does not exist in relation to “reality” as it is reflected in what 
we see before us in our daily lives. Viewing structures from above, 
presents the perspective used in architectural plans which form the 
language used by urban planners, architects and interior decorators to 
organize the space they mould and which they control. Caine’s choice 
of images is in contrast to the typological process defined by the 
Bechers, who used a street-level perspective to photograph the façades 
of architectural structures – the industrial structures which operated 
during the First and Second World Wars in Germany – which were 
taken out of their physical context by the photographs that isolated 
them from their external environment. In place of the horizontal and 
categorized view which tries to order existing knowledge, as proposed 
by the Bechers, Ariel Caine presents an overview, reflecting expanding 
boundaries of knowledge beyond the limits of the photographed 
object. In this manner, the factories are presented by means of satellite 
photographs used by Google, in relation to the geographical spaces 
in which they are located and operate. Thus, they are presented as 
part of a larger system of the post-industrial world in which the new 
methods of vision in their real and virtual contexts serve as central 
components in a new productive economy. However, like the Bechers,  
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Figure 3. Cooling Tower, Duisburg-Bruckhausen, Germany, 2009.
Pigment Print on Archival Paper, 175cm x 110cm.
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Figure 4. Consolidation Collinery, Gelsenkirchen, Germany, 
2011. Pigment Print on Archival Paper, 181cm x 105cm.
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who adopted the tactic of fragmentation in creating a series which 
includes discrete elements fulfilling a predetermined typological 
logic, Caine creates fragmentation whose source is in the restrictions 
of the photographic apparatus set up by Google. In order to create 
visibility of the sites as existing in a high quality photograph printed 
with high resolution, he has disassembled the chosen frame to 
hundreds of smaller frames and using a picture processing program, 
he has combined them in a way which has created the representation 
of a spatial sequence. The continuum of consciousness achieved 
in the Becher’s work using cataloguing methodologies, has been 
converted into a creation of sequencing which is meant to respond 
to a functional need. However, simultaneously, it demonstrates the 
meanings derived from the use of new photographic apparatuses that 
dictate the ways in which the real world is mediated through them. 
An additional work which arouses interest in the context of 
Flusser’s argument is the work of Paolo Cirio, Street Ghosts. In this 
work, Cirio pasted posters of people who had been photographed 
by the cameras of the Google Street View project in public spaces in 
New York, London and Berlin. The posters of low resolution images, 
returned the photographed subjects to the same locations in real 
space in which they had been originally photographed. However, the 
pasted images in public spaces were not exact reproductions of what 
appeared in the Google application. They had undergone processing 
which blurred their entire bodies, creating an image which looks  
like a human shadow. ‘These images do not offer details, but the 
blurred colors and lines on the posters give a gauzy, spectral aspect 
to the human figures, unveiling their presence like a digital shadow 
haunting the real world.’ 23
Cirio’s work protests against the way in which the photographic 
apparatus expropriates the right to privacy of those who are 
photographed in the project. The blurring of the faces of the 
photographed individuals alludes to a social/ethical code safeguarded 
by international regulation which requires that Google blur faces  
with special algorithms which have been written for that purpose. 
Paolo Cirio protests the distinction made by the lawmakers between  
the face of the individual and his/her body, a distinction which in his 
opinion is hypocritical: an individual can also be identified by the  
rest of his/her body, by the clothes s/he wears or his/her hair.24 The 
ability to identify a person is made possible for anyone, which creates 
a potential for invading someone else’s private space. Cirio explains 
that the motivation for this work derives from the desire to 
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re-contextualize not only data, but also a conflict. He defines his work 
as an installation taking place on what he terms a “battlefield” where 
a war is taking place between private and public interests over control 
of privacy and personal habit, and in whose framework individuals 
become victims of the struggle over ownership of information.25 In 
reaction to the way the company operates without taking the trouble 
to receive express permission from the photographed persons for 
inclusion of their images in the framework of the project, he uses these 
images without receiving permission from Google. He defines the 
work as a war for control in which the strong, in his words, are the 
victors and in this victory is the power to affect the design of relations 
between the private and the public in our living space.26 In this work, 
he investigates the question of who has power: Is it the artists, the 
giant companies, the legal system, the public or is it the power of 
technology? The photographed images, in his view, are entities which 
serve as a reconfiguration of informational power, and they are 
agents in the struggle resulting from the new possibilities posed by the 
apparatus which enable these images to exist. Like the work of Caine, 
this work also demonstrates that the types of life of a photograph stem 
from the unique character of the spaces within which they operate on 
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Photography and Textualization
I contended above that there was a process in which a new form 
of textualization of the photographic image was created. I will 
expand on this process in what follows. I also maintain that this new 
direction, coming from the association between photographs and 
databases, and from the specifications latent in the apparatuses of 
digital cameras, requires renewed thought about the characterization 
of relations between text and image, as well as about the relevance of 
the determination, expressed saliently by Mitchell, of the totality of 
the visual turn relative to the linguistic turn which preceded it.
 Walter Benjamin was one of the first to assume a theoretical 
foundation for the photographic medium, in the first half of the 
twentieth century. In many ways, his approach to translation may 
be considered a basis for the analysis of the relations between the 
photographic image and text, as they are manifested in the realm of 
new technologies of photography and information. The photograph, 
argued Benjamin, needs a text to accompany it. The relation between 
them could be limited to that of similarity but, as with a translation 
between one language and another, it should not necessarily aspire to
this. They do not exist in a relationship of mediation with the aim of 
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transmitting “an utterance” from one language to another, but rather 
are present in a state in which both serve as source and translation, 
and they can be identified as ‘making both the original and the 
translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as 
fragments are part of a vessel.’ 27
It is not necessary for the text to decode the photograph and to 
transmit what it is saying. That could harm the “deliverability” of the 
photograph. The role of the text is rather to “broaden” the source in 
a way that will not supply ready-made interpretations accompanying 
its appearance and its distribution. It should aspire to simulate a way 
of directing towards the intended meaning of the photograph, as if it 
is a text written from within it. Therefore, the text does not transmit 
content, facts or statements of certainty, but rather something else 
which can be viewed as a difference or as a remainder which is created 
in the transmission and in the struggle between the mediums of 
photography and writing.28 This determination by Benjamin should be 
seen in relation to his general argument with regard to photography. 
In his view, what makes this medium so meaningful is not a unique 
result of the technical procedures on which it is constructed but rather 
of the historical, political, social and legal circumstances in which it 
was created. In the opening paragraphs of his article ‘A Short History 
of Photography’, Benjamin presents a symptomatic approach in his 
analysis of the invention of photography. He views photography as 
an entanglement of cultural, scientific, political and economic factors, 
and not as the sole cause of what came in its wake. Indeed, the 
invention led to significant changes in the possibilities for the existence 
of modern man which were expressed in their modes of action 
and their points of view.29 He argues that, since the development 
of photography as a significant medium, not only is it present in 
everything but it also supplies the conditions for the appearance of 
other things.
In digital photographic platforms, textual information is 
automatically embedded in every photograph saved on the memory 
card of the camera, and this constitutes an inseparable component of 
the Exchangeable image file format (Exif) photo data. In addition to 
colour values of the pixels which compose picture files, wide textual 
information is included with regard to various parameters of the 
photograph as documented by the camera apparatus at the time of the 
shooting itself. These parameters include inter alia, the geographic 
location based on gps, the time the picture was taken, the name of 
the picture, the file format, the camera model and its specifications, 
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the type of lens, and the parameters connected to the time of 
exposure, the width of the lens, the speed of the aperture adjuster 
and others.30 When feeding photographs into databases additional 
data may be added which is not received automatically as part of 
the act of photographing itself. This includes information about the 
photographer, copyrights, and free text describing the picture  
and the context in which it was photographed. This is in addition to 
the systems of categorization and tagging which grant the photograph 
additional meanings beyond the preliminary information assigned 
to it. Textual information of the picture is of great significance to 
the way in which this image is “located” in the databases and in the 
contexts constructed as a result between the picture and the additional 
components of the database. However, no less importantly, it also 
constitutes a central element in the ability of the photograph to be 
retrieved after its insertion in the database and the resulting future 
contexts which may be produced with regard to it. 
In semiotic terms, one can regard the pictorial databases 
as a textual structure that contains visual documents. Naming, 
categorizing, and tagging systems that are attached to the visual 
documents, or alternatively, computerized vision and artificial 
intelligence systems, are all based on applying textual mechanisms 
(algorithms) to the image. Much has been written about the 
significance of the formulation method of the Google search 
algorithm, regarding the visibility level of certain sites as opposed to 
others (meaning the level of their precedence as search results), and 
about the implications of the manipulative measures used to promote 
sites.31 Google’s search engine is built according to a certain network 
structurality, on which a website’s connectivity level is based. There is 
not necessarily a connection between a site’s visibility and its cultural 
relevance or values. What gives specific websites preference over others 
often depends to a large extent on economic and political factors.
Jacques Rancière points to the connection between visibility and 
politics. He offers tools of thought to deal with the modified meaning 
of the photographic act in an era of significant change regarding 
the visibility of images.32 Relating to aesthetic space, he argues that 
nowadays when discussing an image, one cannot relate only to the 
mechanisms with which an individual spectator perceives it, but 
should examine it in a much wider context, derived from the new 
means of image creation, distribution, preservation and accessibility. 
Politics revolves around ‘what is seen and what can be said about  
it, around what has the ability to see and the talent to speak’.33  
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On the other hand, he asserts, words do not merely prescribe what 
the images should do as a narrative doctrine; they have the ability 
to execute political actions. They stipulate the “sensory division” by 
becoming images.34
In Rancière’s opinion, the image no longer exists as a category 
because the distance required to differentiate between an image and 
reality has been lost. Therefore, one should think of images in terms of 
the actions they perform. Representation has always been controlled 
by rules about what is and what is not representable. However, 
the future of images appears to be a regime in which nothing 
is unrepresentable. This is not to say that images or reality will 
disappear. It only signifies a new kind of “imageness”. And indeed, 
the availability of digital cameras and the quality of the photography 
options in smart phones and pocket cameras substantially influence 
the meanings derived from photography. In today’s world, in which 
everything seems to be being photographed, the basic practices of 
making images visible change significantly and become dependent on 
storing and mining data in the public and private information space. 
The visibility (and invisibility) referred to by Rancière can be directly 
connected to database politics. Representation has lost significance.  
It is what enables the image’s visibility that is now significant. 
The idea that “everything is becoming photographed” can be seen 
as another expression of the fixation of the “visual turn” in culture. 
This is evident in the work of theoreticians such as Guy Debord, 
Martin Jay, Jonathan Crary and William J. Mitchell who coined 
the term. Central to this turn is the spatialization of information, 
which we have been witnessing in recent years, as in Google’s space 
visualization applications. In these applications, the mechanisms 
for navigating in the representations of visual space are based on a 
clear and homogeneous system of signs that apply to the represented 
space a spatial logic that is suitable for computer screens, tablets or 
smart phones. Google’s projects, which create a visual representation 
of space, can be seen as an alternative for its textual interfaces, and 
thus as an intensification of this tendency. But at the same time, one 
can see this as the beginning of its inversion, which can be perceived 
according to Manovich’s argument regarding the replacement of 
the linear perspective paradigm with the database paradigm, which 
I referred to above. This change leads to a situation in which the 
spatial interface of the database applies semiotic structures, based 
on a textual reading of the visual representation system of the space, 
and thus re-textualizes the photographic image in which the space 
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is represented. The “vision machines” built by Google are aimed at 
turning the space into an information interface that intersects with its 
parallel information organizing platforms. This mapping process is 
executed using visual means, but it simultaneously acts as a definite 
semiotic system that “returns” linguistic dimensions to the space.  
In the Google Art Project, this manoeuvre acquires additional aspects. 
The images documented in the project are transformed – not only into 
digital photographs, but into something that is closer to text. At the 
core of the Google Art Project stands a deconstructive apparatus  
that encourages the visitor to fragmentize space by dividing it into its 
basic elements, and to reorganize it independently as a simulation of 
the curatorial practice that it enables.
 Making the visual visible by a process of textualization intensifies 
as picture identification applications and artificial intelligence evolve, 
and the result is the sophistication of tagging and cataloguing systems. 
In this context, I would like to comment briefly about the Instagram 
application, which supposedly contradicts this trend as it is based 
on communication through images, (not necessarily relying on an 
accompanying text or tagging system). In my opinion, phenomena  
like Instagram can be explained in an analogy to Žižek’s claim  
that the return to the real by means of its virtualization constitutes 
the loss of touch with the real. Instagram’s popularity can arguably 
be seen, inter alia, as a reaction to the phenomenon of image 
textualization becoming rooted in an age of networked databases. 
The communicative act in Instagram is essentially based on images 
(despite its tagging attributions), but at the same time it produces 
visual manipulation that can be perceived as another text. This text 
is not disguised; it produces some kind of an estrangement in regard 
to photographing as an act of representation. The purchase of this 
application by Facebook exemplifies my fundamental argument 
regarding the new status of the photographic image as the networked 
interface in a meta-data space, which allows complex visibility 
through diverse processes of textualization. 
The textualization mechanisms undergone by the images 
stored on a cloud, can be seen as mechanisms of contextualization 
in real time, enabling the simultaneous existence of different 
fields of discourse. These processes involve both the creators of 
the photographs and their recipients in the creation of dynamic 
interpretation mechanisms, in which political, social, cultural 
and economic meanings are subordinate to the possibilities and 
limitations of the storage and retrieval platforms from which they 
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derive. In this way, a process takes place in which personal contexts 
are expressed along with wider collective ones, which may lead to 
a focus on ideological struggles, differing world-views or different 
frames of reference. This to claim that there is an external interpretive 
system based on photography, but rather that dynamic systems are 
assimilated in the way that digital photography is framed, and in 
the systems within which images are stored. Considered in a digital 
context, the lack of separation between text and photographed image 
which Benjamin referred to is structural, and this is what enables the 
vitality of the image proposed by Mitchell.
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C o d a
In a book concerned with contemporary photography – or indeed any 
photography – one might have initially wondered at the minimalist 
approach we adopted in terms of the actual showing of an image.  
This has not been because of a dearth in the quality of selection, for 
which we have been spoiled for choice and for which the best are  
foreground in the second book of this ahrc series, The Incomplete 
Image: Photography in the Age of Thinking Machines. Moreover,  
it is not due to the, often all too predictable, tendency to privilege  
academic writing over the artwork itself, in a bid to give the latter a 
certain kind of gravitas whilst simultaneously embedding the former 
with a certain kind of “street-cred”. Nor for that matter were we 
trying to move rapidly away from the, also rather predictable, use 
of image as though it could act as an “example” of some abstract 
debating point; or conversely to have a concept staged or represented 
(somehow) by the image. 
It is rather that, in the wake of digital transformation, with 
its multi-mobile media image-making, image-taking and image 
dissemination, the very notion of what it means to be “visual” and 
with it, what it means to “see” is radically disfigured, troubled, 
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unhinged. With On the Verge of Photography, the artists, 
philosophers, cultural technologists and designers have immersed 
ourselves in the drawing boards of science and of life for another  
re-think, another revision, of “image/imaging” and the multiplicity  
of its being pictured, here, now. 
Yes, this includes the modest photo/graph of those initial image 
pioneers of the early 19th century. But we find, also, that the usual 
suspects associated with photography – the very act of witnessing, the 
neat capturing of a history of the past or of a present, or, of any time 
and place, alongside the question of perception/observation/vantage 
point/punctum; indeed, the very question of truth not to mention what 
remains in the realm of the human/social “eye” – all run into difficulty 
as the newly entrenched variables of a post-industrialised/ quantum 
mechanics world come to the fore. These variables include, though are 
not limited to surface-screen ana-materialisms, neither “virtual” nor 
“real”. They include the sensuous life and times – one could say, fractal 
embodiments – of light, speed, energy, intensity and mass. 
Which leads us to another, somewhat curious set of truths about 
photography in the 21st century: that beauty, taste, indeed image 
itself no longer rests in the eye of the beholder; it is the beholder, 
a composite verge of multiversal and networked entanglements. 
Suddenly photography and the metaphysics to which it has clung for 
so long, gets a whole, new, deeply troubling, facelift.
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On the Verge of Photography
I m a g i n g  B e y o n d  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n
On The Verge of Photography: Imaging Beyond Representation
is a provocative and bold rethinking of photography in light of  
the digital transformation and its impact on fine art, culture  
and society. Addressing the centrality of the digital image to our  
contemporary life, the fourteen new essays in this collection  
challenge the traditional categories of photographic theory – that  
of representation, evidence, documentation and the archive –  
and offer a fresh approach to its impact on aesthetics, contemporary 
philosophy and the political.  Drawing on the networked human 
condition of embodiment, social-media, and bio-politics, On the 
Verge of Photography offers an invaluable resource for students  
of visual culture, researchers in the field of digital imaging and artists 
working with new media.
Reading this extraordinary book it becomes clear that so much  
of what we knew or thought we knew about photography is  
at one and the same time accurate and obsolete. With digital  
photography the image can no longer be discussed or defined for 
what it is conventionally assumed to be – a distinct visual unit.
This is not a crisis, claim the editors of this timely volume, but  
an opportunity to step away from the representational terminology 
that has over-determined the discourse of photography in order  
to address the image’s actual modes of being and becoming:  
being digitally-born, constantly transmitted, mutated and shared.
When images are“digitally networked” they cannot be isolated  
and viewed as distinct or unique. This book is a must read  
for anyone who shares with the authors collected in it an urge to  
acknowledge the contemporary image as a kind of living organism 
that intervenes in the world we share not only by and through  
the ways we share them.
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